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Abstract
As the cloud computing paradigm has gained prominence, the need for verifiable com-
putation has grown urgent. Protocols for verifiable computation enable a weak client to
outsource difficult computations to a powerful, but untrusted, server. These protocols pro-
vide the client with a (probabilistic) guarantee that the server performed the requested
computations correctly, without requiring the client to perform the computations herself.
Surprisingly powerful protocols for verifying outsourced computations were discovered
within the computer science theory community in the 1980s and 1990s, in the form of inter-
active proofs and their brethren. However, these protocols were considered to be primarily
of theoretical interest, far too inefficient for actual deployment. This thesis seeks to overturn
this viewpoint.
We make progress along two interrelated directions. The first seeks to render interactive
proofs suitable for applications involving massive data. To this end, we introduce two new
computational models, dubbed streaming interactive proofs and annotated data streams. In
these models, a streaming algorithm (modeling a cloud computing user lacking the resources
to store the massive input locally) makes a single pass over an adversarially-ordered input,
which is also observed by a powerful but untrusted prover (modeling a cloud computing
service). Afterward, the prover sends the user the answer to queries about the stream, and
proves that the answers are correct. Our study of these models reveals a rich theory, and we
give protocols achieving essentially optimal tradeoffs between proof length and the verifier’s
iii
space usage for a variety of significant problems.
The second direction revisits some of the most powerful protocols in the theory literature
and substantially improves their efficiency. Specifically, we describe a refinement of a powerful
general-purpose interactive proof protocol originally due to Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum
(2008). Our refinements reduce the runtime of the prover in this protocol from Ω(S3) to
O(S logS), where S is the size of an arithmetic circuit computing the function of interest.
We also show how to further reduce the prover’s runtime for computations that are sufficiently
structured, including arbitrary data parallel computation. We complement our analysis with
implementations that demonstrate the genuine scalability of our protocols.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
Protocols for verifiable computation enable a computationally weak verifier V to oﬄoad
computations to a powerful but untrusted prover P . These protocols aim to provide the
verifier with a guarantee that the prover performed the requested computations correctly,
without requiring the verifier to perform the computations herself.
Surprisingly powerful protocols for verifiable computation were discovered within the
computer science theory community several decades ago, in the form of interactive proofs and
their brethren: interactive arguments and probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs). In these
protocols, the prover P solves a problem using her (possibly vast) computational resources,
and tells V the answer. P and V then have a conversation, i.e., they engage in a randomized
protocol involving the exchange of one or more messages. During this conversation, P ’s goal
is to convince V that the answer is correct.
More precisely, any protocol for verifiable computation must satisfy two properties. The
first is called completeness ; this property roughly requires that an honest prover will be able
to convince the verifier that the claimed answer is correct. The second property is called
soundness ; this property roughly requires that if the claimed answer is incorrect, then the
verifier will reject the answer with high probability no matter what the prover says to try
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to convince her otherwise. In the case of interactive proofs, soundness must hold against
computationally unbounded provers.
Results quantifying the power of interactive proofs, interactive arguments, and PCPs
represent some of the most celebrated results in all of computational complexity theory, but
until recently they were considered primarily of theoretical interest, far too inefficient for
actual deployment.
However, the surging popularity of cloud computing has brought renewed interest in pos-
itive applications of protocols for verifiable computation. A typical motivating scenario is as
follows. A business – call it ArthurSystems – processes billions or trillions of transactions a
day. The volume is sufficiently high that ArthurSystems cannot or will not store and pro-
cess the transactions on its own. Instead, it oﬄoads the processing to a commercial cloud
computing service – call it MerlinSystems. The oﬄoading of any computation raises issues
of trust. ArthurSystems may be concerned about relatively benign errors: perhaps Merlin-
Systems dropped some of the transactions, executed a buggy algorithm, or experienced an
uncorrected hardware fault. Alternatively, ArthurSystems may be more cautious and fear
that MerlinSystems is deliberately deceptive or has been externally compromised. Either
way, each time ArthurSystems poses a query to MerlinSystems, it may demand that Merlin-
Systems provide not only the answer but also some proof that the returned answer is correct.
This is precisely what protocols for verifiable computation accomplish, with MerlinSystems
acting as the prover in the protocol, and ArthurSystems acting as the verifier.
This thesis describes progress toward achieving protocols for verifiable computation that
are efficient enough for use in the real world. All of our results hold in variants of the
interactive proofs model, meaning they are secure even against computationally unbounded
cheating provers.
2
Structure of this thesis
• Chapter 2 introduces the standard interactive proofs model, discusses seminal work in
the area, and reviews prior work that forms the foundation of this thesis, including the
well-known sum-check protocol of Lund, Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [77].
• Chapter 3 introduces the annotated data streams model. In this setting, a computa-
tionally weak verifier (modeling ArthurSystems in the scenario of the Introduction),
who lacks the resources to store the entire input locally, is given access to a power-
ful but untrusted prover (modeling the cloud computing service). The verifier must
execute within the confines of the restrictive data streaming paradigm, i.e., it must
process the input sequentially in whatever order it arrives, using space that is substan-
tially sublinear in the total size of the input. The prover is allowed to annotate the
data stream as it is read, with the goal of convincing the verifier of the correct answer.
The streaming restriction for the verifier fits the cloud computing setting well, as the
verifier’s streaming pass over the input can occur while uploading data to the cloud.
In this chapter, we present annotated data streaming protocols achieving non-trivial
tradeoffs between the amount of annotation used and the space required to verify
it. We also prove lower bounds on such tradeoffs, often nearly matching the upper
bounds, via notions related to Merlin-Arthur communication complexity. Our anno-
tated data streaming protocols, as well as our lower bounds, cover classic data stream
problems such as selection and frequency moments, and fundamental graph problems
such as triangle-freeness and connectivity. Finally, this chapter describes how to ex-
ploit sophisticated Fast Fourier Transform algorithms to ensure that the prover in our
protocols runs quickly, as well as experimental results demonstrating scalability.
• While many of the protocols of Chapter 3 are optimal, such optimality holds only for
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streams whose length is commensurate with the size of the data universe. In contrast,
many real-world data sets are relatively sparse, including graphs that contain only
o(n2) edges, and IP traffic streams that contain much fewer than the total number
of possible IP addresses, 2128 in IPv6. In Chapter 4, we describe protocols that allow
both the annotation and the space usage to be sublinear in the total number of stream
updates rather than the size of the data universe. On the other hand, we give a lower
bound that, for the first time, rules out smooth tradeoffs between annotation and space
usage for a specific problem.
• Chapter 5 describes background on the powerful general-purpose interactive proof pro-
tocol due to Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [57].
• Chapter 6 introduces the model of streaming interactive proofs, which extends the
annotated data streams model to allow for multiple rounds of interaction between
the prover and verifier. This chapter presents some preliminary results on streaming
interactive proofs, and in particular reveals an exponential separation between the
annotated data stream and streaming interactive proofs models.
• Chapter 7 revisits Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum’s general-purpose interactive proof
protocol (henceforth GKR protocol), and shows how to reduce the runtime of the prover
from Ω(S3) to O(S logS), where S is the size of an arithmetic circuit computing the
function of interest. This chapter also describes a full implementation of the proto-
col, demonstrating much greater scalability than one might have expected. Finally, we
describe a parallel implementation of the protocol that leverages Graphics Process-
ing Units (GPUs), and experimentally demonstrate the GKR protocol’s substantial
amenability to parallelization.
• Chapter 8 describes further refinements and extensions of the GKR protocol. A major
4
message of this chapter is that the more structure that exists in a computation, the
more efficiently it can be verified, and that this structure exists in many real-world
computations. Our first refinement applies to circuits whose wiring pattern is suffi-
ciently “regular”; for these circuits, we bring the runtime of the prover down from
O(S logS) as achieved in Chapter 7 to O(S). That is, our prover can evaluate the
circuit with a guarantee of correctness, while suffering only a constant-factor blowup
in work compared to evaluating the circuit without any guarantee. We argue that
our refinements capture a large class of circuits, and complement our theoretical re-
sults with experiments on problems such as matrix multiplication and determining the
number of distinct elements in a data stream. Experimentally, our refinements yield
a prover that is less than 10x slower than a C++ program that simply evaluates the
circuit. Leveraging similar techniques, we also describe a protocol targeted at general
data parallel computation. Compared to prior work, this protocol can more efficiently
verify complicated computations as long as the computation is applied independently
to many different pieces of data. Finally, we describe a special-purpose protocol for
matrix multiplication that is of interest in its own right.
• Chapter 9 concludes, by comparing the approach to verifiable computation taken in
this thesis to several parallel lines of work, and describing some important directions
for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Preliminaries
This chapter introduces the standard interactive proofs model, elaborates on seminal
work in the area, and reviews prior work that forms the foundation of this thesis. The main
technical tools upon which we draw in subsequent chapters are the well-known sum-check
protocol of Lund, Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [77] (introduced in this chapter), and the
powerful general-purpose interactive proof protocol due to Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum
[57] (introduced in Chapter 5).
2.1 Interactive Proofs
We give here a standard definition of interactive proofs.
Definition 2.1.1. An interactive proof system for a language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ consists of a
probabilistic polynomial time verifier V and a prover P who are given a common input x ∈
{0, 1}n. P and V exchange a sequence of messages to produce a transcript t = (V(r),P)(x),
where r denotes V ’s internal randomness. After the transcript is produced, V decides whether
to output accept or reject based on r, t, and x. We denote by out(V , x, r,P) the output of
verifier V on input x given prover strategy P and that V ’s internal randomness is equal to r.
6
We say the interactive proof system has completeness error δc and soundness error δs if
the following two properties hold.
1. (Completeness) There exists a prover strategy P such that for every x ∈ L,
Pr[out(V , x, r,P) = accept] ≥ 1− δc.
2. (Soundness) For every x /∈ L and every prover strategy P ′, Pr[out(V , x, r,P ′) =
accept] ≤ δs.
We say interactive proof system is valid if δc, δs ≤ 1/3. The complexity class IP is the
class of all languages possessing valid interactive proof systems.
If V and P exchange at most m messages for every pair (x, r), we refer to dm/2e as the
round complexity of the interactive proof system.
Several clarifying remarks are in order. First, notice that the soundness requirement in
Definition 2.1.1 is required to hold even against computationally unbounded provers P ′.
Second, Definition 2.1.1 implicitly assumes that the total number of messages exchanged by
P and V is poly(n), as V must run in poly(n) time over the entire course of the interaction.
Third, notice that in an interactive proof system, V ’s randomness is internal, and in particular
is not visible to the prover.
Interactive proofs were introduced in 1985 by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [58]. At the
same conference, Babai [9] independently introduced the Arthur-Merlin class hierarchy, which
captures constant-round interactive proof systems, with the additional requirement that the
verifier’s randomness is public – that is, visible to the prover. Goldwasser and Sipser [59]
subsequently proved that any constant-round private coin interactive proof system can be
simulated by a constant-round public coin system.
See the chapter by Arora and Barak [8, Chapter 8] for an excellent overview of founda-
tional work on interactive proofs.
7
2.1.1 On Interactive Proofs for Languages Versus Functions
Given a language L, let fL(x) = 1 if x ∈ L and fL(x) = 0 otherwise. Notice that Definition
2.1.1 requires that if fL(x) = 1 then there is some prover that will cause the verifier to accept
with high probability, and if fL(x) = 0 then there is no such prover. In particular, for x 6∈ L,
Definition 2.1.1 does not require there to be a “convincing proof” of the fact that fL(x) = 0.
Later in this thesis, we will consider interactive proofs for non-Boolean valued functions
f , and we will typically give protocols that allow the the prover to convince the verifier of the
value of f(x) for all x. Equivalently, we will give interactive proof systems for the language
Lf = {(x, y) : y = f(x)}.
2.2 Schwartz-Zippel Lemma
Throughout this thesis, we will frequently make use of the following basic property of
polynomials. This lemma is commonly known as the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [88,109].
Lemma 2.2.1. Let F be any field, and let f : Fm → F be a nonzero polynomial of total
degree at most d. Then on any finite set S ⊆ F,
Pr
x←Sm
[f(x) = 0] ≤ d/|S|.
In words, if x is chosen uniformly at random from Sm, then the probability that f(x) = 0 is
at most d/|S|. In particular, any two distinct polynomials of total degree at most d can agree
on at most d/|S| fraction of points in Sm.
2.3 Sum-Check Protocol
The sum-check protocol of Lund, Fortnow, Karloff, and Nisan [77] underlies many of the
results of this thesis. We present what is now the standard variant of this protocol.
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Suppose we are given a v-variate polynomial g defined over a finite field F. The purpose
of the sum-check protocol is to compute the sum:
H :=
∑
b1∈{0,1}
∑
b2∈{0,1}
· · ·
∑
bv∈{0,1}
g(b1, . . . , bv).
In applications, this sum will be over a very large number of terms, so the verifier will not
have the resources to compute the sum on her own. Instead, she uses the sum-check protocol
to force the prover to compute the sum for her.
Remark 1. In full generality, the sum-check protocol can compute the sum
∑
b∈Bmg(b) for
any B ⊆ F, but we will only require B = {0, 1} for most of the applications in this thesis.
For presentation purposes, we assume here that the verifier has oracle access to g, i.e., V
can evaluate g(r1, . . . , rv) for a randomly chosen vector (r1, . . . , rv) ∈ Fv with a single query
to an oracle, though this will not be the case in applications. In our applications, V will
either be able to efficiently evaluate g(r1, . . . , rv) on her own, or if this is not the case, V will
ask the prover to tell her g(r1, . . . , rv), and P will subsequently prove this claim is correct
via further applications of the sum-check protocol.
The protocol proceeds in v rounds as follows. In the first round, the prover sends a
polynomial g1(X1), and claims that g1(X1) =
∑
(x2,...,xv)∈{0,1}v−1 g(X1, x2, . . . , xv). Observe
that if g1 is as claimed, then H = g1(0) + g1(1).
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we use degi(p) to denote the degree of p in
variable i. Observe that the polynomial g1(X1) has degree deg1(g). Hence g1 can be specified
with deg1(g) + 1 field elements, for example by sending the evaluation of g1 at each point in
the set {0, 1, . . . , deg1(g)}.
Then, in round j > 1, V chooses a value rj−1 uniformly at random from F and sends rj−1
to P . We will often refer to this step by saying that variable j − 1 gets bound to value rj−1.
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In return, the prover sends a polynomial gj(Xj), and claims that
gj(Xj) =
∑
(xj+1,...,xv)∈{0,1}v−j
g(r1, . . . , rj−1, Xj, xj+1, . . . , xv). (2.1)
The verifier compares the two most recent polynomials by checking gj−1(rj−1) = gj(0) +
gj(1), and rejecting otherwise. The verifier also rejects if the degree of gj is too high: each gj
should have degree degj(g), the degree of variable xj in g.
In the final round, the prover has sent gv(Xv) which is claimed to be g(r1, . . . , rv−1, Xv).
V now checks that gv(rv) = g(r1, . . . , rv) (recall that we assumed V has oracle access to
g). If this test succeeds, and so do all previous tests, then the verifier is convinced that
H = g1(0) + g1(1).
The protocol is summarized in Figure 2.1.
The following proposition formalizes the completeness and soundness properties of the
sum-check protocol.
Proposition 2.3.1. Let g be a v-variate polynomial of total degree at most d defined over a
finite field F. For any H ∈ F, let L be the language of of polynomials g (given as an oracle)
such that
H =
∑
b1∈{0,1}
∑
b2∈{0,1}
· · ·
∑
bv∈{0,1}
g(b1, . . . , bv).
The sum-check protocol is an interactive proof system for L with completeness error δc = 0
and soundness error δs ≤ vd/|F|.
Proof. Completeness is evident: if the prover sends the prescribed polynomial gj(Xj) at all
rounds j, then V will accept with probability 1.
The proof of soundness is by induction on v. In the case v = 1, P ’s only message
specifies a degree d univariate polynomial g1(X1). If g1(X1) 6= g(X1), then by Lemma 2.2.1,
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• Fix an H ∈ F.
• In the first round, P sends the univariate polynomial
g1(X1) :=
∑
x2,...,xv∈{0,1}v−1
g(X1, x2, . . . , xv),
and sends g1 to V. V checks that g1 is a univariate polynomial of degree at most
deg1(g), and that H = g1(0) + g1(1), rejecting if not.
• V chooses a random element r1 ∈ F, and sends r1 to P.
• In the jth round, for 1 < j < v, P sends to V the univariate polynomial
gj(Xj) =
∑
(xj+1,...,xv)∈{0,1}v−j
g(r1, . . . , rj−1, Xj , xj+1, . . . , xv).
V checks that gj is a univariate polynomial of degree at most degj(g), and that
gj−1(rj−1) = gj(0) + gj(1), rejecting if not.
• V chooses a random element rj ∈ F, and sends rj to P.
• In Round v, P sends the univariate polynomial
gv(Xv) = g(r1, . . . , rv−1, Xv)
to V. V checks that gv is a univariate polynomial of degree at most degv(g),
rejecting if not.
• V chooses a random element rv ∈ F and evaluates g(r1, . . . , rv) with a single
oracle query to g. V checks that gv(rv) = g(r1, . . . , rv), rejecting if not.
• If V has not yet rejected, V halts and accepts.
Figure 2.1: Description of Sum-Check Protocol.
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g1(r1) 6= g(r1) with probability at least 1 − d/|F| over the choice of r1, and hence V ’s final
check will cause V to reject with probably at least 1− d/|F|.
Assume by way of induction that for all v−1-variate polynomials, the sum-check protocol
has soundness error at most (v− 1)d/|F|. Suppose P sends a polynomial h1(X1) 6= g1(X1) =∑
x2,...,xv∈{0,1}v−1 g(X1, x2, . . . , xv) in Round 1. Then by Lemma 2.2.1, h1(r1) 6= g1(r1) with
probability at least 1 − d/|F|. Conditioned on this event, P is left to prove the false claim
in Round 2 that h1(r1) =
∑
x2,...,xv∈{0,1}v−1 g(r1, x2, . . . , xv). Since g(r1, x2, . . . , xv) is a v − 1-
variate polynomial of total degree d, the inductive hypothesis implies the V will reject at
some subsequent round of the protocol with probability at least 1− d(v− 1)/|F|. Therefore,
V will reject with probability at least
1− Pr[h1(r1) 6= g1(r1)]− (1− Pr[V rejects in some Round j > 1|h1(r1) 6= g1(r1)])
≥ 1− d|F| −
d(v − 1)
|F| = 1−
dv
|F| .
Discussion of costs. Observe that there is one round in the sum-check protocol for each
of the v variables of g. The total communication is
∑v
i=1 degi(g) + 1 = v+
∑v
i=1 degi(g) field
elements. In particular, if degi(g) = O(1) for all j, then the communication cost is O(v) field
elements.
The running time of the verifier over the entire execution of the protocol is proportional to
the total communication, plus the cost of a single oracle query to g to compute g(r1, . . . , rv).
Determining the running time of the prover is less straightforward. Recall that P can
specify gj by sending for each i ∈ {0, . . . , degj(g)} the value:
gj(i) =
∑
(xj+1,...,xv)∈{0,1}v−j
g(r1, . . . , rj−1, i, xj+1, . . . , xv). (2.2)
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An important insight is that the number of terms defining the value gj(i) in Equation (2.2)
falls geometrically with j: in the jth sum, there are only 2v−j terms, each corresponding to a
Boolean vector in {0, 1}v−j. Thus, the total number of terms that must be evaluated over the
course of the protocol is
∑v
j=1 degj(g)2
v−j = O(2v) if degj(g) = O(1) for all j. Consequently,
if P is given oracle access to g, then P will require just O(2v) time.
In all of our applications in this thesis, P will not have oracle access to the truth table
of g, and the key to many of our results in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 is to show that in our
applications P can nonetheless evaluate g at all of the necessary points in close to O(2v)
total time.
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Chapter 3
Annotations in Data Streams
The surging popularity of commercial cloud computing services has rendered the following
scenario increasingly plausible. A business such as ArthurSystems from Chapter 1 processes
billions or trillions of transactions a day. The volume is sufficiently high that ArthurSystems
cannot or will not store and process the transactions on its own. Instead, it oﬄoads the
processing to a commercial cloud computing service – MerlinSystems from Chapter 1.
The oﬄoading of any computation raises issues of trust. ArthurSystems may be con-
cerned about relatively benign errors: perhaps the cloud dropped some of the transactions,
executed a buggy algorithm, or experienced an uncorrected hardware fault. Alternatively,
ArthurSystems may be more cautious and fear that the cloud operator is deliberately de-
ceptive or has been externally compromised. Either way, each time ArthurSystems poses a
query to MerlinSystems, it may demand that the cloud provide not only the answer but also
some proof that the returned answer is correct.
In this chapter and the next, we consider a computationally weak verifier (modeling
ArthurSystems in the above scenario), who lacks the resources to store the entire input
locally, and is given access to a powerful but untrusted prover (modeling the cloud comput-
ing service). The verifier must execute within the confines of the restrictive data streaming
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paradigm, i.e., it must process the input sequentially in whatever order it arrives, using
space that is substantially sublinear in the total size of the input. The prover is allowed to
annotate the data stream as it is read, with the goal of convincing the verifier of the correct
answer. The streaming restriction for the verifier fits the cloud computing setting well, as
the verifier’s streaming pass over the input can occur while uploading data to the cloud.
Our approach is naturally related to interactive proofs as introduced in Chapter 2, as well
as Merlin-Arthur communication complexity (introduced in Section 3.2) but differs in two
important regards. Firstly, the verifier must process both the original data and the advice
provided by the helper under the usual restrictions of the data stream model. Secondly,
we focus on annotations that can be provided online, i.e., annotation that depends only
on data that has arrived before the annotation is written. Note that in interactive proofs
and Merlin-Arthur communication, it is assumed that the helper is omniscient and that the
advice he provides can take into account data held by any of the players. In the stream model,
this would correspond to prescience, where the annotation in the stream at any particular
position may depend on data that is yet to arrive. In contrast, we are primarily interested in
designing algorithms with online annotation; this corresponds to a helper who sees the data
concurrently with the verifier.
3.1 Our Contributions
Our first contribution in this chapter is to formally define the relevant models: traditional
and online Merlin-Arthur communication, and streaming models with either prescient or on-
line annotations. We then investigate the complexity of a range of problems in these models,
including selection, frequency moments, and graph problems such as triangle-counting, con-
nectivity, and bipartite perfect matching. Estimating frequency moments in particular has
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become a canonical problem when exploring variants of the data stream model such as ran-
dom order streams [29] and read/write streams [12]. In contrast, we give annotation protocols
– which we call schemes – for solving the frequency moments problem and its generalizations
exactly. The fact that we obtain schemes that solve the exact frequency moments problem
is essential, as it allows us to use these schemes as primitives to solve more complicated
problems that on their surface appear to have nothing to do with frequency moments.
We now give a detailed overview of the results in this chapter. We use the shorthand
“(ca, cv)-scheme” for streaming algorithm that uses O(ca) bits of annotation and requires
O(cv)-space; a scheme could be either prescient or online. In general, our streams have
length N and consist of tokens from the data universe [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. In the case of
graph streams, we consider tokens from the universe [n]× [n].
Selection. The problem of finding the median of N values in the range [n] highlights the
difference between prescient and online annotation. For arbitrary positive integers x and
y, with xy ≥ n, we present an online (x log n, y log n)-scheme. Furthermore, we show that
this trade-off is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. In contrast, a trivial O(log n)-space
algorithm can verify O(log n) bits of prescient annotation, implying a prescient (log n, log n)-
scheme.
Frequency Moments and Frequent Items. We next consider properties of {fi}i∈[n]
where fi is the frequency of the token “i” in the stream. For arbitrary positive integers x
and y, with xy ≥ n, we present an online (φ−1 log2 n+x log n, y log n)-scheme that computes
the set of tokens whose frequency exceeds φN .
For any positive integers x, y with xy ≥ n, we also present an online (k2x log n, ky log n)-
scheme that computes the kth frequency moment Fk :=
∑
i f
k
i exactly, where k is a positive
integer. This scheme is based on a beautiful, nearly optimal MA communication protocol for
16
the set-disjointness problem (henceforth, disj) developed by Aaronson and Wigderson [3]
using algebraic techniques analogous to those in the sum-check protocol presented Chapter
2. We will informally refer to this class of schemes and techniques as sum-check schemes
and techniques. The tradeoff between annotation length and space usage of our Fk scheme
is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors even if the algorithm is allowed to use prescient
annotation. To prove this, we present the first Merlin-Arthur communication bounds for
multi-party set-disjointness.
Additionally, we generalize the scheme for Fk to any frequency-based function, i.e., a
function of the form
∑
i∈[n] g(fi) for some g : Z+ → Z+. Assuming N = O(n), we obtain
a prescient (n2/3 log n, n2/3 log n)-scheme and an online (n2/3 log4/3 n, n2/3 log4/3 n) scheme for
this important class of functions, as well as improved schemes for skewed data streams.
Matrix-Vector Multiplication Further extending the sum-check techniques, we give an
online scheme for multiplying an n×n matrix with integer entries by an n-dimensional integer
vector. Specifically, for any positive integers x and y with xy ≥ n2 and x ≥ n, we give an
(x log n, y log n) protocol for matrix-vector multiplication. These tradeoffs are optimal up to
logarithmic factors, and this scheme serves as a critical primitive in the development of the
schemes for graph problems described next.
Graph Problems. We present optimal or nearly-optimal schemes for the following graph
problems.
• Counting Triangles. For any positive integers x and y, with xy ≥ n3, we present
an online (x log n, y log n)-scheme for counting triangles in the graph. We also give an
online (n2 log n, log n)-scheme for this problem.
• Connectivity and Bipartiteness. For any positive integers x and y with x ≥ n and
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xy ≥ n2, we present online (x log n, y log n)-schemes for determining whether a graph
is connected or bipartite.
• Bipartite Perfect Matching. For any positive integers x and y with x ≥ log n
and xy ≥ n2, we present online (x log n, y log n)-schemes for solving bipartite perfect
matching. These tradeoffs between annotation length and space usage for the verifier
are optimal up to logarithmic factors.
• Shortest s-t Path. Given a directed graph G with non-negative integer edge weights
and designated nodes s and t, let d be the maximum distance between s and any node
reachable from s. For any positive integers x, y such that xy ≥ dn2 and x ≥ dn, we
give an online (x log n, y log n) protocol for computing the shortest s-t path. These
tradeoffs are essentially optimal for small-diameter graphs. The scheme relies on linear
programming duality and the total unimodularity of the shortest s-t path problem, in
conjunction with sum-check techniques.
• Minimum Weight Bipartite Perfect Matching (MWBPM). Suppose we are
given a bipartite graph G with non-negative integer edge weights. For any positive
integers x, y such that xy ≥ n3wmax and x ≥ nwmax, we give an (x log n, y log n)
protocol for MWBPM, where wmax is the maximum weight of any edge.
Algorithm Simulation. Next, we present a general-purpose online scheme for simulating
an arbitrary deterministic algorithm in the standard RAM model. In this scheme, the verifier
requires only log n space, and the annotation length is O(m log n+ T log n), where T is the
runtime of the algorithm, where m is the input length. As an immediate corollary, we derive
online (m log n, log n)-schemes for the following problems on graphs with m edges on n
vertices: connectivity, bipartiteness, minimum spanning tree, and maximum matching. We
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show that our algorithms are optimal in many cases, in the sense that the annotation length
cannot be decreased without increasing the space usage above O(log n).
Implementation and Experiments. We close the chapter by presenting experimental
results based on an implementation of several of our schemes (F2 and matrix-vector multipli-
cation). Using Fast Fourier Transform techniques, we bring the runtime of the prover in our
sum-check schemes down to O(n log n), from O(can) in a naive implementation, where ca is
the annotation length. Our experimental results demonstrate that our schemes require just
a few MBs of space and annotation even when the data universe size is in the trillions, that
our verifier additionally runs extremely quickly (processing millions of stream updates per
second), and that our FFT-based prover implementation processes several hundred thousand
updates per second, allowing the prover implementation to easily scale to streams over data
universes of size in the billions.
3.2 Models, Notation, and Terminology
Many of the algorithms (schemes) in Chapter 4 use randomization in subtle ways, mak-
ing it important to properly formalize several models of computation. While the schemes
presented in this chapter use randomization in a more straightforward manner, our careful
treatment of randomness as we introduce the models will pay dividends in Chapter 4.
We begin with Merlin–Arthur communication models, a topic first studied by Babai,
Frankl and Simon [10], which we eventually use to derive lower bounds. We then turn to
annotated data stream models. At the end of the section we set up some notation and
terminology for the rest of Chapters 3 and 4.
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3.2.1 Communication Models
Let F : X × Y → {0, 1} be a function, where X and Y are both finite sets. This
naturally gives a 2-player number-in-hand communication problem, where the first player,
Alice, holds an input x ∈ X, and the second player, Bob, holds an input y ∈ Y . The players
wish to compute F (x, y) by executing a (possibly randomized) communication protocol that
correctly outputs F (x, y) with “high” probability. In Merlin–Arthur communication, there
is additionally a “super-player,” called Merlin, who knows the entire input (x, y), and can
help Alice and Bob by interacting with them. The precise pattern of interaction matters
greatly and gives rise to distinct models. Merlin’s goal is to get Alice and Bob to output
“1” regardless of the actual value of F (x, y), and so Merlin is not to be blindly trusted.
Intuitively, one can think of F (x, y) as the indicator function of a property of (x, y), and
Merlin’s goal is to convince Alice and Bob that the input satisfies the property (even if it
does not).
One important departure we make from prior work is that we allow Merlin to use private
random coins during the protocol. Most prior work on MA (and AM) communication (e.g.
[10,70,71]) defined Merlin to be deterministic, which does not make a difference in the basic
setting where Merlin knows the entire input (x, y) when communicating with Alice and Bob.
But in this work we are concerned with “online MA” models, where the distinction does
matter, and these online MA models are in close correspondence with the annotated data
stream models that are our eventual topic of study.
MA Communication. In a Merlin–Arthur protocol (henceforth, “MA protocol”) for F ,
Merlin begins by sending a help message h(x, y, rM), using a private random string rM . The
help message is seen by both Alice and Bob. Then Alice and Bob (the pair that constitutes
the entity “Arthur”) run a randomized communication protocol Q, using a public random
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string rA, eventually outputting a bit out
Q(x, y, rA, h). Importantly, rA is not known to
Merlin at the time he sends h. The protocol Q is δs-sound and δc-complete if there exists a
function h : X × Y × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ such that the following conditions hold.
1. If F (x, y) = 1 then PrrM ,rA [out
Q(x, y, rA, h(x, y, rM)) = 0] ≤ δc.
2. If F (x, y) = 0 then ∀ h′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ : PrrA [outQ(x, y, rA, h′) = 1] ≤ δs.
We define err(Q) to be the minimum value of max{δs, δc} such that the above conditions
hold. We define the help cost hcost(Q) to be 1 + maxx,y,rM |h(x, y, rM)| (forcing hcost ≥
1, even for traditional Merlin-free protocols), and the verification cost vcost(Q) to be the
maximum number of bits communicated by Alice and Bob over all x, y and rA. We define
MAδ(F ) = min{vcost(Q) + hcost(Q) : Q is an MA protocol for F with err(Q) ≤ δ}, and
MA(F ) = MA1/3(F ). The constant 1/3 is chosen by convention, and can be replaced by any
constant in (0, 1/2) without affecting the theory.
Online MA Communication. An online MA protocol is defined to be an MA protocol,
as above, but with the communication pattern required to obey the following sequence. (1)
Input x is revealed to Alice and Merlin; (2) Merlin sends Alice a help message h1(x, rM) using
a private random string rM ; (3) Input y is revealed to Bob and Merlin; (4) Merlin sends Bob
a help message h2(x, y, rM); (5) Alice sends a message to Bob (this message can depend on
a public random string rA that is not known to Merlin at the time he sends h1(x, rM) or
h2(x, y, rM)), who then gives a 1-bit output. We see this model as the natural MA variant
of one-way communication, and the analogy with the gradual revelation of a streamed input
should be obvious.
For such a protocol Q, we define hcost(Q) to be 1+maxx,y,rM (|h1(x, rM)|+ |h2(x, y, rM)|)
We define soundness, completeness, err(Q), and vcost(Q) as for MA. Define MA→δ (F ) =
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min{hcost(Q) + vcost(Q) : Q is an online MA protocol for F with err(Q) ≤ δ} and write
MA→(F ) = MA→1/3(F ).
Online AMA Communication. An online AMA protocol is a souped-up version of an
online MA protocol, where public random coins can be tossed at the start (and revealed to
all parties), before any input is revealed. The number of such coin tosses is added to the
vcost of the protocol. This models the cost of an initial round of communication between
Arthur (i.e., Alice + Bob) and Merlin. Note that the second public random string, used when
Alice talks to Bob, does not count towards the vcost.
Multiparty MA Communication. We also will have reason to consider a generalization
of the MA communication model to settings in which there are more than two non-Merlin
players. Let f : X1 × · · · × Xt → {0, 1} be a function, where each Xi is a finite set. This
naturally gives a t-player number-in-hand communication problem, where Player i holds an
input xi ∈ Xi and the players wish to output f(x1, . . . , xt) correctly, with high probability.
Merlin knows the entire input x = (x1, . . . , xt). Merlin begins by sending a help message
h(x, rM), using a private random string rM , that is seen by all t other players. Then Players
1 through t run a randomized protocol Q, using a public random string R, eventually out-
putting a bit outQ(x, R, h(x, rM)). To clarify, R is not known to Merlin at the time he writes
h(x, rM). We define soundness, completeness, err(Q), hcost(Q), and vcost(Q) as for MA.
On Merlin’s Use of Randomness. In an MA protocol, Merlin can deterministically
choose a help message that maximizes Arthur’s acceptance probability. However, Merlin
cannot do so in the online MA model, because he does not know the entire input when he
talks to Alice. This is why we allow Merlin to use randomness in these definitions.
Several recent papers, including one on which this chapter is based [30, 72], use “online
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MA” to mean a more restrictive model where a deterministic Merlin talks only to Bob and
not to Alice. With Merlin required to be deterministic, this communication restriction is
irrelevant, as Merlin cannot tell Alice anything she does not already know. However, we
permit Merlin to be probabilistic, and in this case we do not know that Merlin can avoid
talking to Alice. That is, we do not know how to show that for every protocol in which a
randomized Merlin talks to Alice, there is a protocol of similar cost in which Merlin does
not talk to Alice. Our online MA communication model, which permits Merlin to both be
randomized and talk to Alice, may therefore be strictly more powerful than the variant
considered in [30,72] in which Merlin cannot talk to Alice at all.
As noted earlier, our goal in defining the communication models this way is to closely
correspond to annotated data stream models. In several of our online schemes in Chapter 4
(see, e.g., Section 4.5), the helper provides initial annotation that specifies a random “hash”
function, h, and the completeness guarantee of the subsequent protocol depends crucially on
h having “low collision” properties. Since h must be chosen without seeing all of the input,
such low collision properties cannot be guaranteed by picking a fixed h in advance. However,
if the helper chooses h at random, then we do have such guarantees for each fixed input,
with high probability.
3.2.2 Data Stream Models
We now define our annotated data stream models. Recall that a (traditional) data stream
algorithm computes a function F of an input sequence x ∈ UN , where N is the number of
stream updates, and U is some data universe, such as {0, 1}b or [n] = {0, . . . , n − 1}: the
algorithm uses a limited amount of working memory and has access to a random string. The
function F may or may not be Boolean.
An annotated data stream algorithm, or a scheme, is a pair Q = (h,V), consisting of a
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help function h : UN ×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ used by a prover (henceforth, P) and a data stream
algorithm run by a verifier, V . Prover P provides h(x, rP) as annotation to be read by V .
We think of h as being decomposed into (h1, . . . , hN), where the function hi : UN → {0, 1}∗
specifies the annotation supplied to V after the arrival of the ith token xi. That is, h acts on
x (using rP) to create an annotated stream xh,rP defined as follows:
xh,rP := (x1, h1(x, rP), x2, h2(x, rP), . . . , xN , hN(x, rP)) .
Note that this is a stream over U ∪{0, 1}, of length N+∑i |hi(x, rP)|. The streaming verifier
V , who uses w bits of working memory and has access to a (private) random string rV , then
processes this annotated stream, eventually giving an output outV(xh,rP , rV).
Prescient Schemes. The scheme Q = (h,V) is said to be δs-sound and δc-complete for
the function F if the following conditions hold:
1. For all x ∈ UN , we have PrrP ,rV [outV(xh,rP , rV) 6= F (x)] ≤ δc.
2. For all x ∈ UN , h′ = (h′1, h′2, . . . , h′N) ∈ ({0, 1}∗)N , we have PrrV [outV(xh′ , rV) 6∈
{F (x),⊥}] ≤ δs.
If δc = 0, the scheme satisfies perfect completeness ; otherwise it has imperfect completeness.
An output of “⊥” indicates that V rejects P ’s claims in trying to convince V to output a
particular value for F (x).
We note two important things. First, the definition of a scheme allows the annotation
hi(x, rP) to depend on the entire stream x, thus modeling prescience: the advice from the
prover can depend on data that the verifier has not seen yet. Second, P must convince V of
the value of F (x) for all x. This is stricter than the traditional definitions of interactive proofs
and MA communication complexity (including our own, above) for decision problems, which
place different requirements on the cases F (x) = 0 and F (x) = 1. In Chapter 4 (Section
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4.6), we briefly consider a relaxed definition of schemes that is in the spirit of the traditional
definition.
We define err(Q) to be the minimum value of max{δs, δc} such that the above conditions are
satisfied. We define the annotation length hcost(Q)=maxx,rP
∑
i |hi(x, rP)|, the total size of
P ’s communications, and the verification space cost vcost(Q) = w, the space used by the
verifier V . We say that Q is a prescient (ca, cv)-scheme if hcost(Q) = O(ca), vcost(Q) = O(cv)
and err(Q) ≤ 1
3
.
Online Schemes. We call Q = (h,V) a δ-error online scheme for F if, in addition to
the conditions in the previous definition, each function hi depends only on (x1, . . . , xi).
We define error, hcost, and vcost as above and say that Q is an online (ca, cv)-scheme if
hcost(Q) = O(ca), vcost(Q) = O(cv), and err(Q) ≤ 13 .
Note that in this thesis we do not always assume that the universe size n and stream length
N are polynomially related; it is possible that N = no(1). This becomes relevant particularly
in Chapter 4. Therefore we must be much more careful about logarithmic factors than in
some of the publications on which this chapter is based [30,40].
Notice that the help function can be made deterministic in a prescient scheme, but not
necessarily so in an online scheme. This is directly analogous to the situation for MA and
online MA communication models, as discussed at the end of Section 3.2.1.
AMA Schemes. We also consider what we call AMA schemes, where there is a common
source of public randomness, in addition to the verifier’s private random coins. The AMA
scheme model is identical to the one considered by Gur and Raz [61], who referred to it as
the “Arthur–Merlin streaming model.”
An online AMA scheme is identical to a (standard) online scheme, except that the data
stream algorithm and help function both have access to a source of public random bits. The
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number of random bits used is also counted in both the hcost and the vcost of the scheme.
On Practicality and the Plausibility of Prescience. Although our definition of a
scheme allows annotation to be sent after each stream update, with just one exception (the
prescient Subset protocol of Lemma 3.8.1), all the schemes we design require annotation only
before the start or after the end of the stream. As a practical matter, this avoids the need
for fine-grained coordination between the annotation and the data stream, and permits the
annotation to be sent to the verifier as an email attachment, or posted on a website for the
verifier to retrieve at her convenience.
Online annotation schemes have the appealing property that the prover need not “see
into the future” to execute them; at any time t, the prover’s message only depends on
stream updates that arrived before time t. While the online restriction appears most natural,
prescient schemes may still be suitable in some settings, such as when P has already seen the
full input prior to V beginning to read it. Consider a volunteer computing scenario where the
verifier farms out many computations to volunteers, and only inspects a particular input if a
volunteer has already looked at that input and claims to have found something interesting.
In brief, in some settings the prover may naturally see the input before the verifier, and in
this case a prescient scheme will be feasible.
3.2.3 Relationship Between MA Protocols and Schemes
Any prescient (resp. online) (ca, cv)-scheme Q = (h,V) for a function F can be converted
into an MA (resp. online MA) protocol for F in the natural way: Merlin sends the output
of the ith help function hi to Alice—who receives a prefix of the input stream—or Bob, de-
pending on which of the players possesses the ith piece of the input. Alice runs the streaming
algorithm V on her input as well as any annotation she received, and sends the state of the
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algorithm to Bob. Bob uses this state to continue running V on his input and the annotation
he received, and then outputs the end result. The hcost of this protocol is at most ca logN ,
since Merlin has to specify which stream update i each piece of annotation is associated with,
and the vcost of this protocol is at most cv. Thus, lower bounds on usual (resp. online) MA
communication protocols imply related lower bounds on the costs of prescient (resp. online)
annotated data stream algorithms.
3.2.4 Additional Notation and Terminology
A data stream specifies an input x incrementally. Typically, x can be thought of as a
vector (although more generally it may represent a graph or a matrix). Each update in the
stream is of the form (i, δ) where i ∈ U identifies an element of the data universe, and δ ∈ Z
describes the change to the frequency of i. The frequency of universe item i is defined as
fi(x) :=
∑
(jk,δk)∈x:jk=i δk. We refer to the vector f(x) = (f1(x), . . . , fn(x)) as the frequency
vector of x, where n denotes the size of the data universe. When the stream x is apparent,
we will often omit x and refer to the frequency vector as f = (f1, . . . , fn). We use Z+ to
denote the set of non-negative integers.
We consider several different update models. In the most general update model, the non-
strict turnstile model, the δ values may be negative, and so fi may also be negative. In the
strict turnstile model, the δ values may be negative, but it is assumed that the frequencies
fi always remain non-negative. In the insert-only model, the δ values must be non-negative.
Orthogonal to these, in the unit-update version of each model, the δ values are assumed to
have absolute value 1. Each of our results applies to a subset of these models, and we specify
within the statement of each theorem which update models it applies to.
Throughout, n will denote the size of the data universe, N will denote the total number
of stream updates, m will denote the total number of items with non-zero frequency at the
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end of the stream, and M will refer to the total number of distinct items that ever appear
within some stream update. We will refer to N as the length of the stream, to m as sparsity
of the stream, and to M as the footprint of the stream. Notice that it is always the case
that m ≤M ≤ N . In the case of insert-only streams, m = M , but for streams in the (strict
or general) turnstile models it is possible for m to be much smaller than M . Note also that
while whenever we talk about “sparse” streams in this thesis, we refer to the relative size of
n and m, not the absolute size. Indeed, we assume that m is typically large, too large for V
to store the stream explicitly (else the problems can become trivial).
Throughout this thesis, when analyzing the runtime of the prover or verifier in any
protocol, an addition or multiplication within a finite field is assumed to require a single
time step.
3.2.5 A Preliminary Lemma: Fingerprints
We often make use of fingerprint functions of streams, which enable a streaming verifier
to test whether two large streams have the same frequency vector. The verifier chooses a
fingerprint function g(x) at random from some family of functions satisfying the property
that (over the random selection of the function g),
Pr[g(x) = g(y) | f(x) 6= f(y)] < 1/p
for a parameter p. Typically, g(x) is an element of a finite field of size poly(p), and hence
the number of bits required to store the value g(x) (as well as g itself) is O(log p). Further,
there are known constructions of fingerprint functions where g(x) can be computed in space
O(log p) by a streaming algorithm in the non-strict turnstile update model, as formalized in
the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.2.1 (Fingerprints). Given a prime q, let Fq denote the finite field with q elements.
Let G = {gα : α ∈ Fq} denote the family of functions defined as follows:
gα(f(x)) =
n∑
i=1
fi(x)α
i.
Then given data streams x and y defined over a universe of size n,
Pr
α←Fq
[gα(x) = gα(y) | f(x) 6= f(y)] ≤ n/q,
and for any fixed α, gα(f(x)) can be computed from the data stream x by a streaming algo-
rithm in O(log q) space.
Proof. To prove the inequality, suppose x and y are two data streams defined over a universe
of size n such that f(x) 6= f(y). Let px(α) =
∑n
j=1 fi(x)α
i and py(α) =
∑n
j=1 fi(y)α
i. Since
f(x) 6= f(y), px and py are distinct polynomials in α of degree n. Because two distinct
polynomials of degree n can agree on at most n points, it holds that Prα←Fq [g(x) = g(y) |
f(x) 6= f(y)] ≤ n/q.
To compute the fingerprint of f(x), a streaming algorithm can store a single element
z ∈ Fq, and process each update (i, δ) via z ← z + δαi. This requires O(log q) space, and it
is easily seen that z equals gα(f(x)) at the end of the stream.
Lemma 3.2.1 implies that if the field size q is sufficiently large, say, polynomial in n and
m, then Prα←Fq [g(x) = g(y) | f(x) 6= f(y)] can be made polynomially small while keeping
the space usage of the verifier logarithmic in n.
3.3 Index and Selection
In this section, we present an online scheme for the selection problem. Our definition
of the Selection problem assumes all frequencies fi :=
∑
(jk,δk):jk=i
δk are non-negative,
and so this definition is only valid for the strict turnstile update model.
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Definition 3.3.1. The Selection problem is defined in terms of the quantity N ′ =∑
i∈[n] fi, the sum of all the frequencies. Given a desired rank ρ ∈ [N ′], output an item j from
the stream x = 〈(j1, δ1), . . . , (jN , δN)〉, such that
∑
(jk,δk):jk<j
δk < ρ and
∑
(jk,δk):jk>j
δk ≥
N ′ − ρ.
An easy prescient (log n, log n)-scheme is for the helper to give a claimed answer s as
annotation at the start of the stream. The verifier need only count how many items in the
stream are (a) smaller than s and (b) greater than s. The verifier then outputs s if the rank
of s satisfies the necessary conditions, and outputs ⊥ otherwise.
However, our goal is to present (almost) matching upper and lower bounds when only
online annotation is allowed. To do this, we first consider the online MA complexity of the
communication problem of index: Alice holds a string x ∈ {0, 1}N , Bob holds an integer
i ∈ [N ], and the goal is for Bob to output index(x, i) := xi. The lower bound for selection
will follow from the lower bound for index and a key idea for the selection upper bound is
taken from the communication protocol for index seen in the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.2 (Online MA complexity of index). Let ca > 1 and cv be integers such
that ca · cv ≥ N . There is an online MA protocol Q for index, with hcost(Q) ≤ ca and
vcost(Q) = O(cv log ca). Futhermore, any online MA protocol Q for index must have
hcost(Q) vcost(Q) = Ω(N). Thus, in particular, MA→(index) = Θ˜(√N).
Proof. For the lower bound, we use an online MA protocol Q to build a (Merlin-less) ran-
domized one-way index protocol Q′. Here, a one-way protocol is a one in which Alice sends
a message to Bob, with no communication from Bob to Alice.
We first consider the case where Merlin does not send any message to Alice at all and
then explain how to modify the proof to cover the case where Merlin sends a message to
Alice (possibly based on Merlin’s internal randomness rM) that does not depend on Bob’s
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input. Let ca = hcost(Q). Let B(n, p) denote the binomial distribution with parameters
n and p, and let k be the smallest integer such that X ∼ B(k, 1
3
) ⇒ Pr[X > k/2] ≤
2−ca/3. A standard Chernoff bound gives k = Θ(h). Let a(x,RA) denote the message that
Alice sends in Q when her random string is RA (notice a(x,RA) does not depend on any
help message h1(x, rM) from Merlin, since we have assumed no such help message is sent),
and let b(a, h2) be the bit Bob outputs in Q upon receiving message a from Alice and h2
from Merlin. In the protocol Q′, Alice chooses k independent random strings R1, . . . , Rk
and sends Bob a(x,R1), . . . , a(x,Rk). Bob then outputs 1 iff there exists a ca-bit string h
such that majority (b(a(x,R1), h2), . . . , b(a(x,Rk), h2)) = 1. Let C be the number of bits
communicated in this protocol. Clearly, C ≤ k · vcost(Q) = O(hcost(Q) vcost(Q)). We
claim that Q′ is a 1
3
-error protocol for index whence, by a standard lower bound (see, e.g.,
Ablayev [4]), C = Ω(N).
To prove the claim, consider the case when xi = 1. By the correctness of Q there ex-
ists a suitable help message h2 from Merlin that causes Pr[b(a(x,RA), i, h2) = 0] ≤ 13 .
Thus, by construction and our choice of k, the probability that Bob outputs 0 in Q′ is
at most 2−ca/3. Now suppose xi = 0. Then, every possible message h2 from Merlin satisfies
Pr[b(a(x,RA), i, h2) = 1] ≤ 13 . Arguing as before, and using a union bound over all 2h possible
messages h, we see that Bob outputs 1 with probability at most 2ca · 2−ca/3 = 1
3
.
Now consider the case in which Merlin sends a message to Alice (possibly based on
Merlin’s internal randomness rM) that does not depend on Bob’s input. Assume that the
soundness probability of the protocol is 1/13-complete (this can be achieved by repeating
the whole protocol O(1) times and taking the majority vote, which increases the costs by
only constant factors). In this case, we construct a one-way randomized (Merlin-less) com-
munication protocol for index as follows. Alice chooses a random string rM herself. Since
Merlin’s message to Alice, h1(x, rM), does not depend on Bob’s input y, Alice can compute
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h1(x, rM) herself. Alice sends to Bob the messages a(x,R1, h1(x, rM)), . . . , a(x,Rk, h1(x, rM))
that she would have sent in the online MA protocol given Merlin’s message h1(x, rM), and
Bob outputs 1 if and only if there exists a ca-bit string h that would have caused him to
accept on a majority of Alice’s messages.
Consider the case when xi = 1. By the correctness of Q, with probability at least 3/4
over the choice of rM , there exists a suitable help message h2 from Merlin that causes
Pr[b(a(x,RA, h1(x, rM)), i, h2) = 0] ≤ 13 (otherwise, with probability at least 1/4 ·1/3 = 1/12
over the choice of both rM and RA, Merlin will fail to convince Bob to output 1, contra-
dicting the fact that the protocol is 1/13-complete.) Call such a choice of rM “good”. By
construction and our choice of k, if rM is good then the probability that Bob outputs 0 in Q′
is at most 2−ca/3. Thus, in the case xi = 1, our one-way randomized communication protocol
outputs 1 with probability at least 3/4− 2−ca/3 > 2/3.
In the case xi = 0, the argument that our one-way randomized communication protocol
outputs 0 with probability at least 2/3 proceeds exactly as in the case where Merlin did
not send any message to Alice, since it holds that for every message h1 to Alice and every
possible message h2 to Bob, the protocol satisfies Pr[b(a(x,RA, h1), i, h2) = 1] ≤ 13 .
The upper bound follows as a special case of the two-party set-disjointness protocol
in [3, Theorem. 7.4] since the protocol there is actually online. We give a more direct protocol,
which establishes intuition for our selection result. Write Alice’s input string x as x =
y(1) · · · y(v), where each y(j) is a string of at most ca bits, and fix a prime q with 3ca < q < 6ca.
Let y(k) be the substring that contains the desired bit xi. Merlin sends Bob a string z of
length at most ca, claiming that it equals y
(k). Alice picks a random α ∈ Fq and sends Bob
α and the strings gα(y
(1)), . . . , gα(y
(v)), where gα is defined as in Lemma 3.2.1. This requires
communicating O(v log q) = O(v log ca) bits. Bob checks if gα(z) = gα(y
(k)), outputting ⊥
if not. If the check passes, Bob assumes that z = y(k), and outputs xi from z under this
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assumption. By Lemma 3.2.1, the error probability is at most ca/q < 1/3.
It is worth making the following two remarks on the above proof.
1. The above lower bound argument in fact shows that an online MA protocolQ for an ar-
bitrary two-party communication problem F satisfies hcost(Q) vcost(Q) = Ω(R→(F )),
where R→(F ) is the one-way, randomized communication complexity of F . Thus,
MA→(F ) = Ω(
√
R→(F )). A similar result was proved by Aaronson [2].
2. The upper bound for index presented above works more or less unchanged when
Alice’s string is in ΣN , for an arbitrary finite alphabet Σ. In view of Lemma 3.2.1,
one simply needs to choose the prime q such that 3|Σ|h < q < 6|Σ|h to bound the
error probability below 1/3. This leads to a protocol P with hcost(P) ≤ h log |Σ|
and vcost(P) = O(v(log |Σ| + log h)). Henceforth, we shall refer to this generalized
protocol simply as “the index protocol” — the alphabet Σ will usually be clear from
the context.
Theorem 3.3.3. For all ca, cv such that ca · cv ≥ n, there is an online (ca log n, cv log n)-
scheme for selection. Furthermore, any online (ca, cv)-scheme for selection must have
ca · cv = Ω(n).
Proof. Conceptually, the verifier builds a vector r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Zn+ where rk =
∑
j<k fk.
This is done by inducing a new stream x′ from the input stream x: each tuple (xk, δk) in A
causes virtual tokens (xk+1, δk), (xk+2, δk), . . . , (n, δk) to be inserted into A
′. Then r = f(A′);
note that ‖r‖1 = O(nN). We apply the index protocol to this vector, with q = Θ(m2) to
retrieve the ranks of elements surrounding the claimed answer s. This information is sufficient
to check that s has the claimed rank.
For the lower bound, we use a standard reduction from the index problem. Given the
string x ∈ {0, 1}N , Alice transforms it into the stream over universe [2N ] whose jth tuple is
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(2j − xj, 1), for each j. Given the index i ∈ [N ], Bob transforms it into a stream consisting
of i copies of (2N, 1) and N − i copies of (1, 1). Consequently, the median of the combined
length-(2N) stream is 2i− xi, from which the value of xi can be recovered. To complete the
proof, observe that any online scheme to compute this median would imply an online MA
protocol for index with the same cost; and that all players can perform this reduction online
without extra space or annotation.
Notice that in the above scheme the information computed by the verifier is independent
of ρ, the rank of the desired element. Therefore these algorithms work even when ρ is revealed
at the end of the stream.
3.4 A First Result for Frequent Items
The φ-heavy hitters (also known as the frequent items) are those items whose frequency
of occurrence in the data stream exceeds a φ fraction of the total count N ′ =
∑
i∈[n] fi. This
definition assumes all frequencies fi :=
∑
(jk,δk):jk=i
δk are non-negative, and so this definition
is only valid for the strict turnstile update model. This problem has a long history in the
data streams literature. In the traditional data stream model exact computation of heavy
hitters requires linear space [80]. As a result, many algorithms that recover approximate
heavy hitters from a data stream have been developed [32,41].
In order to identify the heavy hitters, a prescient helper can list the set of claimed
frequent items, along with their frequencies, for the verifier to check against the stream. But
we must also ensure that the helper is not able to omit any items whose frequencies exceed
the threshold.
Theorem 3.4.1. For all ca, cv such that ca ·cv ≥ n, there is an online (caφ−1 log2 n, cv log n)-
scheme and a prescient (φ−1 log2 n, φ−1 log2 n)-scheme for demonstrating the φ-heavy hitters
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the witness set introduced in the proof of Theorem 3.4.1.
in the strict turnstile update model.
Proof. Given the threshold T = φN ′, the set of heavy hitters is {j : fj > T}. We impose a
binary tree T over the data, whose leaves are the elements of the universe [n], and partition
the (2n− 1) nodes of T into cv groups G1, . . . , Gv, with each |Gi| ≤ 2ca. For each node w of
T , let p(w) denote the parent of w, and let L(w) denote the set of leaves of the subtree of
T rooted at w. We define fˆ(w) = ∑i∈L(w) fi.
The fˆ -values for the nodes in each group Gi form a vector with entries in {0, 1, . . . , N ′}.
As the verifier processes the stream it maintains an O(log n)-bit basic fingerprint of each
such vector; this is easy to do since each token arrival simply causes a linear update to each
vector. Once the end of the stream is reached, the helper can then convince the verifier of
any fˆ(w) value using the index protocol: he simply supplies the vector for the group Gi
that contains w, using at most 2ca log(N
′+1) = O(ca log n) bits of annotation. In particular,
he can identify all the heavy hitters. But he must also convince the verifier that no heavy
hitters have been omitted.
To this end, we consider a witness set, W , of nodes of T which together cover the universe.
The set W , given threshold T , consists of all leaves ` with fˆ(`) > T , plus all nodes u such
that fˆ(u) ≤ T but fˆ(p(u)) > T . Each node of the latter type is witness to the fact that no
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leaves j ∈ L(u) can have fj > T . The sets L(u) for such u together with {j : fj > T} cover
all of [n]. Further, because of the lower bound on fˆ(p(u)), there can be at most 2φ−1 such
nodes u at any level of T , as the sum of fˆ(w) over all nodes w at the parent level is exactly
m. Hence |W | = O(φ−1 log n).
This concept is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The figure shows a frequency distribution of
[2, 3, 9, 4, 1, 3, 2, 0]. Over these leaves, we impose a binary tree, and for each internal node w
in the tree we show fˆ(w). With a threshold of φ = 0.24, we seek to find all leaves of weight
6 or above. There is only one such leaf, with weight 9. For the witness set, we also include
the fourth leaf, since its parent exceeds the threshold. Other nodes at higher levels in the
tree are also included in the witness set when their parent exceeds the threshold but they
individually do not. Nodes in the witness set are indicated by a red fill.
The prover presents the verifier with each node u in W , in increasing order of minL(u),
together with a convincing proof of the value of fˆ(u). The verifier, besides checking the
proofs using the stored fingerprints, checks that the sets L(u) do cover all of [n] (outputting
⊥ if they do not) and outputs those u that are leaves of T with fˆ(u) > T . In total, hcost =
O(|W | · ca log n) = O(caφ−1 log2 n) and vcost = O(cv log n). Note that the stated vcost does
not explicitly account for the verifier storing the O(φ−1 log n) claimed heavy hitters, as in
some settings (e.g., Theorem 3.7.1, later in this chapter) this is not required.
In the prescient case, the helper provides W upfront, which requires O(|W | log n) =
O(φ−1 log2 n) bits of annotation. The verifier stores it and then computes all fˆ -values for
nodes in W , checking that these satisfy the requirements on a witness set. In this case, the
stated vcost does account for the verifier storing the O(φ−1 log n) claimed heavy hitters.
In Section 3.6, we return to this problem and present more involved protocols with a
lower cost. Specifically, Theorem 3.6.1 shows how to exploit sum-check techniques to allow
the frequencies of all items in W to be confirmed with essentially the same cost as a single
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item. It also shows how the size of the witness set W can be reduced by a logarithmic factor
in the prescient case.
3.5 Frequency Moments and Generalizations
In this section we continue the study of properties of the frequency distribution f(x) =
(f1(x), . . . , fn(x)) of a given stream x. In particular, we study the computation of frequency
moments, which has a long history in the data streams literature, like the frequent items
problem discussed earlier.
Definition 3.5.1. The kth frequency moment of the stream x is defined as Fk = Fk(f) :=∑
j∈[n] f
k
j = ‖f(x)‖kk. Slightly abusing notation, we also define Fk(v) := ‖v‖kk for a vector v.
It is well known that in the traditional data stream model, exact computation of Fk
(k 6= 1) requires Ω(n) space. Even constant factor approximation requires Ω(n1−2/k) space
for k ≥ 2 [31].
3.5.1 Schemes for Frequency Moments
We now show a family of schemes that exhibit an optimal tradeoff between verification
space and annotation length for the exact computation of Fk as a special case. This scheme
is a good example of a sum-check scheme as described in Section 3.1, and is based on the
Aaronson–Wigderson MA protocol for disj [3].
Theorem 3.5.2. Let f (1), . . . , f (`) denote the frequency vectors of ` data streams, each over
the universe [n]. Let g be an `-variate polynomial of total degree d over the integers. Let
F =
∑n
i=1 g(f
(1)
i , . . . , f
(`)
i ), and let o be an a priori upper bound on |F |. Then for positive
integers ca, cv with cacv ≥ n, there is an online (dca(log n+ log o), `cv(log n+ log o))-scheme
for computing F in the non-strict turnstile update model.
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Proof. We work on Fq, the finite field with q elements, for a suitably large prime q; the
choice q > 2d(n+ o)2 suffices. V treats each n-dimensional vector f (j) as a ca× cv array with
entries in Fq, using any canonical injection from [n] to [ca] × [cv], and interpreting integers
as elements of Fq in the natural way. Through interpolation, this defines a unique bivariate
polynomial f˜ (j)(X, Y ) ∈ Fq[X, Y ] of degree ca − 1 in X and cv − 1 in Y , such that for all
x ∈ [ca], y ∈ [cv], f˜ (j)(x, y) = f (j)(x, y).
The polynomials f˜ (j) can then be evaluated at locations outside [ca] × [cv], so in the
scheme V picks a random position r ∈ Fq, and evaluates f (j)(r, y) for all j ∈ [`] and y ∈ [cv];
V can do this using cv words of memory per vector f (j) in a streaming manner as follows.
To maintain each f˜ (j)(r, y) for y ∈ [cv], note that upon reading a new token i ∈ [n] in
stream j that maps to (a, b) ∈ [ca] × [cv], the necessary update is of the form f˜ (j)(r, y) ←
f˜ (j)(r, y) + χa,b(r, y), where χa,b is the Lagrange polynomial
χa,b(X, Y ) :=
∏
i∈[ca]\{a}
(X − i)(a− i)−1 ·
∏
j∈[cv ]\{b}
(Y − j)(b− j)−1 .
Since χa,b(r, y) = 0 for any y ∈ [cv] \ {b}, the verifier need only update the single value
f˜ (j)(r, b), by adding χa,b(r, b), upon reading this token. Using a table of O(ca) appropriate
precomputed values, this update can be computed quickly. For ca ≤
√
n, this takes a constant
number of arithmetic operations per update without affecting the asymptotic space cost.
Let g˜ denote the total-degree-d polynomial over Fq that agrees with g at all inputs in F`q.
P then presents a polynomial p(X) of degree at most d(ca−1) that is claimed to be identical
to
∑
y∈[cv ] g˜(f˜
(1)(X, y), . . . , f˜ (`)(X, y)).
V checks that p(r) = ∑y∈[cv ] g˜ (f˜ (1)(r, y), . . . , f˜ (`)(r, y)). If this sum check passes, then
V believes P ’s claim and accepts ∑x∈[ca] p(x) as the correct answer. It is evident that this
scheme satisfies perfect completeness. The proof of soundness follows from the Schwartz-
38
Zippel lemma: if P ’s claim is false, then
Pr
[
p(r) =
∑
y∈[cv ]
g˜
(
f˜ (1)(r, y), . . . , f˜ (`)(r, y)
)]
≤ d(ca − 1)/q .
By setting ` = 1 and g(fi) = f
k
i , we obtain the following immediate corollary.
Theorem 3.5.3. Suppose ca and cv are positive integers with ca · cv ≥ n. Then, for integers
k ≥ 1, there exists an online (k2ca logm, kcv logm)-scheme for computing Fk exactly in the
non-strict turnstile update model.
Numerous problems such as computing Hamming distances and inner products, and
approximating F2 and F∞, can be solved using Fk as a primitive or using related techniques.
We proceed to outline the relevant schemes and the results they provide.
Approximate F2. We obtain an AMA scheme that can approximate F2 up to a (1 + ε)
factor from an integer linear sketch of size O(1/ε2) [5, 62, 101]. In particular, if CSw(A) de-
notes a length-w Count-Sketch vector of the stream A built using 4-wise independent hash
functions, then F2(CSw(A)) estimates F2(A) with relative error ε = w
−1/2 with constant
probability [101]. Thus, if the verifier and helper have access to a source of public random-
ness to define the hash functions used by the sketch, the above F2 scheme yields an online
(ε−2α logm, ε2α−2 logm)-scheme for any α ∈ [0, 1]. This follows from the combination of
sum-check techniques with the observation that the verifier can track linear updates to their
sketch efficiently.
Approximate F∞. Recall that F∞ = maxj∈[n] fj and note that F t∞ ≤ Ft ≤ nF t∞. Hence,
if t = log n/ log(1 + ε), then (Ft)
1/t is at most a factor 1 + ε from F∞. This yields an online
((1
ε
log n)2ca logm, (
1
ε
log n)cv logm)-scheme for approximating F∞ for any ca, cv such that
ca · cv ≥ n. We make use of this scheme in Section 3.7.1.
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Inner Product and Hamming Distance. Consider a stream consisting of a string x ∈
{0, 1}N followed by a string y ∈ {0, 1}N . Exact computation of F2 implies online schemes
for certain functions of x and y. For example, the inner product x ·y is (F2(x+y)−F2(x)−
F2(y))/2 and the Hamming distance between x and y is |{i : xi = 1}|+ |{i : yi = 1}|−2x ·y.
Hence we get an online (ca logN, cv logN)-scheme for each of these functions, for every pair
of positive integers ca, cv satisfying ca · cv ≥ N . Alternately, Theorem 3.5.2 can be used to
more directly generate schemes for these problems with the same bounds, by treating x and
y as two separate data streams, and setting g(fi(x), fi(y)) = fi(x) · fi(y).
3.5.2 Lower Bounds on Frequency Moments
We now present lower bounds on the tradeoffs possible for the exact and approximate
computation of the nontrivial frequency moments Fk. The first part of the theorem below
shows that the tradeoff given by Theorem 3.5.3 is nearly tight.
Theorem 3.5.4. Suppose k ≥ 0 and k 6= 1. Let Q be a (ca, cv)-scheme (online or prescient)
for computing Fk even in the insert-only unit-update model.
(1) If Q computes Fk exactly, then it requires ca · cv = Ω(n).
(2) If Q approximates Fk up to a constant factor, then it requires ca · cv = Ω(n1−5/k).
Proof. Both results follow from lower bounds on the MA complexity of disjn,t : {0, 1}nt →
{0, 1}, the t-party set disjointness problem, which is defined as follows. The input is a t ×
n Boolean matrix, with Player i holding the ith row, for i ∈ [t]. We call an input x =
(xij)i∈[t],j∈[n] valid if every column of x has weight either 0 or 1 or t, and at most one column
has weight t. The desired output is
disjn,t(x) := ¬ ∨nj=1 ∧ti=1xij ,
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i.e., 1 iff the subsets of [n] represented by the rows of x are disjoint. Note that disjn,t is
naturally related to frequency moments: for any valid input x, Fk(S) ≥ tk if disjn,t(x) = 0
and Fk(S) ≤ n if disjn,t(x) = 1 where S is the multiset {j : xij = 1}. Thus, reductions from
disjn,2 and disjn,O(n1/k) establish the first and second parts of the theorem, respectively, in
a straightforward manner.
To complete the proof, we need a lower bound for disjn,t itself. This is given in the next
theorem, which generalizes a result by Klauck [70] and also resolves a question of Feigenbaum
et al. [50].
Theorem 3.5.5. Let Q be an ε-error t-party MA protocol for disjn,t, where ε ≤ 1/3. Then
hcost(Q) · vcost(Q) = Ω(n/t4). In particular, MA(disjn,t) = Ω(
√
n/t2).
Proof. A rectangle is defined as a subset of inputs of the form X1 × · · · × Xt, where each
Xi ⊆ {0, 1}n is a subset of the set of all possible inputs for Player i. A basic fact about
deterministic communication protocols is that the inverse image of any transcript of such a
protocol must be a rectangle; this is usually called the rectangle property. Let A = disj−1n,t(1)
and B = disj−1n,t(0). The following lemma was proved by Alon, Matias and Szegedy [6],
generalizing a result due to Razborov [84].
Lemma 3.5.6 (Lemma 3.4 of [6]). There exists a distribution µ over valid inputs such that
(1) µ(A) = µ(B) = 1/2, and
(2) every rectangle T satisfies µ(T ∩B) ≥ (2e)−1µ(T ∩ A)− t2−n/2t4.
Returning to our theorem, assume t = ω(n1/4) since otherwise the bound is trivial. Put
ca = hcost(Q) and cv = vcost(Q). An input x ∈ A is said to be covered by a message
h from Merlin if PrR[out
Q(x, R, h) = 0] ≤ ε. By correctness, every such input must be
covered, so there exists a help message h∗ that covers every input in a set G ⊆ A, with
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µ(G) ≥ 2−caµ(A) = 2−ca−1. Fix Merlin’s message inQ to h∗ and amplify the correctness of the
resulting randomized Merlin-free protocol by repeating itO(ca) times and taking the majority
of the outputs. This gives us a randomized protocol Q′ for disjn,t with communication cost
c = O(ca · cv) whose error, on every input in G ∪B, is at most 2−2ca .
Let µ′ denote the distribution µ conditioned on G ∪ B. Note that, by condition (1) of
Lemma 3.5.6,
∀x ∈ {0, 1}nt : either µ′(x) = 0 or µ(x) ≤ µ′(x) ≤ 2µ(x) . (3.1)
By fixing the random coins of Q′ we can obtain a deterministic protocol Q′′, for disjn,t, that
communicates c bits and satisfies errµ′(Q′′) ≤ 2−2ca . By the rectangle property, there exist
disjoint rectangles T1, T2, . . . , T2c such that out
Q′′(x) = 1 if and only if x ∈ ⋃2ci=1 Ti. Therefore
2c∑
i=1
µ′(Ti ∩B) ≤ 2−2ca , and (3.2)
µ′
(
A \
2c⋃
i=1
Ti
)
≤ 2−2ca . (3.3)
By (3.1), we have µ′(A) = µ′(G) ≥ µ(G) ≥ 2−ca−1. Using (3.1), and a rearrangement of (3.3):
2c∑
i=1
µ(Ti ∩ A) ≥ 1
2
2c∑
i=1
µ′(Ti ∩ A) ≥ 1
2
(
µ′(A)− 2−2ca) ≥ 2−ca−3 .
Suppose c ≤ n/5t4 and n is large enough. Applying condition (2) of Lemma 3.5.6 to each
term in the leftmost sum above, we get
2c∑
i=1
µ(Ti ∩B) ≥ 2
−ca−3
2e
− 2ct · 2−n/2t4 ≥ 2−ca−6 .
However, by (3.1) and (3.2), we have
∑2c
i=1 µ(Ti∩B) ≤ 2−2ca , a contradiction. Hence ca ·cv =
Ω(c) = Ω(n/t4).
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3.6 Frequent Items
In this section, we provide further results on finding exact frequent items. Our new
results for frequent items improve over Theorem 3.4.1 in two ways: Firstly, we show that in
the online case, the frequencies of all items in the witness set can be simultaneously checked
with essentially the same cost as checking a single frequency, thereby saving some polynomial
factors. Secondly, we show that in the prescient case it is possible to use a more compact
witness set relative to Theorem 3.4.1, thereby saving logarithmic factors.
Theorem 3.6.1. Let T = φN ′, where N ′ =
∑
i∈[n] fi is the sum of the frequencies of a data
stream over a universe of size n. For every pair of positive integers ca, cv satisfying ca ·cv ≥ n,
there is an online (φ−1 log2 n+ ca log n, cv log n)-scheme for finding {j : fj > T} in the strict
turnstile update model, as well as a prescient (φ−1 log n, φ−1 log n)-scheme. Any online or
prescient (ca, cv)-scheme for this problem, even in the unit-update insert-only model, must
have ca · cv = Ω(n).
Proof. We begin with the online scheme. Let W be the witness set from Theorem 3.4.1.
Recall that W is a subset of the nodes of a binary tree T imposed over the data universe,
and in the scheme of Theorem 3.4.1, P sends to V a claimed value for fˆ(w) = ∑i∈L(w) fi,
where L(w) denotes the set of all leaves in the subtree rooted at W .
We show how V can check that fˆ(w) is as claimed for all items w ∈ W . Let z denote the
2n−1-dimensional vector such that zw = 1 if w ∈ W , and zw = 0 otherwise. Let f ∗ denote the
2n−1-dimensional vector such that f ∗w equals the claimed value of fˆ(w) if w ∈ W , and f ∗w = 0
otherwise. Abusing notation, we will also think of fˆ itself as a 2n−1-dimensional vector such
that fˆw = fˆ(w). Then fˆ(w) = f
∗
w for all w ∈ W if and only if 0 =
∑
j∈[2n−1] zj(fˆw − f ∗w)2.
Theorem 3.5.2 gives an online scheme for computing the quantity
∑
j∈[2n−1] zj(fˆw − f ∗w)2:
within the statement of Theorem 3.5.2, we let ` = 3, f (1) = fˆ , f (2) = f ∗, and f (3) = z. It is
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easy for V to run the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 on derived streams defining these three vectors;
for any ca, cv such that cacv ≥ n, Theorem 3.5.2 yields a scheme with hcost = O(ca log n)
and vcost = O(cv log n).
Thus, the total hcost of our scheme is φ−1 log2 n + ca log n, where the φ−1 log
2 n term is
the annotation required to specify the items in W and the claimed values for fˆw : w ∈ W ,
while the ca log n term is the annotation required to check that the claimed fˆw values are
correct. The verifier’s space usage is cv log n, yielding the claimed result.
For the prescient scheme, we specify a witness set that is more succinct than that of
Theorem 3.4.1. Consider a binary tree T whose leaves are the elements of the universe [n],
as in Theorem 3.4.1. We will specify a witness set W of size O(φ−1) to identify to identify all
leaves j with fj > T ; we base W on the concept of Hierarchical Heavy Hitters (HHHs) [37].
Below, we refer to the set of Hierarchical Heavy Hitters as H.
We define H inductively, beginning with the leaves and working our way to the root.
We include a leaf in H if its frequency exceeds T . Let u be a node at distance l from the
root (i.e., at level l of T ), and assume inductively that we have determined all HHHs at
levels greater than l. Let H(u) denote the set of descendants of u that have been included in
H, and let L(u) denote the set of leaves of the subtree rooted at u. Finally, define S(u) :=
L(u) \ ( ∪v∈H(u) L(v)). Intuitively, S(u) is the set of leaves in L(u) that have not already
contributed their frequency to an HHH descendant of u. Define the conditioned count of u
as g(u) :=
∑
j∈S(u) fj; we include u in H if g(u) > T . Observe there are at most φ
−1 items
in H since T = φN ′: each leaf contributes its frequency to g(u) for exactly one u ∈ H, and
therefore |H|T ≤∑u∈H g(u) ≤ N ′.
We now define our witness set W as all leaves j in H in addition to all nodes u such that
u’s parent is in H but u is not in H. Observe that each node u ∈ W is witness to the fact
that no leaves j ∈ S(u) can have fj > T . We also include the root r in W to account for any
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leaves that are not descendants of any node in H. The sets S(u) for u ∈ W form a partition
of [n]. Notice that |W | = O(φ−1) since |H| ≤ φ−1.
In the prescient scheme, the helper lists all nodes u ∈ W sorted by the natural order
on nodes, and the verifier remembers this information. The verifier may then compute the
conditioned count of each u ∈ W using space O(|W | log n) = O(φ−1 log n): each time an item
j appears in the stream, the verifier determines the unique u ∈ W such that j ∈ S(u) (u
is simply the ancestor of j in W farthest from the root), and increments g(u). The verifier
checks that g(j) > T for all leaf nodes j ∈ W , and that g(u) ≤ T for all internal nodes in
W and outputs ⊥ otherwise. Since the sets S(u) partition [n], this latter check ensures that
the helper does not omit any leaves j with fj > T .
We prove the lower bound by an easy reduction from two-party set-disjointness, disjn,2.
Consider Alice and Bob with respective inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1}n. Alice’s input x induces a
stream A by placing one copy of token j in the stream if xj = 1. Then Bob places one copy
of item j in the stream if yj = 1. We may assume Bob knows |{j : xj = 1}|, and hence knows
the number of non-zero entries N ′ in the stream; if not Alice can tell Bob |{j : xj = 1}| at
an additive cost of logarithmically many bits. Now x and y are disjoint if and only if the set
{j : fj > 1 = φN ′} for φ = 1/N ′ is non-empty. Thus, determining the frequent items for
T = 1 solves two-party set disjointness, proving the bound by Theorem 3.5.5.
3.7 Frequency-Based Functions
It is natural to ask whether the Fk scheme of Theorem 3.5.3 generalizes to more com-
plicated functions. We demonstrate that this is indeed the case by presenting non-trivial
algorithms for the class of all frequency based functions. A frequency based function is any
function G on frequency vectors f = (f1, . . . , fn) of the form G(f) =
∑
j∈[n] g(fj) for some
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Figure 3.2: Example to illustrate Theorem 3.7.1
g : Z+ → Z+.
Frequency-based functions have a number of important special cases, including frequency
moments, F0 (the number of distinct items in the stream), and point and range queries on
the frequency distribution, and can also be used to compute F∞, the highest frequency in the
frequency vector. These functions occupy an important place in the streaming world: Alon,
Matias, and Szegedy asked for a precise characterization of which frequency-based functions
can be approximated efficiently in the standard streaming model in their seminal paper
[6]. Braverman and Ostrovsky [22] gave a zero-one law for approximating monotonically
increasing functions of frequencies that are zero at the origin. This can be contrasted with
our result that, in the annotation model, all frequency-based functions have non-trivial exact
schemes.
Theorem 3.7.1. Assume g(x) ≤ nc for some constant c, so that each value in the range of
g and G can be represented using O(log n) bits. Suppose N = O(n). Let G(f) =
∑
j∈[n] g(fj)
be any frequency-based function. Then G has a prescient (n2/3 log n, n2/3 log n)-scheme and
an online (n2/3 log4/3 n, n2/3 log4/3 n)-scheme, both in the non-strict turnstile update model.
Proof. We first describe the prescient scheme. It is natural to attempt to directly apply
the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 (with ` = 1) to the given function g. However, this does not
yield a useful result. The problem with this approach is that while the function g within the
definition of G may be viewed through polynomial interpolation as a polynomial g˜ over the
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integers or the relevant finite field, the degree of g˜ may be large – as large as 2N , since we
need it to hold that g˜(x) = g(x) for all possible frequencies x ∈ {−N, . . . , N}. If N = Ω(n),
it would be more efficient for the helper to just repeat the stream in sorted order.
The solution is to reduce the degree of g˜ by removing the heavy hitters from x with the
aid of the prover. That is, we run the prescient heavy hitters scheme from Theorem 3.6.1 to
determine H :=
∑
j∈S g(fj)−|S|g(0), where S := {j : fj ≥ nβ} and β < 1 is a parameter we
will fix later. Note that this requires communication O((N/nβ) log n) = O(n1−β log n) since
N = O(n) by assumption. Intuitively, H represents the contribution of the heavy hitters to
the frequency-based function, and the verifier then “removes” these items from the stream
by setting fj = 0 for all j ∈ S. This ensures that the removed items do not contribute to the
sum R =
∑
j∈[n] g(fj). The verifier and prover then run the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 on the
modified frequency vector, and the final result is given by H +R. From now on, let f denote
this modified vector.
Figure 3.2 gives an illustation of the central idea: the frequency distribution is concep-
tually split into two pieces, the set of heavy hitters S and the residual distribution f . The
contributions of each piece are calculated as H and R respectively, and summed to obtain
the answer G.
When running the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2, we exploit the fact that each entry of f lies
in {0, 1, . . . , nβ}. This lets us use a degree-nβ polynomial g˜ within the scheme of Theorem
3.5.2. For any ca, cv such that ca · cv ≥ n, Theorem 3.5.2 yields an online (nβca log n, cv log n)
scheme for computing
∑
i∈[n] g˜(fi).
It remains to show that we can set the parameters ca, cv, and β of the above protocol to
achieve hcost = vcost = O(n2/3 log n). The help cost isO(n1−β log n) bits for the heavy hitters
scheme plus O(can
β log n) bits for the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2. The respective verification
costs are O(n1−β log n) and O(cv log n). Setting β = 13 , ca = n
1/3, and cv = n
2/3 achieves the
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desired costs.
In order to achieve an online (n2/3 log4/3 n, n2/3 log4/3 n)-scheme for G, observe that the
only place where the above scheme used prescience was to identify heavy hitters. So we simply
substitute the online heavy hitters scheme of Theorem 3.6.1, with parameter α ∈ [0, 1],
in place of the prescient version. In this case, the help cost is O(n1−β log2 n + nα log n)
bits for the heavy hitters scheme and O(can
β log n) bits for the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2.
The respective verification costs are O(n1−α log n) and O(cv log n). Balancing these costs by
setting nβ = n1/3 log2/3 n, nα = n2/3, ca = n
1/3/ log1/3 n, and cv = n
2/3 log1/3 n gives the
desired overall costs.
Applications. Theorem 3.7.1 provides annotation schemes for the problems described
below.
• We can compute F0, the number of items with non-zero count. This follows by observing
that F0 is equivalent to computing
∑
i∈[u] g(fi) for the function g given by g(0) = 0
and g(x) = 1 for x > 0. This yields a prescient (n2/3 log n, n2/3 log n)-scheme for F0,
and an online (n2/3 log4/3 n, n2/3 log4/3 n)-scheme.
• More generally, we can compute functions on the inverse distribution, i.e., queries of
the form “How many items occur exactly k times in the stream?” We do this by setting
g(k) = 1 and g(x) = 0 for x 6= k; here we think of k as being fixed. In the case of
k = 1, this function is known as rarity [45]. One can build on this to compute, e.g., the
number of items that occurred between k and k′ times, the median of this distribution,
etc.
• We obtain a protocol for F∞ = maxj∈[n] fj, with a little more work. The helper first
claims a lower bound ` on F∞ by providing the index of an item with frequency
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F∞, which the verifier checks by running the generalized index protocol from Sec-
tion 3.3 (see Remark 2 after Theorem 3.3.2). Then the verifier runs the above protocol
with g(x) = 0 for x ≤ ` and g(x) = 1 for i > `; if ∑j∈[n] g(fj) = 0, then the
verifier is convinced that no item has frequency higher than `, and concludes that
F∞ = `. We therefore achieve a prescient (n2/3 log n, n2/3 log n)-scheme and an online
(n2/3 log4/3 n, n2/3 log4/3 n)-scheme for F∞.
3.7.1 Frequency-Based Functions for Skewed Streams
In practice, the frequency distributions of data streams are often skewed, in the sense
that a small number of frequent items make up a large portion of the stream. We observe
that, if the stream is sufficiently skewed, so that there are few heavy hitters, we can achieve
more efficient schemes for frequency-based functions. To see this, notice that in the scheme
of Theorem 3.7.1, the verifier, after learning the heavy hitters from the helper, only needs
to know an approximate upper bound on F∞(A′), where A′ is the stream obtained from
the input stream A by deleting all the heavy hitters. That is, the helper only needs to
convince the verifier that he has presented “enough” of the true heavy hitters (and their
exact frequencies) so that F∞(A′) ≤ b for some upper bound b = Θ(nβ)—then we may
define g˜ to agree with g on [b], so that the degree of g˜ remains O(nβ).
Observe that if there are not many heavy items, the helper can send a list L of heavy
hitters and their frequencies (proving the frequencies are truthful as in Theorem 3.6.1) and
then appending a proof of an approximate upper bound (within factor 1 + ε) as per Section
3.5.1 on the quantity F∞(A′).
It suffices to let ε be any positive constant in order to achieve b = O(nβ). When there
are fewer than ` items with frequency greater than nβ, the index queries, if they are on-
line, require annotation O(` log n+ ca log n) and space O(cv log n) for the verifier, while the
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approximate F∞ scheme requires annotation O(ca log
3 n) and space O(cv log
2 n). Therefore,
we will obtain an (` log n+ ca log
3 n, cv log
2 n) scheme for identifying the set of heavy hitters
and an upper bound u on F∞(A′).
For concreteness, we will analyze the costs of our improved scheme under the assumption
that the frequencies of items in the stream follow a Zipfian distribution, a power law distribu-
tion that accurately approximates many real-world data sets. Under the Zipfian distribution,
the ith largest frequency is (at most) Ni−z for parameter z. Setting this equal to nβ and
rearranging, we obtain that there are at most (N/nβ)1/z heavy hitters to identify.
Therefore, if N = Θ(n), we can reduce the cost of the heavy hitters sub-protocol
within the scheme of Theorem 3.7.1 to (n(1−β)/z log n + capolylog n, cvpolylog n). Adding
in the annotation cost of sending the polynomial g˜ ◦ f˜ , and the space cost to the veri-
fier, the entire scheme therefore requires O˜(n(1−β)/z + canβ) annotation and O˜(cv) space,
where the O˜ notation hides factors polylogarithmic in n. Assume z ≤ 2. Balancing ex-
ponents by setting β = (2 − z)/(2 + z), ca = nz/(2+z), and cv = n/ca, we obtain an
(n2/(2+z)polylog n, n2/(2+z)polylog n) scheme.
This strictly improves on Theorem 3.7.1 as long as z > 1. For example, if z = 2, we
obtain an online (n1/2polylog n, n1/2polylog n)-scheme, which essentially matches the cost of
our online scheme for F2 from Theorem 3.5.3.
3.8 Set and Multiset Inclusion
Building on some of the results and techniques in Section 3.5, we now address a family of
abstract problems that involve a helper proving a subset (inclusion) relation to a streaming
verifier. Both sets and multisets are of interest. For example, we may need to prove that
A ⊆ B for two sets A and B, or we may need to prove that a set A is exactly the support
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set of a multiset B. These abstract problems turn out to be common subproblems arising
in a number of applications that we shall consider later (see, e.g., Theorems 3.10.5, 3.10.6,
and 3.10.7).
Throughout this section, the size of a multiset is the number of elements in it, counting
multiplicities. A fingerprint of a multiset is a basic fingerprint, as in Definition 3.2.1, of its
characteristic (frequency) vector.
Lemma 3.8.1. Let A ⊆ [n] be a set and B ⊆ [n] a multiset of size t. Let B′ be the set
formed by removing all duplicate elements from B. Then, given a stream which begins with
the elements of A followed by the elements of B, there is a prescient (t log n, log n)-scheme
that establishes whether B′ = A.
Proof. As the elements of A are observed in the stream, the helper annotates each a ∈ A
with the multiplicity, fa, of a in B. Once A has been observed, the helper then lists each
element b in the set difference B′ \ A, along with the corresponding multiplicity fb in B.
Obviously there are no such elements iff B′ = A. From the provided information, the verifier
constructs a fingerprint of the multiset in which each a ∈ A ∪ B′ appears with multiplicity
fa.
Then, while observing the elements of the multiset B, the verifier incrementally constructs
a fingerprint of B, as in Lemma 3.2.1. The verifier accepts iff the two fingerprints match.
In the remainder of this section, we give three schemes achieving tradeoffs between hcost
and vcost for (multi)-set inclusion, in order of generality. First, we give an essentially optimal
online (ca log n, cv log n)-scheme, for any positive integers ca and cv with ca · cv ≥ n, for the
special case when B is a set rather than a multiset.
Theorem 3.8.2. Let X, Y ⊆ [n] be sets. Then given a stream with elements of X and Y
arbitrarily interleaved, there is an online (ca log n, cv log n)-scheme for determining whether
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X ⊆ Y for any ca and cv such that ca · cv ≥ n. Moreover, any online (ca, cv)-scheme requires
ca · cv = Ω(n).
Proof. Let x, y ∈ {0, 1}n be the characteristic vectors of X and Y respectively. Notice F2(y−
x) = |X∆Y |. Thus, X ⊆ Y if and only if F2(y−x) = |Y |−|X|. Consequently, the helper can
run the F2 scheme of Theorem 3.5.3 on the vector y − x to determine if the above equality
holds.
The lower bound follows from a straightforward reduction from index. Take N = n.
Given the string x ∈ {0, 1}n, Alice transforms it into the stream over [n] representing the
set Y = {j : xj = 1}. Given the index i ∈ [n], Bob transforms it into a stream representing
the singleton set X = {i}. Then xi = 1 if and only if X ⊆ Y .
We now show how to use the result for frequency-based functions to handle duplicated
items; in this case X and Y are multisets rather than sets. The next theorem lets us efficiently
handle a small number of duplicates.
Theorem 3.8.3. Let X, Y ⊆ [n] be multisets. Assume k is a known upper bound on the
maximum frequency of any element in X or in Y . Then given a stream with elements of X
and Y arbitrarily interleaved, there is a online (kca log n, cv log n)-scheme for determining
whether X ⊆ Y , for any ca and cv with cacv ≥ n.
Proof. Let x, y be the characteristic vectors of X and Y respectively. Then X ⊆ Y if and only
if yi− xi ≥ 0 for all i. The bound on the maximum frequency implies that −k ≤ yi− xi ≤ k
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let g˜ be defined through interpolation as the polynomial of degree
2k over the finite field Fp such that g˜(x) = 0 for x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, and g˜(x) = 1 for
x ∈ {−k,−k+ 1, . . . ,−1}. Then ∑i g˜(yi−xi) = 0 if and only if X ⊆ Y ; intuitively, g˜ acts as
an indicator function for the set of possible negative entries in the vector y−x. Applying the
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polynomial-agreement protocol defined in the proof of Theorem 3.7.1 under this definition
of g˜, we obtain a (kca log n, cv log n)-scheme for checking X ⊆ Y whenever ca · cv ≥ n.
Finally, we give an online (n2/3 log n, n2/3 log n)-scheme for the general multiset inclusion
problem, as long as t = O(n).
Theorem 3.8.4. Let X, Y ⊆ [n] be multisets of size at most t. Then given a stream with
elements of X and Y arbitrarily interleaved, there is there is an online (n2/3 log n, n2/3 log n)-
scheme for determining whether X ⊆ Y assuming t = O(n).
Proof. Let x, y be the characteristic vectors of X and Y respectively. It holds that X ⊆ Y if
and only if yi−xi ≥ 0 for all i. Define g : {−t,−t+1, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , t} → {0, 1} by g(x) = 0 for
x ∈ {0, . . . , t} and g(x) = 1 for x ∈ {−t,−t+1, . . . ,−1}. The theorem holds by applying the
protocol of Theorem 3.7.1 to G(f), where f is the vector y− x and G is the frequency-based
function defined by g. (As stated, the protocol of Theorem 3.7.1 applies only to g : Z+ → Z+,
but it applies without modification to any function g defined on a suitably small domain,
such as ours).
3.9 Matrix-Vector Multiplication
We now give a scheme achieving essentially optimal tradeoffs between annotation length
and space usage for multiplying a b× c integer matrix A by a c-dimensional vector x.
Theorem 3.9.1. Consider a data stream containing entries of a b × c matrix A and a
c-dimensional vector x, in some arbitrary order, possibly interleaved. We assume that all
entries of A and x are integers of absolute value polynomial in b and c. For any positive
integers ca, cv such that cacv ≥ c, there is an online (bca log(b + c), cv log(b + c))-scheme for
computing product Ax. Moreover, any (ca, cv) protocol requires ca · cv = Ω(min(c, b)2) bits for
matrices with Ω(b · c) non-zero entries.
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Proof. We begin with the upper bound. The protocol for verifying inner-products, which
follows from Theorem 3.5.2 treats a c dimensional vector (such as a row of A) as a ca × cv
array H, where ca · cv ≥ c. This then defines a bivariate polynomial h over a suitably large
field Fq, such that h has degree ca in its first variable and cv in its second variable, and such
that h(x, y) = Hx,y for all (x, y) ∈ [ca]× [cv]. For an inner-product between two vectors (such
as a row of A and the vector x, treated as arrays H and G respectively), we wish to compute∑
x∈[ca],y∈[cv ] Gx,yHx,y =
∑
x∈[ca],y∈[cv ] g(x, y)h(x, y) for the corresponding arrays G,H and
polynomials g, h. These polynomials can then be evaluated at locations outside [ca]× [cv], so
in the protocol V picks a random position r and evaluates h(r, y) and g(r, y) for 1 ≤ y ≤ cv.
P then presents a degree ca polynomial p(X) which is claimed to be
∑cv
y=1 g(X, y)h(X, y).
V checks that p(r) = ∑cvy=1 g(r, y)h(r, y), and if so accepts ∑cax=1 p(x) as the correct answer.
In Theorem 3.5.2 it is shown how V can compute h(r, y) efficiently as H is defined
incrementally in the stream: each addition of δ to a particular index is mapped to (x, y) ∈
[ca]× [cv], which causes h(r, y)← h(r, y) + δ · χx,y(r), where χx,y is a Lagrange polynomial.
Equivalently, the final value of h(r, y) over updates in the stream where the jth update is
tj = (δj, xj, yj) is f(r, y) =
∑
tj :yj=y
δj · χxj ,y(r).
To run this protocol over multiple vectors in parallel naively would require keeping the
h(r, y) values implied by each different vector separately, which would be costly, as it would
increase both the annotation and the space usage by a factor of b relative to a single inner
product query. Our observation is that rather than keep these values explicitly, it is sufficient
to keep only a fingerprint of these values, using the linearity of fingerprint functions to finally
test whether the polynomials provided by P for each vector together agree with the stored
values.
In our setting, the b×c matrix A implies b bivariate polynomials h1, . . . , hb of degree ca in
the first variable and cv in the second. We evaluate each polynomial at (r, y) for 1 ≤ y ≤ cv
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for the same value of r: since each test is fooled by P with small probability, the chance that
none of them is fooled can be kept high by choosing the field to evaluate the polynomials over
to have size polynomial in b+ c. Thus, conceptually, the parallel invocation of b instances of
this protocol require us to store hi(r, y) for 1 ≤ y ≤ cv and 1 ≤ i ≤ b (for the b rows of A), as
well as g(r, y) for 1 ≤ y ≤ cv (where g is the polynomial derived from x). Rather than store
this set of b · cv values explicitly, V instead stores only cv fingerprints, one for each value of
y, where each fingerprint captures the vector b values of hi(r, y).
From the definition of our fingerprinting function in Lemma 3.2.1, this means over stream
updates tj = (δj, ij, xj, yj) of weight δj to row ij and column indexed by xj and yj we compute
one fingerprint zy for each value y ∈ [cv]:
zy =
b∑
i=1
hi(r, y)α
i =
b∑
i=1
∑
tj :yj=y,ij=i
δj · χxj ,y(rj)αi,
where α is chosen uniformly at random from Fq as in Lemma 3.2.1. Observe that for each y
this can be computed incrementally in the stream by storing only r and the current value of
zy.
To verify the correctness, V receives the b polynomials pi, one for each row, and incre-
mentally builds a fingerprint z∗ of the b-dimensional vector whose ith entry is pi(r). V then
tests whether
cv∑
y=1
zyg(r, y) = z
∗.
To see the correctness of this, we expand the left hand side as
cv∑
y=1
zyg(r, y) =
cv∑
y=1
( b∑
i=1
hi(r, y)α
i
)
g(r, y)
=
cv∑
y=1
( b∑
i=1
g(r, y)hi(r, y)α
i
)
=
b∑
i=1
( cv∑
y=1
g(r, y)hi(r, y)
)
αi
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Likewise, if all pi’s are as claimed, then
z∗ =
b∑
i=1
pi(r)α
i =
b∑
i=1
(
cv∑
y=1
g(r, y)hi(r, y)
)
αi
Thus, if the pi’s are as claimed, then these two fingerprints will match. Moreover, by
the Schwartz-Zippel lemma (Lemma 2.2.1), and the fact that α and r are picked uniformly
at random from Fq by V and not known to P , the fingerprints will not match with high
probability if the pi’s are not as claimed, when the polynomials are evaluated over a field of
size polynomial in (b+ c).
To analyze the vcost, we observe that V can compute all fingerprints in O(cv) space. As
P provides each polynomial pi(x) in turn, V can incrementally compute z∗ and check that
this matches
∑cv
y=1 zyg(r, y). At the same time, V also computes
∑b
i=1
∑ca
x=1 pi(x), as the
value of Ax. Note that if each pi is sent one after another, V can forget each previous oi after
the required fingerprints and evaluations have been made; and if ca is larger than cv, V does
not even need to keep pi in memory, but can instead evaluate it term by term in parallel for
each value of x. Thus the total space needed by V is dominated by the cv fingerprints and
check values.
The total size of the information sent by P is dominated by the b polynomials of degree
ca.
To prove the lower bound, we give a simple reduction of index to matrix-vector multi-
plication. Suppose we have an instance (x, k) of index where x ∈ {0, 1}n2 , k ∈ [n2]. Alice
constructs an n × n matrix A from x alone, in which Ai,j = 1 if xf(i,j)=1, where f is a 1-1
correspondence [n]× [n]→ [n2], and Ai,j = 0 otherwise. Assume f(i, j) = k. Bob then con-
structs a vector x ∈ Rn such that xi = 1 and all other entries of x are 0. Then the j’th entry
of Ax is 1 if and only if xf(i,j)=1, and therefore the value of xf(i,j) can be extracted from the
vector Ax. Therefore, if we had a (ca, cv) protocol for verifying matrix-vector multiplication
given an n× n matrix A (even for a stream in which all entries of A come before all entries
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of x), we would obtain a (
√
ca,
√
cv) protocol for index. The lower bound for matrix-vector
multiplication thus holds by a lower bound for index given in Theorem 3.3.2.
3.10 Graph Problems
In this section we consider computing properties of graphs with n vertices, determined by
a stream of m edges [48, 64] (possibly with deletions of edges). That is, each stream update
specifies an edge in [n]×[n] to be inserted or deleted. We present tight results for connectivity
of sparse graphs, bipartiteness, determining if a bipartite graph has a perfect matching,
counting triangles, shortest s-t path, and minimum weight bipartite perfect matching. Our
(standard) bipartite perfect matching result achieves optimal tradeoffs up to logarithmic
factors, as does our shortest s-t path result for small-diameter graphs.
3.10.1 Counting Triangles via Matrix Multiplication
Estimating the number of triangles in a graph has received significant attention because
of its relevance to database query optimization—knowing the degree of transitivity of a
relation is useful when estimating the cost of evaluation plans for certain relational queries—
and investigating structural properties of the web-graph and social graphs [11,25,67]. In the
absence of annotation, any single-pass algorithm to determine if there is a non-zero number
of triangles requires Ω(n2) bits of space, where n is the number of vertices in the graph [11].
In contrast, we show that the exact number of triangles can be verified in logarithmic space,
with the help of O(n2 log n) bits of annotation. The following theorem, proved using ideas
from Bar-Yossef et al. [11] coupled with Theorem 3.5.5, shows that this amount of annotation
is nearly optimal, for a log-space verifier.
Theorem 3.10.1. Any (ca, cv)-scheme for counting triangles on graphs with n vertices must
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have ca · cv = Ω(n2) for graphs with Ω(n2) edges, even in the insert-only update model.
Proof. We show a reduction from disj(n2/9),2. We represent an instance of disj as a pair of
(n/3) × (n/3) Boolean matrices X, Y in the natural way. We proceed to construct a graph
that has a triangle if and only if Xij = Yij = 1 for some i, j ∈ [n/3]. The nodes are partitioned
into sets U, V,W so that |U | = |V | = |W | = n/3. Insert edges {(ui, wi) : i ∈ [n/3]}∪{(ui, vj) :
Xij = 1} ∪ {(wi, vj) : Yij = 1}. There is a triangle (ui, vj, wi) iff Xij = Yij = 1, and there is
no other way to form a triangle. The result follows from Theorem 3.5.5.
We now outline an online scheme with vcost = O(log n) and hcost = O(n2 log n). A major
subroutine of our algorithm is the verification of (integer) matrix multiplication in our model.
That is, given n × n matrices A,B and C with integer entries, verify that AB = C. Our
technique extends the classic result of Frievalds [53] by showing that if the prover presents
the results in an appropriate order, the verifier needs only O(log n) bits to check the claim.
Note that this much annotation is necessary if the prover is to provide C in his stream.
Theorem 3.10.2. There exists an online (n2 log n, log n)-scheme for multiplying two n× n
integer matrices.
Proof. Let q be a prime larger than 2n · o2 + 1, where o is an a priori upper bound on the
absolute values of all entries of A and B. By the result of Kimbrel and Sinha [68], the verifier
can check AB = C by picking r uniformly from Fq and checking that A(BrT) = CrT, in
the field Fq, for vector r = (r0, r1, . . . , rn−1). This fails to identify an incorrect product with
probability at most n/q. Rather than computing A(BrT) and CrT explicitly, the verifier will
compare fingerprints of CrT and ABrT. These are computed as yCrT and yABrT, for a
vector y = (y0, y1, . . . , yn−1) where y is picked uniformly from Fq. This fingerprinting fails
to distinguish distinct vectors with probability at most n/q.
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We observe that (1) yCrT =
∑
i,j s
irjCij can be computed easily whatever order the
entries of C are presented in. (2) yABrT = (yA)(BrT) is the inner product of two n-
dimensional vectors, and that (yA)i =
∑
j y
jAij and (Br
T)i =
∑
j r
jBji. Therefore, if the
prover presents the ith column of A followed by the ith row of B for each i in turn, the
verifier can easily compute sABrT in O(log q) space. Picking q ≥ 6n ensures that the verifier
is fooled with probability at most 1/3, and the total space used by the verifier to store r, y
and intermediate values is O(log n).
With this primitive, arbitrary matrix products A`A`−1 · · ·A2A1 are verified with O(`n2 log n)
annotation by verifying A(2) := A2A1, then A
(3) := A3A
(2), etc. Matrix powers A` are verified
with O(n2 log ` log n) annotation, using repeated squaring. Here, we assume that the entries
computed do not grow too large, and so can be represented within O(log n) bits.
Theorem 3.10.3. There is an online (n2 log n, log n)-scheme for counting triangles in a
graph with n nodes.
Proof. Denote the graph adjacency matrix by A, with Aii := 0. The prover lists Avw and
A2vw for all pairs (v, w) in some canonical order. The verifier computes
∑
v,w AvwA
2
vw as the
number of triangles. The verifier uses fingerprints to check that A matches the original set
of edges, and the scheme in Theorem 3.10.2 to ensure that A2 is as claimed.
We also show that it is possible to trade off the computation with the prover in a “smooth”
manner. The approach is based on the following observation of Bar-Yossef et al. [11].
From the given stream of edges of a graph, we can create a derived stream, of length
m(n − 2), by replacing each edge (u, v) with the set of triples {(u, v, w) : w 6∈ {u, v}}.
The frequency moments of this derived stream can be expressed in terms of the numbers of
triples of nodes with exactly zero, one, two and three edges between them. It follows that
the number of triangles can be expressed in terms of the frequency moments of this derived
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stream, as (F3−3F2 +2F1)/6. By using the scheme of Theorem 3.5.3, we obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.10.4. For every pair of positive integers ca, cv such that ca · cv ≥ n3, there is an
online (ca log n, cv log n)-scheme for counting triangles in a graph with n nodes.
3.10.2 Bipartite Perfect Matching
We present an online scheme for determining whether a bipartite graph on n nodes has a
perfect matching. Our scheme achieves optimal tradeoffs between hcost and vcost for dense
graphs (i.e., graphs with Ω(n2) edges), up to logarithmic factors. Graph matchings have been
considered in the stream model [48,108] and it can be shown that any single-pass algorithm
for determining the exact size of the maximum matching requires Ω(n2) space. We show that
for any positive integers ca, cv satisfying cacv ≥ n we can off-load this computation to the
prover such that, with only O(nca log n) annotation, the answer can be verified in O(cv log n)
space. This is shown to be best possible by combining a reduction from [48] coupled with
Theorem 3.3.2. Later (see Theorem 3.11.1), we also present an online (m log n, log n) scheme
for this problem. Here, m denotes the number of edges in the graph – this corresponds to
the sparsity of the stream of edges, and so this notation is consistent with the use of m to
denote stream sparsity throughout this chapter and the next.
Theorem 3.10.5. Let ca, cv be positive integers such that cacv ≥ n. There exists an online
(nca log n, cv log n)-scheme for bipartite perfect matching on graphs with n nodes. Any online
(ca, cv)-scheme for bipartite perfect matching requires ca · cv = Ω(n2) for graphs with Ω(n2)
edges, even in the insert-only update model.
Proof. We begin with the upper bound. Our scheme follows the following outline: if G has a
perfect matching, the prover provides the matching, while if G has no perfect matching, the
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prover demonstrates this via Hall’s Theorem. The details follow.
If there is a perfect matchingM, the annotation lists all edges inM, followed by a proof
that M⊆ E. More specifically, for any ca · cv ≥ n2, Theorem 3.8.2 describes how to obtain
an online (ca log n, cv log n)-scheme for showing M ⊆ E, assuming no duplicate edges. This
can be extended to a (kca log n, cv log n)-scheme if edges may be duplicated up to k times by
Theorem 3.8.3. The prover uses this scheme to demonstrateM⊆ E, and the verifier checks
that M is a matching by comparing a fingerprint of M to one of the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
If the graph does not have a perfect matching, let (L,R) be a bipartition, and let L′ ⊆ L
be such that |L′| > |Γ(L′)|. We will use the online (nca log n, cv log n)-scheme for integer
n× n matrix-vector multiplication given in Theorem 3.9.1. The verifier must check that (1)
L is a bipartition of n; (2) L′ ⊆ L; and (3) |L′| > |Γ(L′)|. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be the indicator
vector of L, and let A be the adjacency matrix of G, i.e., Aij = 1 if there is an edge between
i and j in G and Aij = 0 otherwise. Condition (1) is equivalent to x
TAx = 0, which can be
checked using integer matrix-vector multiplication to verify Ax, followed by an inner-product
scheme to verify xTAx. Condition (2) can be checked trivially while the prover specifies L
by requiring the nodes of L′ to be marked. To check (3), notice that |Γ(L′)| is equal to the
number of non-zero entries in the vector Ax. This can be computed while the verifier checks
(1), and that |Γ(L′)| < |L′|.
The result is an online (knca log n, cv log n)-scheme, where k is an a priori upper bound
on the number of times each edge may be duplicated.
3.10.3 Bipartiteness
The problem of determining if a graph is bipartite was considered in the standard stream
model [48, 49], and it can be shown that any one-pass algorithm without annotations needs
Ω(n) bits of space. We prove later (see Theorem 3.11.1) that in our model, the prover can
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convince a verifier with O(log n) space whether a graph is bipartite, using only O(m log n)
annotation, and we show that this is essentially the best possible for sparse graphs where
m = O(n) using a reduction from disjn,2 to bipartiteness. Here, we achieve tradeoffs between
hcost and vcost for dense graphs, obtaining an online (nca log n, cv log n)-scheme for every
pair of positive integers ca, cv such that cacv ≥ n.
Theorem 3.10.6. Let ca, cv be positive integers such that ca · cv ≥ n. There exists an on-
line (nca log n, cv log n)-scheme for bipartiteness on graphs with n nodes. Any (ca, cv)-scheme
(online or prescient) for bipartiteness requires ca · cv = Ω(n) even when m = O(n), where m
is the number of edges.
Proof. In our scheme, the prover proves that a graph is non-bipartite by providing an odd
cycle C. The verifier must check that the number of edges in C is odd, that C is a cycle,
and that C ⊆ E. The verifier can easily perform the first two checks in logarithmic space.
The verifier checks that C ⊆ E using Theorem 3.8.2.
The prover proves that a graph is bipartite by specifying all nodes L in the left set of a
bipartition. Checking that L is indeed a bipartition of G can be done exactly as in Theorem
3.10.5.
For the lower bound, we reduce an instance (x, y) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n of disjn,2 to an
instance of bipartiteness on a graph withO(n) edges over nodes (vij)i∈[3],j∈[n]. For each j ∈ [n],
create edges (v1j, v2j); if xj = 1, add the edge (v1j, v3j), and if yj = 1, add the edge (v2j, v3j).
The resulting graph contains an odd cycle if and only if x and y are not disjoint.
3.10.4 Connectivity
The problem of determining if a graph is connected was considered in the standard
stream model [48, 64] and the multi-pass W-stream model [46]. In both models, it can be
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shown that any constant-pass algorithm without annotations needs Ω(n) bits of space. Later
(see Theorem 3.11.1), we show that we can off-load this computation to the prover such
that, with only O(m log n) annotation, the answer can be verified in O(log n) space. This is
essentially the best possible for sparse graphs where m = O(n) by combining a reduction
from [48] with Theorem 3.3.2. Here, we achieve tradeoffs between hcost and vcost for dense
graphs, obtaining an online (nca log n, cv log n)-scheme for every pair of positive integers ca, cv
such that cacv ≥ n.
Theorem 3.10.7. Let ca, cv be positive integers such that ca · cv ≥ n. There exists an on-
line (nca log n, cv log n)-scheme for connectivity on graphs with n nodes. Any (ca, cv)-scheme
(online or prescient) for connectivity in the insert-only update model requires ca · cv = Ω(n)
even when m = O(n), where m is the number of edges.
Proof. Our scheme follows the following conceptual outline: if G is connected, the prover
demonstrates this by providing a spanning tree; if G is disconnected, the prover identifies
a connected component of the graph. In the first case, the prover provides a set of edges T
claimed to be a spanning tree, and the verifier must check that (1) T is spanning and that
(2) T ⊆ E. Checking (1) is accomplished by appropriate labeling of the O(n) edges, with
O(n) annotation as follows. T can be chosen to be directed towards the root, such that there
is an injective labeling of the nodes ` : V → [n] such that each non-root node with label j
is linked to exactly one node with label greater than j. The prover outputs such a function
`, and the verifier ensures that it is an injection. Then each (directed) edge (u, v) in T and
its labels `(u) < `(v) is presented in decreasing order of `(u). The verifier checks this order,
and ensures that it is consistent with ` via fingerprinting (as per Lemma 3.8.1). By Theorem
3.8.2, condition (2) can be checked with space O(cv log n) and annotation O(nca log n).
If G is disconnected, the prover presents a set L ⊂ V , L 6= V , and claims that L is
disconnected from V \ L. Let A be the adjacency matrix of G, and let x ∈ {0, 1}n be the
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indicator vector of L. To check that L is as claimed, it suffices for the verifier to compute
Ax, and check that the each non-zero entry of Ax corresponds to vertices in L (intuitively,
this means the set L′ of vertices at distance one from L is contained in L). The first step uses
the integer matrix-vector multiplication scheme of Theorem 3.9.1. This allows the verifier to
ensure that the set {i : (Ax)i 6= 0} matches L, via fingerprints.
For the lower bound, we reduce an instance of disjn,2 to connectivity of a graph with
O(n) edges over nodes v0,0 . . . v3,n: create edges (vj,0, vj,i) for j ∈ {0, 2, 3} and i ∈ [n]. Then
if xi = 1, add edge (v0,i, v1,i), else add edge (v1,i, v2,i); and if yi = 1, add edge (v1,i, v3,i) else
add edge (v2,i, v3,i). The resulting graph is connected only if x and y are not disjoint. The
result follows from Theorem 3.5.5.
3.10.5 Totally Unimodular Integer Programs
Consider a linear program of the form max{cTx | Ax ≤ b,}. where b is a b-dimensional
vector and c is a c-dimensional vector. The dual of this program is of the form
{min bTy|ATy = c,y ≥ 0}.
Weak LP duality implies that any feasible solution y to the dual linear program yields
an upper bound on the value of the primal linear program. Strong LP duality implies that
given an optimal solution x to the primal linear program, there is in fact a dual solution
whose value equals that of x, thereby witnessing the optimality of x. This suggests a natural
approach to developing a scheme for linear programs: P tells V a (claimed) optimal solution
x to the linear program, as well as a (claimed) optimal solution y for the dual program, and
then proves that x and y are primal and dual feasible respectively, and that their values
are equal. Of course, it is necessary (and often non-trivial) to ensure that optimal solutions
x and y can be specified succinctly, and that V can check their feasibility and values with
minimal space and annotation.
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Definition 3.10.8. An integer matrix A is totally unimodular if all sub-determinants of A
have absolute value 1.
Consider an integer program of the form max{cTx | Ax ≤ b,b ∈ Zc}. It is well-
known [87, Corollary 19.1a] that if the constraint matrix A of an integer program is totally
unimodular, then any extreme point solution y to the dual of the linear programming relax-
ation of the integer program is in fact integral. Hence, the suggested approach to developing
schemes for linear programs in fact applies to totally unimodular integer programs: P can
specify an optimal solution x to the primal program and prove its optimality by specifying
an integral optimal solution y to the LP relaxation of the dual. We execute this approach
below to develop schemes for two important graph problems that can be formulated as to-
tally unimodular integer programs: shortest s-t path, and minimum weight bipartite perfect
matching (MWBPM).
Shortest s-t Path. We start with a lower bound on the space/annotation tradeoffs achiev-
able by any online scheme that even approximates the shortest s-t path problem up to a
factor 4/3.
Theorem 3.10.9. For any nodes s and t, any online (ca, cv)-scheme that approximates the
length of the shortest s-t path to within a factor 4/3 requires ca · cv ≥ n2 for graphs on n
nodes with Ω(n2) edges, even in the insert-only update model.
Proof. The lower bound follows from a straightforward reduction from index, for which a
lower bound linear in hcost · vcost was proven in 3.3.2.
Given an instance (x, k) of index where x ∈ {0, 1}(n2), k ∈ [(n
2
)
], we construct a graph
G, with VG = [n + 2], and EG = EA ∪ EB. The edge set EA = {(i, j) : x(i,j) = 1} is created
from x alone, where, without loss of generality, we assume that x is indexed by edges (i, j)
with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Then EB is created from k alone, as EB = {(n + 1, i), (j, n + 2)}
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using (i, j) = k. Note that EA and EB can be created by V incrementally as the stream is
seen, using O(log n) bits of memory, to generate an implicit edge stream. The shortest path
between nodes n+ 1 and n+ 2 is 3 if xk = 1 and is 4 or more otherwise. Hence, solving the
s-t path problem with hcost · vcost = o(n2) would also solve the index problem with this
bound, contradicting the linear (in the length of x) bound from Theorem 3.3.2. This also
implies that any approximation within
√
4/3 requires hcost · vcost = Ω(n2).
We now give an online scheme achieving space/annotation tradeoffs that are essentially
optimal for small-diameter graphs. A key insight is that for the relevant totally unimodular
integer program, any dual solution is quite compact, requiring O(n log n) bits to specify,
while a primal optimal solution can be succinctly specified by directly demonstrating a path
which obtains the claimed length.
Theorem 3.10.10. Given a graph G with n vertices specified as a stream of weighted directed
edges such that each edge appears at most once, let d(s, w) denote the shortest-path distance
from s to w in G, and let Cs be the set of nodes reachable from s. Let d = maxw∈Cs d(s, w)
be the maximum distance from s to any node reachable from s. For any ca, cv such that
cacv ≥ dn2 and ca ≥ dn, there is an online (ca log n, cv log n) scheme for shortest s-t path on
directed graphs with non-negative integer edge weights.
Proof. Our protocol handles graphs with non-negative integer edge weights; notice however
that the lower bound of ca · cv = Ω(n2) from Corollary 3.10.9 applies even to unweighted
graphs with constant diameter, so our protocol is optimal in this regime. We assume an
upper bound on d is known in advance, and later show how to remove this assumption at
the cost of a logarithmic factor in space, and no asymptotic increase in annotation.
To aid in the computation, V tracks properties of an (implicit) derived matrix X. Before
observing the stream, V conceptually sets all entries of X to d, where d is the (assumed)
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upper bound on the distances. Then V sees the set of weights wij while observing the stream
and treats each as an addition of wij − d to entry (i, j) of X; this has the effect of setting
Xij = wij. This requires the assumption that each edge (i, j) appears at most once in the
stream. At the end of the stream, Xij = wij if (i, j) ∈ E, and Xij = d otherwise. We note
that it is straightforward for V to check in parallel that each edge appears at most once
by tracking the matrix Y which counts the number of times each edge (i, j) is seen, and
verifying that the squared Frobenius norm of Y , ‖Y ‖2F =
∑
i,j Y
2
ij , satisfies ‖Y ‖2F = m, using
the F2 protocol described above.
First we handle the case where an s-t path exists.
Upper bound on path length. To prove an upper bound on the value of the shortest
path, P lists the edges in a valid s-t path P .
To compute the cost of P , the inner-product protocol that follows from Theorem 3.5.2 is
used to compute P ·X, where we treat P as an indicator matrix, i.e. Pij = 1 iff (i, j) is an
edge in P , and 0 otherwise. If P includes any edges (i, j) not present in E, then Xij = d and
so these are charged at a cost of d. That is, the cost of P is made higher than the bound on
distances, so it is easily detected if P contains edges not in E. This protocol requires O(ca)
annotation and O(cv) space for any ca · cv ≥ n2.
Lower bound on path length. To prove a lower bound on the value of the shortest path,
we leverage the total unimodularity of the integer program for the problem. The dual integer
program for shortest s-t path has a variable yi for every i ∈ V and a constraint for every
edge (i, j) ∈ E:
maximize yt − ys subject to yj − yi ≤ wij for all (i, j) ∈ E.
At a high level, P will prove a lower bound on the value of the shortest s-t path by
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presenting a feasible solution y to the above linear program. Importantly, we note that the
solution is compact: y has only n variables. We present a carefully posed protocol allowing
V to check that y satisfies all m constraints using sublinear annotation.
First, we show that there exists an optimal solution to the dual such that ys = 0 and all
y are non-negative integers with yi ≤ d for all i, where d = maxv∈Cs d(s, v) and Cs is the set
of nodes reachable from s. Let yv = d for all v not reachable from s, and let yv = d(s, v) if v
is reachable from s. All dual constraints are satisfied by y: if not, suppose yj − yi > w(i, j)
for some edge (i, j). Then clearly yi < d since edge weights are non-negative and yj ≤ d,
and hence i is reachable from s. But then j is reachable from s as well, and this contradicts
that yj = d(s, j), as there is a path from s to j of cost yi + w(i, j) < yj.
Specifying y requires O(n log n) bits of annotation since there are n dual variables (more
precisely, it requires n′ log n bits where n′ = |Cs|, since there are only n′ variables not set to
d). V immediately outputs ⊥ if any variable yi in the solution is non-integral, if ys 6= 0, or
if yv > d for any v.
Given the dual assignment y, let W ∈ Zn2 be the matrix defined by
Wij = wij − yj + yi if (i, j) ∈ E and Wij = d− yj + yi if (i, j) 6∈ E.
It is clear that the yi’s constitute a feasible assignment to the dual if and only if Wij ≥ 0
for all (i, j) ∈ E: if (i, j) ∈ E, Wij ≥ 0 only if the constraint corresponding to edge (i, j) is
satisfied, and if (i, j) 6∈ E, the addition of d to Wij ensures Xij ≥ 0, which corresponds to
“no constraint”. We also observe that Wij = Xij − yj + yi for X as described above.
Let wmax be the heaviest edge in G. We can assume wmax ≤ d since V can filter away any
edges with wmax > d, as these edges will not effect the value of the shortest s− t path.
We apply the online scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 to W , using the lowest-degree polynomial
g over Fp such that g(x) = 0 for x ∈ {1, . . . , d + wmax} and g(x) = 1 for x ∈ {−d, . . . , 0}. g
has degree wmax + 2d = O(d), and clearly
∑
i,j∈[n] g(wi,j) = 0 if and only if y is feasible for
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the dual LP, as for all (i, j), −d ≤ Wij ≤ wmax + d. The cost of the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2
l is thus O(dca) annotation and O(cv) space for any ca · cv ≥ n2. Lastly, note that V can
apply the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 on the matrix X derived from the stream, and updated
by performing the necessary additions and subtractions of yi and yj values to all affected
coordinates.
We now remove the assumption that d is known in advance, at the cost of a logarithmic
increase in space. At a high level, while observing the stream V can keep logarithmically
many “guesses” for the value of d, and after the stream is seen, P can tell V which guess
is the tightest upper bound on the value of all variables in the optimal solution to the dual
LP. Then V can forget about the other guesses and simply complete the execution of the
protocol corresponding to the best guess.
More formally, it suffices for V , while observing the stream, to run O(log n) instances of
the above protocol in parallel, with the i’th instance run with parameter d = 2i. This ensures
that one instance will be run with parameter d ≤ maxi yi < 2d. We require P to prepend
the annotation with the value d∗ = min{2i : yj ≤ 2i for all j}. V then needs only to continue
the instance of the protocol run with parameter d = d∗. If d∗ is not as claimed, V will detect
this when a dual variable yj is presented with yj > d
∗, and output ⊥. Thus, the protocol is
valid. The space cost increases by a logarithmic factor compared to when the true value of
d is known in advance, since V must run O(log n) instances of the protocol while observing
the stream. The annotation cost does not increase asymptotically, since the only instance of
the protocol V continues to run after the stream has been observed satisfies 2d ≤ maxi yi
i.e. was run with a “guess” for d that was within a factor of two of the true value of d.
No path from s to t. If the shortest s-t path is infinite (there is no s-t path), let Ct ⊆ V
be the connected component of t. Then the dual assignment with yi = 1 for i ∈ Ct and yi = 0
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for all other i satisfies yi − yj = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E, and the value of the dual objective
function yt − ys is positive. By Farkas’ Lemma, this serves as a witness to the fact that the
primal is infeasible. V can check y is as claimed by running the sum-check scheme of Theorem
3.5.2 on the vector Y with Yij = yi − yj if (i, j) ∈ E, and Yij = yi − yj − 3 if (i, j) 6∈ E and
using the degree-5 polynomial g over Fp such that g(0) = g(−4) = g(−3) = g(−2) = 0 and
g(−1) = g(1) = 1. We can construct the derived stream in the same manner as X and W
above. It is clear that if (i, j) 6∈ E then Yij ∈ {−4,−3,−2}, if (i, j) ∈ E with yi−yj = 0 then
Yij = 0, and otherwise Yij ∈ {−1, 1}. Thus,
∑
i,j g(Yij) = 0 if and only if y is as claimed;
this instance of the sum-check scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 requires annotation O(ca) and space
O(cv) for any ca · cv ≥ n2.
Remark 2. If d is not known in advance, then neither P nor V knows the annotation cost
of the protocol of Theorem 3.10.10 until after observing the stream. Only the space usage cv
can be fixed in advance in this case, and the annotation cost will be O(n2d/cv).
We note that the protocol of Theorem 3.10.10, as well as Theorem 3.10.11 below, does
not handle edge weights that are specified incrementally. The reason is that V must be able
to derive a stream specifying the matrices X and W , which we know how to do only in
the absence of duplicate edges. This is in contrast to schemes such as the matrix vector
multiplication scheme Theorem 3.9.1, which works even when the entries of the matrix and
the vector are specified incrementally.
Minimum Weight Bipartite Perfect Matching.
Theorem 3.10.11. Let wmax be the heaviest edge in a graph G on n vertices. For any ca, cv
such that ca · cv ≥ n3wmax and ca ≥ nwmax, there is an online (ca log n, cv log n) scheme for
MWBPM with non-negative integer edge weights.
In particular, Theorem 3.10.11 implies that both the annotation length and space us-
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age can be chosen sublinear in the stream length if the number of edges m satisfies m =
n3/2+δw1/2max for some δ > 0.
Proof. Upper bound. To prove an upper bound on the value of the minimum weight perfect
matching, P sends the edges in a valid perfect matching M. It is straightforward for V to
storeM and verify that it is perfect matching over n nodes in O(n) space. As in the previous
protocol, V can compute the cost of this matching as an inner product M · X, where Xij
is set to wij if (i, j) is an edge, or 2nwmax otherwise. Hence, if M includes edges not present
in E, it will have excessively high cost, and can be rejected. V can check M is a perfect
matching by comparing a fingerprint of the set {1, . . . , n} to that of the (multi)set of nodes
incident to an edge in M. If the fingerprints match, then with high probability, each node
in n is incident to exactly one edge in M.
Lower bound. A lower bound on the cost of the optimal matching is proven via a feasible
solution to the dual linear program. The dual is given by:
maximize
∑
i∈A
yi +
∑
j∈B
yj
subject to yi + yj ≤ wij for all (i, j) ∈ E,
where A and B are the two sides of the bipartition of G, and wij is the cost of edge (i, j).
Given a dual solution y ∈ Zn, let X ∈ {0, 1}n2 be the vector with Xij = yi + yj − wij if
(i, j) ∈ E and Xij = yi + yj − 2d′ otherwise, where d′ is an upper bound on the value of any
variable y. We show below d′ = nwmax is sufficient. y is a feasible solution to the dual if and
only if all entries of X are less than or equal to zero.
The scheme now proceeds essentially identically to that of Theorem 3.10.10, although
here we can only guarantee the existence of a dual-optimal assignment y with |yi| ≤ nwmax
for all i. This results in increased annotation requirements compared to those of Theorem
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3.10.10. We remark that this bound is tight, in that there are graphs for which any dual-
optimal solution y has |yi| = Ω(nwmax) for some i; one such example is a simple path on n
vertices, with wi,i+1 = wmax if i is odd and wi,i+1 = 0 if i is even.
To argue that there always exists a dual-optimal y with |yi| ≤ nwmax for all i, note
that Cramer’s Rule implies any extreme point solution y to the dual LP can be written
yi =
det(U˜i)
det(U)
for some submatrix U of the constraint matrix of the dual, where U˜i obtained
from U by replacing the i’th column with the vector w of edge weights. Furthermore, it
follows from the total unimodularity of the dual program that det(U) = ±1, and hence
for any extreme point |yi| ≤ |det(U˜i)| ≤ nwmax, where the last inequality can be seen by
performing cofactor expansion along the i’th column of U˜i. Since there is always a dual
optimal solution that is an extreme point, there is always an integral dual optimal solution
y for which |yi| ≤ nwmax.
To conclude, we apply the sum-check scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 to the vector X with
Xij = yi + yj − wij if (i, j) ∈ E and Xij = yi + yj − 2nwmax otherwise. V can construct a
derived stream defining X just as in Theorem 3.10.10, and the sum-check scheme of Theorem
3.5.2 is applied using a polynomial g such that g(x) = 1 for x ∈ {1, . . . , 2nwmax} and g(x) = 0
for x ∈ {−4nwmax, . . . , 0}. g has degree O(nwmax), and
∑
i,j∈[n] g(wi,j) = 0 if and only if y is
feasible for the dual LP. This scheme has hcost = O(canwmax) and vcost = O(cv) for for any
ca · cv = Ω(n2) and ca ≥ nwmax.
If no perfect matching exists, Farkas’ Lemma implies this can be proven by demonstrating
a dual solution y such that yi + yj = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E, and
∑
i∈A yi +
∑
j∈B yj > 0. V can
check this similarly to the scheme of Theorem 3.10.10 when no s-t path exists.
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3.11 Simulating Non-Streaming Algorithms
Next, we give protocols by appealing to known non-streaming algorithms for graph prob-
lems. At a high level, we can imagine the prover running an algorithm on the graph, and
presenting a “transcript” of operations carried out by the algorithm as the proof to V that
the final result is correct. Equivalently, we can imagine that V runs the algorithm, but since
the data structures are large, they are stored by P , who provides the contents of memory
needed for each step. There may be many choices of the algorithm to simulate and the
implementation details of the algorithm: our aim is to choose ones that result in smaller
annotations.
To make this concrete, consider the case of requiring the graph to be presented in a par-
ticular order, such as depth first order. Starting from a given node, the exploration retrieves
nodes in order, based on the pattern of edges. Assuming an adjacency list representation, a
natural implementation of the search in the traditional model of computation maintains a
stack of edges representing the current path being explored. Edges incident on the current
node being explored are pushed, and pops occur whenever all nodes connected to the current
node have already been visited. P can allow V to recreate this exploration by providing at
each step the next node to push, or the new head of the stack when a pop occurs, and so on.
To ensure the correctness of the protocol, additional checking information can be provided,
such as pointers to the location in the stack when a node is visited that has already been
encountered.
With care, this idea of “augmenting a transcript” of a traditional algorithm can be
made to work on an algorithm-by-algorithm basis. However, while the resulting protocols
are lightweight, it rapidly becomes tedious to provide appropriate protocols for other com-
putations based on this idea. Instead, we introduce a more general approach, which argues
that any (deterministic) algorithm to solve a given problem can be converted into a protocol
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in our model. The running time of the algorithm in the RAM model becomes the size of the
proof in our setting.
Our main technical tool is the off-line memory checker of Blum et al. [18], which we use
to efficiently verify a sequence of accesses to a large memory. Consider a memory transcript
of a sequence of read and write operations to this memory (initialized to all zeros). Such a
transcript is valid if each read of address i returns the last value written to that address. The
protocol of Blum et al. requires each read to be accompanied by the timestamp of the last
write to that address; and to treat each operation (read or write) as a read of the old value
followed by the write of a new value. Then to ensure validity of the transcript, it suffices
to check that a fingerprint of all write operations (augmented with timestamps) matches a
fingerprint of all read operations (using the provided timestamps), along with some simple
local checks on timestamps. Consequently, any valid (timestamp-augmented) transcript is
accepted by V , while any invalid transcript is rejected by V with high probability.
We use this memory checker to obtain the following general simulation result.
Theorem 3.11.1. Suppose P is a graph problem possessing a deterministic algorithm A in
the random-access memory model that, when given G = (V,E) in adjacency list or adjacency
matrix form, outputs P (G) in time t(m,n), where m = |E| and n = |V |. Then there is an
online (m log n+ t(m,n) log n, log n) scheme for P.
Proof. P first repeats (the non-zero locations of) a valid adjacency list or matrix represen-
tation G, as writes to the memory (which is checked by V); V uses fingerprints to ensure
the edges included in the representation precisely correspond to those that appeared in the
stream, and can use local checks to ensure the representation is otherwise valid. This requires
O(m) annotation and effectively initializes memory for the subsequent simulation. There-
after, P provides a valid augmented transcript T ′ of the read and write operations performed
by algorithm A, which is checked by V using the memory checking protocol of [18]. V rejects
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if the memory checking protocol rejects T ′, or if any read or write operation executed in T ′
does not agree with the prescribed action of A. As only one read or write operation is per-
formed by A in each timestep, the length of T ′ is O(t(m,n)), resulting in an (m+ t(m,n), 1)
protocol for P .
Although Theorem 3.11.1 only allows the simulation of deterministic algorithms, P can
non-deterministically “guess” an optimal solution S and prove optimality by invoking The-
orem 3.11.1 on a (deterministic) algorithm that merely checks whether S is optimal. Un-
surprisingly, it is often the case that the best-known algorithms for verifying optimality are
more efficient than those finding a solution from scratch (see e.g. the MST protocol below),
and this gives the simulation theorem considerable power. We specify some easy corollaries
below. These are our first results that improve over the schemes of previous sections for
sparse graphs – these schemes allow the product of the annotation length and the space
usage to be O˜(m), while all previous schemes required the product to be Ω(n2), even if
m = o(n2). However, the algorithm simulation approach does not allow for both space usage
and annotation length to be sublinear in m. We will achieve this for a wide range of problems
in Chapter 4.
Theorem 3.11.2. Let G be a graph with n vertices and m edges. There is an online
(m log n, log n) scheme to find a minimum cost spanning tree in G; online (m log n, log n)
schemes for connectivity, bipartiteness, and bipartite perfect matching in G; an online
(m log n + n log2 n, log2 n) scheme to verify single-source shortest paths in G; and online
(m log n, log n) schemes for max-flow and min-cut in G.
Proof. We first prove the bound for MST. Given a spanning tree T , there exists a linear-
time algorithm A for verifying that T is minimum (see e.g. [69]). Let A′ be the linear-time
algorithm that, given G and a subset of edges T in adjacency matrix form, first checks that
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T is a spanning tree by ensuring |T | = n− 1 and T is connected (by using e.g. breadth-first
search), and then executes A to ensure T is minimum. We obtain an online (m log n, log n)
scheme for MST by having P provide a minimum spanning tree T and using Theorem 3.11.1
to simulate algorithm A′.
The upper bounds for connectivity and bipartiteness follow from the fact the breadth-first
such runs in O(m) time, and the upper bound for bipartite perfect matching follows from the
fact that there exist simple O(m)-time algorithms for checking that a (claimed) matching is
valid, and for checking that |N(S)| ≤ |S| for a set S whose existence is guaranteed by Hall’s
Theorem if a bipartite graph G lacks a perfect matching.
The upper bound for single-source shortest path follows from Theorem 3.11.1 and the
fact that there exist implementations of Djikstra’s algorithm that run in time m+ n log n.
The upper bound for max-flow and min-cut follow from the fact that, given a flow and
a cut can be specified with O(m log n) annotation, and the feasibility and value of both the
max-flow and the min-cut can be checked by a RAM algorithm in time O(m). The max-flow,
min-cut theorem (which is a special case of strong LP duality) implies that if the values of
the flow and the cut are equal, then the flow is a max-flow and the cut is a min-cut.
3.12 Improving the Runtime of the Prover and Exper-
imental Results.
3.12.1 Fast Proofs via Fast Fourier Transforms
In this section, we describe how to drastically speed up P ’s computation for essentially
all sum-check based schemes developed in this chapter. In these schemes, P often needs to
evaluate a low-degree extension (i.e. the polynomial f˜ within the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2)
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at a large number of locations, which can be the bottleneck. Here, we show how to reduce
the cost of this step to near linear, via Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) methods.
For concreteness, we describe the approach in the context of the F2 scheme of Theorem
3.5.3. Our initial experiments with a naive implementation of this scheme that did not use
FFTs identified the prover’s runtime as the principal bottleneck in the protocol. In this
naive implementation, P required Θ(n3/2) time, and consequently the implementation failed
to scale for n > 107. Here, we show that FFT techniques can dramatically speed up the
prover, leading to a protocol that easily scales to streams consisting of billions of items.
We stress that while our experiments focus on the F2 and matrix-vector multiplication
problems, our FFT techniques apply to all of the sum-check based schemes in this thesis,
including graph problems such as testing connectivity and identifying perfect matchings.
Thus, by developing a scalable, practical implementation for F2 and matrix-vector multipli-
cation, we also achieve big improvements in protocols for a host of important (and seemingly
unrelated) problems.
Non-interactive F2 and matrix-vector multiplication Protocols. We first briefly
recall the F2 scheme from 3.5.3. This construction yields a (ca log n, cv log n) protocol for
positive integers ca, cv satisfying cacv ≥ n, i.e., it allows a tradeoff between the amount of
communication and space used by V ; for brevity we describe the protocol when ca = cv =
√
n.
Assume for simplicity that n is a perfect square. We treat the n dimensional vector f as
a
√
n ×√n array. This implies a two-variate polynomial f˜ over a suitably large finite field
Fq, such that
∀(x, y) ∈ [√n]× [√n] : f˜(x, y) = fx,y.
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To compute F2, we wish to compute∑
x∈[√n],y∈[√n]
f 2x,y =
∑
x∈[√n],y∈[√n]
f˜ 2(x, y).
The low-degree extension f˜ can also be evaluated at locations outside [
√
n] × [√n]. In
the scheme, the verifier V picks a random position r ∈ Fq, and evaluates f˜(r, y) for every
y ∈ [√n]. The proof given by P is in the form of a degree 2(√n − 1) polynomial p(X)
which is claimed to be
∑
y∈[√n] f˜(X, y)
2. V uses the values of f˜(r, y) to check that p(r) =∑
y∈[√n] f˜(r, y)
2, and if so accepts
∑
x∈[√n] p(x) as the correct answer.
3.12.2 Breaking the Bottleneck
Since p(X) has degree at most 2
√
n− 1 it is uniquely specified by its values at any 2√n
locations. We show how P can quickly evaluate all values in the set
S := {(x, p(x)) : x ∈ [2√n]}.
Since p(X) =
∑
y∈[√n] f˜(X, y)
2, given all values in the set
T := {(x, y, f˜(x, y)) : x ∈ [2√n], y ∈ [√n]},
all values in S can be computed in time linear in n. A naive implementation calculates each
value in T independently. This requires Θ(n1/2) time for each value (x, y) ∈ ([2√n] \ [√n])×
[
√
n], and hence Θ(n3/2) time overall. Indeed, for each x ∈ [2√n] \ [√n], and each y ∈ [√n],
computing f˜(x, y) requires computing S(x), where S is the univariate polynomial of degree
at most
√
n− 1 defined via interpolation as follows: on input x′ ∈ [√n], S(x′) is satisfies the
identity S(x′) = f(x′, y). As S(x′) is defined via its values on
√
n points, computing S(x)
via polynomial interpolation requires Θ(
√
n) time.
We show how FFT techniques allow us to calculate T much faster. The task of computing
T boils down to multi-point evaluation of the polynomial f . It is known how to perform fast
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multi-point evaluation of univariate degree t polynomials in time O(t log t), and bivariate
polynomials in subquadratic time, if the polynomial is specified by its coefficients [81]. How-
ever, there is substantial overhead in converting f˜ to a coefficient representation. It is more
efficient for us to directly work with and exchange polynomials in an implicit representation,
by specifying their values at sufficiently many points.
Representing as a convolution. We are given the values of f˜ at all points located on
the [
√
n]× [√n] “grid”. We leverage this fact to compute T efficiently in nearly linear time
by a direct application of the Fast Fourier Transform. For (x, y) ∈ [√n] × [√n], f˜(x, y) is
just fx,y, which P can store explicitly while processing the stream. It remains to calculate
(x, y, f˜(x, y)) for
√
n ≤ x < 2√n. For fixed y ∈ [√n], we may write f˜(X, y) explicitly as
f˜(X, y) =
∑
i∈[√n]
fi,yχi(X),
where χi is the Lagrange polynomial – the unique polynomial of degree
√
n such that χi(i) =
1, while for all j ∈ [√n] such that j 6= i, it holds that χi(j) = 0. Here, the inverse is the
multiplicative inverse within the field.
χi(j) =
∏
x∈[√n]\{i}
(x− j)(x− i)−1
If j 6∈ [√n], then we may write
f˜(j, y) =
∑
i∈[√n]
h(j)by(i)g(j − i) (3.4)
where by(i) = fi,y
∏
x∈[√n]\{i}
(x− i)−1,
h(j) =
j∏
k=(j+1−√n)
k,
and g(j − i) = (j − i)−1.
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As a result f˜(j, y) can be computed as a circular convolution of by and g, scaled by h(j).
That is, for a fixed y, all values in the set Ty := {(x, y, f˜(x, y)) : x ∈ [2
√
n]} can be found
by computing the convolution in Equation 3.4, then scaling each entry by the appropriate
value of h(j).
Computing the Convolution. We represent by and g by vectors of length 2
√
n over a
suitable field, and take the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of each. The convolution is
the inverse transform of the inner product of the two transforms [73, Chapter 5]. There is
some freedom to choose the field over which to perform the transform. We can compute
the DFT of f˜y and g over the complex field C using O(
√
n log n) arithmetic operations via
standard techniques such as the Cooley-Tukey algorithm [36], and simply reduce the final
result modulo q, rounded to the nearest integer. Logarithmically many bits of precision past
the decimal point suffice to obtain a sufficiently accurate result. Since we compute O(
√
n)
such convolutions, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3.12.1. The honest prover in the F2 protocol of 3.5.3 requires O(n log n) arith-
metic operations on numbers of bit-complexity O(log n).
In practice, however, working over C can be slow and requires us to deal with precision
issues. Since the original data resides in some finite field Fq, and can be represented as fixed-
precision integers, it is preferable to also compute the DFT over the same field. Here, we
exploit the fact that in designing our protocol, we can choose to work over any sufficiently
large finite field Fq.
There are two issues to address: we need that there exists a DFT for sequences of length
2
√
n (or thereabouts) in Fq, and further that this DFT has a corresponding (fast) Fourier
Transform algorithm. We can resolve both issues with the Prime Factor Algorithm (PFA)
for the DFT in Fq [26]. The “textbook” Cooley-Turkey FFT algorithm operates on sequences
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whose length is a power of two. Instead, the PFA works on sequences of length N = N1×N2×
. . .×Nk, where the Ni’s are pairwise coprime. The time cost of the transform is O((
∑
iNi)N).
The algorithm is typically applied over the complex numbers, but also applies over Fq: it
works by breaking the large DFT up into a sequence of smaller DFTs, each of size Ni for
some i. These base DFTs for sequences of length Ni exist for Fq whenever there exists a
primitive Ni’th root of unity in Fq. This is the case whenever Ni is a divisor of q − 1. So we
are in good shape so long as q − 1 has many distinct prime factors.
Here, we use our freedom to fix q, and choose q = 261 − 1.1 Notice that
261 − 2 = 2× 32 × 52 × 7× 11× 13× 31× 41× 61× 151× 331× 1321,
and so there are many such divisors Ni to choose from when working over Fq. If 2
√
n is not
equal to a factor of q − 1, we can simply pad the vectors fy and g such that their lengths
are factors of 261 − 2. Since 261 − 2 has many small factors, we never have to use too much
padding: we calculated that we never need to pad any sequence of length 100 ≤ N ≤ 109
(good for n up to 1018) by more than 16% of its length. This is better than the Cooley-Tukey
method, where padding can double the length of the sequence.
As an example, we can work with the length N = 2×5×7×9×11×13 = 90090, sufficient
for inputs of size n = (N/2)2, which is over 109. The cost scales as (2+5+7+9+11+13)N =
47N . Therefore, the PFA approach offers a substantial improvement over naive convolution
in Fq, which takes time Θ(N2).
Parallelization. This protocol is highly amenable to parallelization. Observe that P per-
forms O(
√
n) independent convolutions of each of length O(
√
n) (one for each column y of
the matrix fx,y), followed by computing
∑
y f
2
x,y for each row x of the result. The convolu-
tions can be done in parallel, and once complete, the sum of squares of each row can also
1Arithmetic in this field can also be done quickly, see Section 7.4.1.
81
be parallelized. This protocol also possesses a simple two-round MapReduce protocol. In the
first round, we assign each column y of the matrix fx,y a unique key, and have each reducer
perform the convolution for the corresponding column. In the second round, we assign each
row x a unique key, and have each reducer compute
∑
y f
2
x,y for its row x.
3.12.3 Implications
As we experimentally demonstrate, the results of this section make practical the fun-
damental building block for all the sum-check based protocols of this thesis. Indeed, by
combining Theorem 3.12.1 with schemes developed earlier in this chapter we obtain the
following immediate corollaries. We stress that while we invoke Theorem 3.12.1 to obtain
asymptotic results, in practice it is desirable to work over a finite field and use the Prime
Factor Algorithm as described above. All runtimes below are stated assuming that addition
multiplication on O(log n) bit numbers can be done in O(1) machine operations.
Corollary 3.12.2. 1. (Extending Theorem 3.5.3) For any ca · cv ≥ n, there is an online
(ca log n, cv log n) scheme for computing the inner product and Hamming distance of
two n-dimensional vectors, where V runs in time O(n) and P runs in time O(n log n).
2. (Extending Theorem 3.9.1) For any ca · cv ≥ c, there is an online (b · ca log n, cv log n)
scheme for b× c integer matrix-vector multiplication, where V runs in time O(bc) and
P runs in time O(bc log n).
3. (Extending Theorem 3.10.4) For any ca · cv ≥ n3, there is an online (ca log n, cv log n)
scheme for counting the number of triangles in a graph with n vertices and m edges,
where V runs in time O(mn) and P runs in time O(n3 log n).
4. (Extending Theorem 3.10.7) For any ca · cv ≥ n2, ca ≥ n, there is an online
(ca log n, cv log n) scheme for graph connectivity on graphs with n nodes and m edges,
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where P runs in time O(n2 log n) and V runs in time O(m).
5. (Extending Theorem 3.10.5) For any ca · cv ≥ n2, ca ≥ n, there is an online
(ca log n, cv log n) scheme for bipartite perfect matching on graphs with n nodes and m
edges, where V runs in time O(m) and P runs in time O(t(n)+n2 log n), where t(n) is
the time required to find a perfect matching if one exists, or to find a counter-example
(via Hall’s Theorem) otherwise.
3.12.4 Experiments
We now describe our experiments with the schemes developed in this chapter. To focus
our study, we concentrate on two problems in particular: F2 and matrix-vector multiplication.
As both of these schemes are based on sum-check techniques, the results are representative
for all sum-check based schemes developed in this chapter.
We evaluated the schemes on a multi-core machine with 64-bit AMD Opteron processors
and 32 GB of memory available. Our scalability results here use a single core, though we
also briefly describe results for parallel operation. The large amount of memory allowed us
to experiment with universes of size several billion, with the prover able to store the full data
in memory.
Summary of Experimental Results
The high-level conclusion we draw from our experiments in this section is similar to
the conclusions we will draw for the interactive protocols we develop later in Chapters 5-8.
Specifically, the costs of our protocols are attractive from the verifier’s perspective – the space
and communication costs of our schemes, as well as the verifier’s runtime, are all reasonable.
The bottleneck in our protocols is the runtime of the prover. We show that while a naive
implementation of our prover fails to scale to large inputs, the FFT techniques of Section
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3.12.1 yield non-interactive protocols that easily scale to streams with billions of updates,
improving over a naive implementation by three orders of magnitude. Detailed results follow.
F2: We compare our non-interactive F2 scheme developed in this chapter to two interac-
tive protocols developed later in this thesis. The first multi-round protocol is a specialized
interactive protocol for F2 given in Chapter 6 (MRS). The second multi-round protocol is
based on the general-purpose circuit-checking approach of Chapter 7 based on the GKR
protocol (CC). We compared these multi-round protocols against two implementations of
our non-interactive F2 scheme from this chapter: the first involves a naive implementation
of the prover (NI), while the second prover implementation utilizes our FFT techniques de-
veloped in Section 3.12.1 (NI-FFT). Figures 3.3(b) and 3.3(c) illustrate the verifier’s time
and space costs for all four protocols, while Figure 3.3(a) illustrates the prover’s runtime for
these protocols. Note that in the case of NI and NI-FFT, the verifier behaves identically: the
prover computes the same messages in both cases, but more quickly using FFT.
The main observation from Figures 3.3(b) and 3.3(c) is that the verifier’s costs are ex-
tremely low for all four protocols. V processed over 20 million items/s across all stream
lengths for all protocols. The space usage and communication cost for both interactive pro-
tocols (CC and MRS) is less than 1 kilobyte across all stream lengths tested, while the space
usage for the non-interactive case is much larger but still reasonable (comfortably under a
megabyte even for stream lengths in excess of 1 billion).
Figure 3.3(a) shows a clear separation between the four methods in P ’s effort in generating
the proof. For large streams, it is clear that NI is not scalable, with P ’s runtime growing like
n3/2; this implementation failed to process streams larger than about 40 million updates. In
contrast, the FFT-based implementation of the non-interactive protocol processed between
350, 000 and 750, 000 items per second for all tested values of n, even for values of n well
into the billions. Thus, the FFT techniques of Section 3.12.1 speed up P ’s computation
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Figure 3.3: Experimental Results for both multi-round and non-interactive F2 protocols.
by several orders of magnitude compared to the naive implementation, and allowed the
protocol to easily scale to streams with billions of items. As mentioned in Section 3.12.1, a
wide variety of more complicated protocols use this protocol as a subroutine, and therefore
these non-interactive techniques are as powerful as they are general.
For the multi-round protocols, circuit checking (CC) eventually outpaces NI, and scales
linearly: the CC prover processed about 20,000 items per second across all stream lengths.
Finally, the MRS prover processed 20-21 million items per second.
Matrix-Vector Multiplication: Figure 3.4 shows the behavior of our FFT-based implementa-
tion of the non-interactive protocol for matrix-vector multiplication given in Theorem 3.9.1.
Recall that for an n × n matrix, Theorem 3.9.1 yielded an online (nca, cv) for any positive
integers ca, cv satisfying cacv ≥ n. In the following, we write ca = nα. A convenient feature of
this protocol is that when α = 0, the honest prover’s message consists simply of the correct
answer i.e. the vector Ax. Consequently, we obtain an (n, n) protocol for which the prover
can handle enormous throughputs: 30-50 million items/second as evidenced in Figure 3.4(b).
In outsourcing settings where one can tolerate space usage O(n) for the verifier, this protocol
is truly ideal, as the prover need do nothing more than solve the problem, and the verifier’s
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Table 3.1: Experimental results for the matrix-vector multiplication scheme of Theorem 3.9.1.
α Space Annotation Length P time (s) V time (s)
0 78.1 KB 78.1 KB 1.6 4.3
.15 19.9 KB 468.8 KB 33.9 3.0
.20 12.8 KB 937.5 KB 58.9 2.8
.25 7.8 KB 1.52 MB 61.5 2.6
Results are for matrices of size 10,000 × 10,000 (763 MBs of data). Here, α is a parameter
that controls the tradeoff between space and annotation length.
computation consists only of maintaining n fingerprints. That is, this (n, n) protocol allows
the user to obtain a strong security guarantee on the integrity of the query, almost for free.
Note that for this problem, the size of the input is O(n2) for an n×n matrix, so O(n) space
at the verifier is still much smaller than the full input size.
The behavior becomes more interesting when we set α > 0—in this case, in addition
to providing the correct answer, the prover has to do non-trivial computation to prove
correctness. Because higher values of α mean less space but more communication (see Figure
3.4(c)), setting α > 0 may be needed when the verifier is severely space-limited. It may also be
necessary when the matrix is very wide: in full generality the protocol has communication
and space cost (mnα, n1−α) for an m × n matrix. We show how different costs vary as a
function of α: V ’s time to process the input (Figure 3.4(a)), P ’s time (Figure 3.4(b)), the
communication cost (Figure 3.4(d)), and the space used by V (Figure 3.4(c)). Across all
values of α, P can process in excess of 1 million items per second using our FFT techniques.
The verifier runs over the stream slightly faster for higher values of α, because V maintains
fewer fingerprints for larger α’s. When α = 0, V processed about 20 million items per second,
and when α = .25, V processed in excess of 30 million items per second. For concreteness,
Table 3.1 displays the costs of the protocol when run on matrices of size 10,000 × 10,000.
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Figure 3.4: Experiments on non-interactive matrix-vector multiplication protocols.
Parallel Implementations
The prover’s computations in all of the non-interactive protocols studied here are highly
parallelizable, as noted previously. Indeed, using just three OpenMP2 statements, we were
able to achieve more than a 7-fold speedup over the sequential implementation of the FFT
protocol, by using all 8 cores of the multi-core machine our experiments were run on. Conse-
quently, with 8 processors, the ratio between the speed of the MR and NI-FFT protocols for
F2 drops from 20-60 to 3-8. In theory, the interactive F2 protocol is just as easy to parallelize
as the non-interactive protocol; however, we did not find this to be the case in practice. The
prover’s computations in the multi-round protocol are so light-weight (as evidenced by its
2http://www.openmp.org
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very high throughput) that memory access forms the principle bottleneck.
3.13 Related Work
On MA Communication Complexity. Babai, Frankl, and Simon [10] introduced the
communication complexity analogs of many fundamental Turing Machine complexity classes.
Most relevant to us, they introduced the model of Merlin-Arthur (MA) communication com-
plexity. Aaronson and Wigderson [3] gave a beautiful MA communication protocol for disj
using algebraic techniques analogous to those in the famous sum-check protocol of Lund et
al. [77]. Theorem 3.5.2 is based on Aaronson and Wigderson’s MA protocol. Their protocol
is nearly optimal, essentially matching a lower bound of Klauck [70]. Theorem 3.5.4, in turn,
generalizes the lower bound of Klauck to multiparty MA communication complexity. This
generalization is critical to showing that higher frequency moments are hard even to approx-
imate in the annotations model. Aaronson [2] studied the hardness of the index problem
in a restricted version of the MA communication model, as well as in a quantum variant of
this model. His classical model is similar to the online MA communication model that we
consider.
Other existing results have primarily focused on quantum or multiparty variants of MA-
communication complexity. Klauck [71] proved an Ω(n1/3) lower bound on the quantum
Merlin-Arthur communication complexity of two-party set disjointness. Raz and Shpilka [83]
gave a problem whose quantum communication complexity is exponentially smaller than its
MA-communication complexity. Gavinsky and Sherstov [54] proved a separation between co-
NP and MA in the setting of number-on-the-forehead multiparty communication complexity,
and their lower bound was further refined by Sherstov in [94,95].
As can be seen from the above summary, only a handful of researchers have studied
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MA communication complexity, probably because the model was considered somewhat es-
oteric [71]. However, the relatively recent work of Aaronson and Wigderson [3] gave a new
motivation for studying the communication complexity analog of any Turing Machine com-
plexity class, and MA in particular: they showed that if a communication complexity class
C is not contained within another communication complexity class D, then a certain class
of proof techniques (called algebraizing techniques) will not suffice to show that the Tur-
ing Machine analog of C is contained within the Turing Machine analog of D. We view the
connection between MA communication complexity and annotated data stream models as
another significant motivation for studying MA communication complexity.
Proof Systems for Space-Bounded Verifiers. Early work on interactive proof systems
studied the power of space-bounded verifiers (the survey by Condon [35] provides a compre-
hensive overview), but many of the protocols developed in this line of work require the verifier
to store the input, and therefore do not work in the annotations model, where the verifier
must be streaming. An exception is work by Lipton [76], who relied on using fingerprinting
techniques to allow a log-space streaming verifier to ensure that the prover correctly plays
back the transcript of an algorithm in an appropriate computational model. This approach
does not lead to protocols with sublinear annotation length. More recently, Das Sarma et
al. studied the “best order streaming model,” which can be thought of as the annotations
model where the annotation is restricted to be a permutation of the input [43].
Other Work. There has also been more applied work which implicitly defines annotation
schemes. Tucker et al. [102] considered stream punctuations, which, in our terminology, are
simple prescient annotations, indicating facts such as that there are no more tuples relevant
to timestamp t in the remainder of the stream. Yi et al. [106], in their work on stream out-
sourcing, study the problem of verifying that a claimed “grouping” corresponds to the input
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data. They solve exact and approximate versions of the problem by using a linear amount of
annotation. Lastly, the work of Li et al. [74] on proof infused streams answers various selec-
tion and aggregation queries (e.g. range sum) over sliding windows with logarithmic space
and linear annotation. However, a critical difference is that Li et al. require that the helper
and verifier agree on a one-way (cryptographic) hash function, for which it is assumed the
helper cannot find collisions. Our results are in a stronger model without this assumption.
Independent work subsequent to this chapter. Two recent works have considered
variants of the annotated data stream model. Klauck and Prakash [72] study a restricted
version of the annotations model in which the annotation must essentially end by the final
stream update. Gur and Raz [61] give protocols for a class of problems in a model that is
similar to annotated data streams, but more powerful in that the verifier has access to both
public and private randomness. This corresponds to the AMA communication and streaming
models. We briefly gave a scheme for approximate F2 in this model, and return to it again
in Section 4.7.2 of Chapter 4.
3.14 Open Problems
Up to logarithmic factors, we have resolved the cost of annotated data streaming proto-
cols for a number of fundamental streaming problems, including exact computation of in-
dex, frequency moments, bipartite perfect matching, and shortest s-t path in small-diameter
graphs. However, we have also presented several non-trivial annotated data streaming proto-
cols whose optimality we cannot yet establish. In particular, we highlight the following open
problems.
• Theorem 3.5.4 proves that any (ca, cv) scheme (online or prescient) that approximates
kth frequency moment, Fk, up to a constant factor requires cacv = Ω(n
1−5/k). It is not
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possible to prove a lower bound better than cacv = Ω˜(n
1−2/k) since there exist standard
(Merlin-less) streaming algorithms for computing Fk that use O˜(n
1−2/k) space [7, 21].
(We clarify that it is not known how to achieve a (ca, cv)-scheme for all ca · cv = n1−2/k,
only for ca = O(1), cv = Θ˜(n
1−2/k)). It would be interesting to close the gap between
the O˜(n1−2/k) upper bound and the Ω(n1−5/k) lower bound.
• Assume m = O(n). Determine whether there is a (ca, cv) scheme (online or prescient)
for exactly computing F0 for which ca and cv are both O(n
2/3−δ) for some constant
δ > 0. A negative answer to this question would prove the optimality of Theorem
3.7.1. Note Gur and Raz have recently given a (
√
n · polylog n,√n · polylog n) AMA
scheme for this problem, but it remains open whether there exists a scheme of similar
costs that does not use public randomness.
• Determine whether there is an (online or standard) MA communication protocol of
cost O(n3/2−δ) for some constant δ > 0 (cf. [1]). A negative answer to this question
would prove the optimality of Theorem 3.10.4 and resolve the (online or standard) MA
communication complexity of counting triangles.
• Determine whether there is an (online or standard) MA communication protocol for
connectivity or bipartiteness of cost n1−δ for some constant δ > 0. A negative answer
to this question would resolve the (online or standard) MA communication complexity
of connectivity and bipartiteness. Such a protocol would be interesting even if it only
works under the promise that the graph is sparse, that is, that the graph contains
m = O(n) edges.
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Chapter 4
Annotations for Sparse Data Streams
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 provided considerable understanding of the power of annotated data streams,
revealing a surprisingly rich theory. A number of fundamental problems that possess no non-
trivial algorithms in the standard streaming model do have efficient schemes when the data
stream may be annotated by a prover. By exploiting powerful algebraic techniques originally
developed in the literature on interactive proofs, the results of Chapter 3 achieved essentially
optimal tradeoffs between annotation size and the space usage of the verifier for problems
ranging from frequency moments to bipartite perfect matching.
However, these schemes are only optimal for streams for which the total number of
updates is large relative to the size of the data universe. In contrast, many real-world data
sets are sparse: for example, many real-world graphs, though large, contain much fewer than
the maximum possible number
(
n
2
)
of edges, and IP traffic streams contain much fewer than
the total number of possible IP addresses, 2128 in IPv6.
In this chapter, we give the first schemes in the annotations model that allow both
the annotation size and space usage to be sublinear in the number of items with non-zero
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frequency in the data stream, rather than the size of the data universe n. On the negative side,
we also give a new lower bound that for the first time rules out smooth tradeoffs between
annotation size and space usage for a specific problem. The latter result is derived from a new
lower bound in the Merlin–Arthur (MA) communication model that may be of independent
interest.
4.2 Overview of Results and Techniques
We give an informal overview of our results and the techniques we use to obtain them.
Recall that n denotes the size of the data universe and m the number of items with non-zero
frequency at the end of a data stream (we refer to m as the “sparsity” of the stream).
Section 4.3 contains our first set of results. We begin by precisely characterizing the
complexity of the sparse PointQuery problem—a natural variant of the well-known in-
dex problem from communication complexity—giving an (x log n, y log n)-scheme whenever
xy ≥ m. We give similar upper bounds for the related problems Selection and Heavy-
Hitters. We also prove a lower bound showing that any (ca, cv)-scheme for these problems
requires cacv = Ω(m log(n/m)), improving by a log(n/m) factor over lower bounds that fol-
low from prior work on “dense” streams. By a dense stream we mean one where n is not
much larger than m. This log(n/m) factor may seem minor, but we show that it has the
following striking consequence: the (very) sparse index problem—where Alice’s n-bit string
has Hamming weight O(log n)—has one-way randomized communication complexity that is
within a logarithmic factor of its online MA communication complexity. This implies that no
non-trivial tradeoffs between Merlin’s and Alice’s message sizes are possible for this problem.
That is, it is not possible for Alice’s message to be more than a logarithmic factor smaller
than in the best Merlin-less protocol, unless Merlin’s message is very long (at least as long,
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up to a logarithmic factor, as the cost of the best Merlin-less protocol). To our knowledge
this is the first problem that provably exhibits this phenomenon.
Our scheme for sparse PointQuery relies on universe reduction: the prover succinctly
describes a mapping h : [n]→ [r] that maps the input stream, which is defined over the huge
data universe [n], down to a derived stream defined over a smaller universe [r]. By design,
if the prover is honest and the mapping h does not cause “too many collisions,” then the
answer on the original stream can be determined from the answer on the derived stream. We
then efficiently apply known schemes for dense streams to the derived stream.
For our lower bound in Section 4.3, we give a novel reduction from the standard (dense)
index problem to sparse index that is tailored to the MA communication model. We then
apply known lower bounds for dense index. Our technique also gives what is to our knowl-
edge the first polynomial separation between the online MA and AMA communication com-
plexities of a specific (and natural) problem.
For clarity, the remainder of this overview omits factors logarithmic in n and m when
stating the costs of schemes. Though these factors are important for Section 4.3 (the conse-
quences of our lower bound being most significant when n = mω(1)), we anticipate that in
practice n and m will usually be polynomially related.
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 contain the most interesting and technically involved results of the
chapter, namely, efficient schemes for size-m-set-disjointness (henceforth, m-disj) and
kth Frequency Moments (henceforth, Fk). The schemes here are substantially more complex
than those in Section 4.3 and represent the main technical contributions of this chapter.
Section 4.4 gives (m2/3,m2/3)-schemes for both problems, but the schemes rely on “pre-
scient” annotation, i.e., annotation provided at the start of the stream that depends on the
stream itself. The even more complex schemes of Section 4.5 eliminate the need for prescient
annotation and also achieve much more general tradeoffs between annotation length and
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space usage. Specifically, Section 4.5 gives (mc
−1/2
v , cv)-schemes for m-disj and Fk for any
cv < m. Notice that one recovers the costs achieved in Section 4.4 by setting cv = m
2/3, and
thus the results of Section 4.5 almost subsume those of Section 4.4.1 However, Section 4.4
allows us to present a self-contained and easier proof of a weaker set of results that paves
the way for the results of Section 4.5.
These schemes are the first for these problems that allow both the annotation length and
space usage to be sublinear in m. At a very high level, there are three interlocking ideas that
allow us to achieve this.
1. The first idea is a careful application of universe reduction. We are able to use a
simple version of this idea to derive the upper bound for the PointQuery problem in
Section 4.3, but in the case of disj and Fk the universe-reduction mapping h : [n]→ [r]
specified by the prover is more complicated, requiring refinement in the form of the
additional ideas described below.
2. The second idea is addressed to ensuring that the prover performed the universe-
reduction step in an honest manner, in the sense that the answer on the original
stream can indeed be determined from the answer on the derived stream. The difficulty
of ensuring P is honest varies depending on the structure of the problem at hand. For
Fk, the verifier has to make sure that the universe-reduction mapping h is injective on
the items appearing in the data stream. This requires developing an efficient way for
V to detect collisions under h, even though V does not have the space to store all of
the values h(xi) for stream updates xi. For m-disj, a notion weaker than injectiveness
is sufficient.
1Two advantages of the schemes of Section 4.4 are that the schemes of Section 4.4 satisfy perfect com-
pleteness, while those of Section 4.5 do not, and that the schemes of Section 4.4 are more efficient by
polylogarithmic factors.
95
3. The third idea pertains to allowing P to specify the universe-reduction mapping h
online. That is, for many problems it would be much simpler if P could determine the
mapping h in advance i.e., if P could be prescient and send h to V at the start of the
stream so that V can determine the derived “mapped-down” stream on her own (this
is the approach taken in Section 4.4). When P must specify h in an online fashion,
additional insight is required. At a high level, our approach is to have P specify a
“guess” as to the right hash function at the beginning of the steam and retroactively
modify the hash function after the stream has been observed. The challenging aspect
of this approach is to ensure that P ’s retroactive modification of the hash function
is consistent with the observed data stream, even though V cannot refer back to the
stream to enforce this.
We exploit similar ideas to allow V to avoid storing the universe-reduction mapping
h herself; this is the key to achieving general tradeoffs between annotation length and
space usage in Section 4.5. In some schemes, storing this mapping h would be the
bottleneck in V ’s space usage. We show how V can store only a partial description of
h, and ask P to fill in the remainder of the description at the end of the stream.
Section 4.6 exploits all of these results, applying them to several graph problems, in-
cluding counting triangles and demonstrating a perfect matching. Our schemes have costs
that depend on the number of edges in the graph, rather than the total number of possible
edges and demonstrate that the ideas underlying our m-disj and Fk schemes are broadly
applicable. We state clearly how our schemes improve over prior work throughout.
Section 4.7 considers the general turnstile stream update model, which allows items to
have negative frequencies (i.e., provides correct answers for problems such as frequency mo-
ments and inner products even when the entries of the “frequency vector” may be negative).
96
These negative frequencies potentially break the “collision detection” sub-protocol used in
the previous sections, so we show how to exploit a source of public randomness to allow these
protocols to be carried out. Essentially, the public randomness specifies a remapping of the
input, so that the prover is highly unlikely to be able to use negative frequencies to “hide”
collisions. Because the protocols of Section 4.7 require public randomness, they work in the
AMA communication and streaming models, as opposed to the MA models in which all of
our other protocols operate.
4.3 Point Queries, Selection, and Heavy Hitters
4.3.1 Upper Bounds
Our first result is an efficient online annotation scheme for the PointQuery problem, a
generalization of the familiar index problem.
Definition 4.3.1. In the PointQuery problem, the data stream x consists of a sequence of
updates of the form (i, δ), followed by an index ι, and the goal is to determine the frequency
fι(x) =
∑
(jk,δk)∈x:jk=ι δk.
A prescient (log n, log n)-scheme for this problem is trivial as P can just tell V the index
ι at the start of the stream, and V can track the frequency of ι while observing the stream.
The vcost can be improved to O(logm) if V retains a hashed value of ι and tracks the
frequency of matching updates. The first scheme has perfect completeness, while the second
has completeness error polynomially small in m.
The costs of the scheme below are in terms of the stream sparsity m and not the stream
length N or the stream footprint M ; this is significant if mM , which is the case, e.g., for
the well-known straggler and set-reconciliation problems that have been studied in traditional
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streaming and communication models [47,79]. Our lower bound in Theorem 4.3.8 shows our
scheme is essentially optimal for moderate universe sizes, i.e., when the universe size n is
sub-exponential in the sparsity m.
Theorem 4.3.2. For any pair of positive integers ca, cv such that ca ·cv ≥ m, there is an on-
line (ca log n, cv log n)-scheme in the non-strict turnstile update model for the PointQuery
problem with imperfect completeness. Any online (ca, cv) scheme with ca ≥ log n for this
problem requires ca · cv = Ω(m log(n/m)).
Proof. V requires P to specify at the start of the stream a hash function h : [n] → [cv].
V requires h to have description length O(ca), rejecting if this is not the case. We define
the derived streams xj ∈ UN based on h: we set xjk = xk iff h(xk) = j, and 0 otherwise.
Intuitively, the hash function h partitions the stream updates in x into cv disjoint buckets,
and the vector xj describes the contents of the jth bucket. V maintains fingerprints over a
field of size poly(n) of each of the cv different x
j vectors.
At the end of the stream, given the desired index ι, P provides a description of the
(claimed) frequency vector in the h(ι)th derived stream, f(xh(ι)). V computes a fingerprint
of the claimed frequency vector and compares it to the fingerprint she computed from the
data stream, accepting if and only if the fingerprints match. Since each xj is sparse in
expectation, the cost of this description can be low: provided h does not map more than
O(ca) items with non-zero frequency to h(ι), P can just specify the item id and frequency
of the items with non-zero frequency in f(xh(ι)). In this case, the annotation size is just
O(ca log n). If P exceeds this amount of annotation, V will halt and reject (output ⊥).
Soundness follows from the fingerprinting guarantee: if P does not honestly provide xh(ι),
V ’s fingerprint of xh(ι) computed from the data stream will not match her fingerprint of the
claimed vector of frequencies.
To show (imperfect) completeness, we study the probability that the output of an hon-
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est prover is rejected. This happens only if m(xh(ι)), the number of non-zero entries in
xh(ι), is much larger than its expectation. By the pairwise independence of h, E[m(xh(ι))] =
m(x)/cv = ca. Thus, by Markov’s inequality, Pr[m(x
h(ι)) > 10ca] < 1/10. So by specifying a
hash function chosen at random from a pairwise independent hash family and then honestly
playing back the items that map to the same region as ι, P can convince V to accept with
probability 9/10.
Notice that V does not need to enforce that P picks the hash function h at random from
a pairwise-wise independent hash family, as P has no incentive not to pick the hash functions
in this way. That is, since V will reject if too many items map to the same region as ι, it
is sufficient for P to pick h at random from a pairwise independent hash family in order to
convince V to accept with constant probability. But it is equally acceptable if P wants to
pick h another way; if he does so, P just risks that V will reject with a higher probability.
The lower bound follows from Theorem 4.3.8, which we prove in Section 4.3.2.
The scheme of Theorem 4.3.2 yields nearly optimal schemes for the HeavyHitters and
Selection problems, described below. Table 4.1 summarizes these results and compares to
prior work.
Selection. For the reader’s convenience, we reproduce the definition of the Selection
problem original defined in Definition 3.3.1. Our definition assumes all frequencies fi :=∑
(jk,δk):jk=i
δk are non-negative, so this definition is valid only for the strict turnstile update
model.
Definition 4.3.3. The Selection problem is defined in terms of the quantity N ′ =∑
i∈[n] fi, the sum of all the frequencies. Given a desired rank ρ ∈ [N ′], output an item j from
the stream x = 〈(j1, δ1), . . . , (jN , δN)〉, such that
∑
(jk,δk):jk<j
δk < ρ and
∑
(jk,δk):jk>j
δk ≥
N ′ − ρ.
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Table 4.1: Comparison among PointQuery, Selection, and φ-HeavyHitters schemes.
Problem Scheme Costs Completeness Prescience Source
PointQuery (log n, log n) Perfect Prescient Ch. 3
PointQuery (m log n, log n) Perfect Online Thm 3.11.1
PointQuery (ca log n, cv log n): cacv ≥ n Perfect Online Thm. 3.3.2
PointQuery (ca log n, cv log n): cacv ≥ m Imperfect Online Thm 4.3.2
Selection (log n, log n) Perfect Prescient Ch. 3
Selection (ca log n, cv log n): cacv ≥ n Perfect Online Thm 3.3.3
Selection (m log n, log n) Perfect Online Thm 3.11.1
Selection (ca log
2 n, cv log n): cacv ≥ m log n Imperfect Online Cor 4.3.4
φ-HeavyHitters ( lognφ ,
logn
φ ) Perfect Prescient Thm 3.6.1
φ-HeavyHitters ( log
2 n
φ + ca log n, cv log n): cacv ≥ n Perfect Online Thm 3.6.1
φ-HeavyHitters (m log n, log n) Perfect Online Thm 3.11.1
φ-HeavyHitters ( lognφ ca, cv log n): cacv ≥ m log n Imperfect Online Cor 4.3.6
φ-HeavyHitters ( lognφ + ca log n, cv log n): cacv ≥ m log n Imperfect Online Cor 4.5.6
For all three problems, the schemes of this chapter are the first online schemes to achieve both
annotation and space usage sublinear in the stream sparsity m when m √n, and strictly
improve over the online MA communication cost of prior schemes whenever m = o(n). For
brevity, we omit factors of logcv(m) from the statement of costs of the φ-HeavyHitters
scheme due to Corollary 4.5.6.
Corollary 4.3.4. For any pair of positive integers ca, cv such that cacv ≥ m log n, there is
an online (ca log
2 n, cv log n)-scheme for Selection in the strict turnstile update model.
The corollary follows from a standard observation to reduce Selection to answering
prefix sum queries and hence to multiple instances of the PointQuery problem. V treats
each stream update (i, δ) in the stream x as an update to O(log n) dyadic ranges, where
a dyadic range is a range of the form [j2k, (j + 1)2k − 1] for some j and k. Thus, we can
view the set of dyadic range updates implied by x as a derived stream of sparsity m log n.
Notice we are using the fact that this transformation from the original stream of sparsity m
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results in a derived stream of sparsity at most m log n; a different derived stream was used in
Theorem 3.3.3 to address the Selection problem, but the sparsity of that derived stream
could be substantially larger than the sparsity of the original stream.
For any i, the quantity Ti :=
∑
(j,δ):j≤i δ can be written as the sum of the counts of
O(log n) dyadic ranges. Thus, at the end of the stream P can convince V that item i has
the desired Ti value by running log n PointQuery protocols as in Theorem 4.3.2 in parallel
on the derived stream of sparsity m log n. The verifier’s space usage is the same as for a
single PointQuery instance on this stream: V fingerprints each of the derived streams xj
defined in the proof of Theorem 4.3.2 and uses these fingerprints in all log n instances of the
PointQuery scheme. The annotation length is log n times larger than that required for a
single PointQuery instance because P may have to describe the frequency vectors of up
to log n derived streams.
Thus, we get an online (ca log
2 n, cv log n)-scheme as long as cacv = Ω(m log n).
Frequent Items. We also reproduce the definition of he φ-HeavyHitters problem for the
reader’s convenience. Here, we assume all frequencies fi :=
∑
(jk,δk):jk=i
δk are non-negative,
and so this definition is only valid for the strict turnstile update model.
Definition 4.3.5. The φ-HeavyHitters problem (also known as frequent items) is to list
those items i such that fi ≥ φN ′ where N ′ =
∑
i∈[n] fi, i.e., to list the items i whose frequency
of occurrence exceeds a φ fraction of the total count N ′.
We give a preliminary result for the φ-HeavyHitters problem in Corollary 4.3.6 below.
We give a substantially improved scheme in Section 4.5 using the ideas underlying our online
scheme for frequency moments.
Corollary 4.3.6. For all positive integers ca, cv such that cacv ≥ m log n, there is an online
(caφ
−1 log2 n, cv log n)-scheme for solving φ-HeavyHitters in the strict turnstile update
101
model.
Corollary 4.3.6 follows from the following analysis. Theorem 3.4.1 describes how to re-
duce φ-HeavyHitters to demonstrating the frequencies of O(φ−1 log n) items in a derived
stream. Moreover, the derived stream has sparsity O(m log n) if the original stream has
sparsity m. We use the PointQuery scheme of Theorem 4.3.2. As in Corollary 4.3.4, the
annotation length blows up by a factor φ−1 log n relative to a single PointQuery, but the
space usage of V can remain the same as in a single PointQuery instance. Hence, we obtain
an online (caφ
−1 log2 n, cv log n)-scheme for any cacv ≥ m log n.
4.3.2 Lower Bound
In this section, we prove a new lower bound on the online MA communication complexity
of the (m,n)-Sparse index problem.
Definition 4.3.7. In the (m,n)-Sparse index problem, Alice is given a vector x ∈ {0, 1}n
of Hamming weight at most m, and Bob is given an index ι. Their goal is to output the
value xι.
We prove our lower bound by reducing the (dense) index problem (i.e., the (m,n)-Sparse
index problem with m = Θ(n)) in the MA communication model to the (m,n)-Sparse index
problem for small m. The idea is to replace Alice’s dense input with a sparser input over a
bigger universe and then take advantage of our sparse PointQuery protocol. A lower bound
on the online MA communication complexity of the dense index problem was proven in
Theorem 3.3.2. There, it was shown that any online MA communication protocol Q requires
hcost(Q) vcost(Q) ≥ n. Combining this with our reduction of the dense index problem to
the sparse version, we conclude that any protocol for sparse index must be costly.
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Theorem 4.3.8. Any online MA communication protocol Q for the (m,n)-Sparse index
problem for which hcost(Q) ≥ log n must have hcost(Q) vcost(Q)=Ω(m log(n/m)).
Proof. Assume we have an online MA communication protocol Q for (m,n)-sparse index.
We describe how to use this online MA protocol for the sparse index problem to design one
for the dense index problem on vectors of length n′ = m log(n/m).
Let k = log(n/m). Given an input x to the dense index problem, Alice partitions x
into n′/k blocks of length k, and constructs a 0-1 vector y of Hamming weight n′/k over the
universe {0, 1}(n′/k)·2k = {0, 1}n as follows. She replaces each block Bi with a 1-sparse vector
vi ∈ {0, 1}2k , where each entry of vi corresponds to one of the 2k possible values of block
Bi. That is, if block Bi of x equals the binary representation of the number j ∈ [2k], then
Alice replaces block Bi with the vector ej ∈ {0, 1}2k , where ej denotes the vector with a 1
in coordinate j and 0s elsewhere.
Alice now has an n′/k = m-sparse derived input y over the universe {0, 1}n. Merlin looks
at Bob’s input to identify the index ι of the dense vector x in which Bob is interested. Merlin
then tells Bob the index ` such that ` = 2k(i − 1) + j, where Bi is the block in which ι
is located, and block Bi of Alice’s input x equals the binary representation of the number
j ∈ [2k]. Notice that Merlin can specify ` using log n bits. If Bob is convinced that y` = 1,
then Bob can deduce the value of all the bits in block Bi of the original dense vector x, and
in particular, the value of xι.
The parties then run the assumed online MA protocol for (m,n)-Sparse index. The total
hcost of this protocol is hcost(Q) + log n = O(hcost(Q)), and the total vcost is vcost(Q).
Thus, by Theorem 3.3.2, hcost(Q) vcost(Q) = Ω(n′) = Ω(m log(n/m)) as claimed.
Theorem 4.3.8 should be contrasted with the following well-known upper bound.
Theorem 4.3.9. Assume n < mm. Then the one-way randomized communication complexity
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of the (m,n)-Sparse index Problem is O(m logm).
Proof. Alice chooses a hash function h : [n]→ [m3] at random from a pairwise independent
family and uses h to perform “universe reduction”. That is, she sends h along with the set S
of m values {h(j) : xj = 1}. Notice h can be specified with O(log n) = O(m logm) bits, and
S can be specified with O(m logm) bits. Bob outputs 1 if h(ι) ∈ S, and 0 otherwise. The
correctness of the protocol follows from the pairwise independence property of h: if xι = 0,
then with high probability ι will not collide under h with any j such that xj = 1. The total
cost of this protocol is O(m logm).
4.3.3 Implications of the Lower Bound
Our lower bound in Theorem 4.3.8 has interesting consequences when it is combined
with the upper bound in Theorem 4.3.9. Consider in particular the (m,n)-Sparse index
Problem, where n = 2m. Theorem 4.3.9 implies that the one-way randomized communication
complexity of this problem is O(m logm); that is, without any need of Merlin, Alice and Bob
can solve the problem with O(m logm) communication.
Meanwhile, Theorem 4.3.8 implies that even if Merlin’s message to Bob has length
Ω(log n) = Ω(m), Alice’s message to Bob must have length Ω(m log(n/m)/m) = Ω(m).
Indeed, Theorem 4.3.8 shows that for any protocol Q, if hcost(Q) ≥ log n = m, then we
must have hcost(Q) vcost(Q) = Ω(m log(n/m)) = Ω(m2). In particular, this means that if
hcost(Q) = m, vcost(Q) must be Ω(m). This trivially implies that for any protocol Q with
hcost(Q) less than m, vcost(Q) must still be Ω(m); otherwise we could achieve a protocol
with hcost(Q) = m and vcost(Q) = o(m) simply by running Q and adding in extraneous
bits to the proof to bring the proof length up to m.
Consequently, the online MA communication complexity of this problem is at least Ω(m),
which is at most a logarithmic factor smaller than the one-way randomized communication
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complexity. To our knowledge, this is the first problem that provably exhibits this behavior.
Specifically, this rules out smooth tradeoffs between annotation size and space usage in
any annotated streaming protocol for the (m, 2m)-Sparse index Problem: there is an online
(1,m logm)-scheme for this problem, but in order to reduce the space cost even to o(m), the
annotation length must be Ω(m).
Corollary 4.3.10. The one-way randomized communication complexity of the (m, 2m)-
Sparse index Problem is O(m logm). The online Merlin-Arthur communication complexity
is Ω(m).
Other Sparse Problems. A number of lower bounds in Chapter 3 are proved via re-
ductions from index that preserve stream length up to logarithmic factors. This holds for
Selection and HeavyHitters, as well as for the problem of determining the existence
of a triangle in a graph. For all such problems, the lower bound of Theorem 4.3.8 implies
corresponding new lower bounds for sparse streams, i.e., streams for which m = o(n). We
omit the details for brevity.
Separating Online MA and AMA Communication Complexity. Another implica-
tion of Theorem 4.3.8 is a polynomial separation between online MA communication com-
plexity and online AMA communication complexity. Indeed, there is an online AMA protocol
of cost O˜(
√
m) for the (m, 2
√
m)-Sparse index Problem, where the O˜ notation hides factors
polylogarithmic in m: the first message, which consists of public random coins, is used to
specify a hash function h : [n]→ [m3] from a pairwise independent hash family; this message
has length O(log n) = O(
√
m). With high probability, h is injective on the set {j : xj = 1}.
The parties then run the online MA communication protocol of Theorem 4.3.2 on the inputs
h(x) and h(ι) and output the result. The total cost of this protocol is O˜(
√
m) as claimed.
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Meanwhile, the lower bound of Theorem 4.3.8 implies that the online MA communication
complexity of this problem is Ω(m3/4). Indeed, if we have a protocol Q with hcost(Q) =
m3/4 > log n, Theorem 4.3.8 implies that hcost(Q) vcost(Q) = Ω(m log(n/m)) = Ω(m3/2),
and hence vcost(Q) > m3/4.
To our knowledge, this is the first such separation between online AMA and online MA
communication complexity (we remark that polynomial separations between online MA and
MAMA communication complexity were already known for problems including index and
disj [3, 30]). Indeed, all previous lower bound methods that apply to online MA commu-
nication complexity, such as the proof of Theorem 3.3.2 and the methods of Klauck and
Prakash [72], in fact yield equivalent AMA lower bounds. At a high level, the reason is that
these methods work via round reduction – they remove the need for Merlin’s message. They
therefore turn any online MA protocol for a function F into an online “A” protocol for F ,
which is really just a one-way randomized protocol without a prover, allowing one to invoke
a known lower bound on the one-way randomized communication complexity of F . Similarly,
they turn an online AMA protocol for F into an online AA protocol, which is also just a
one-way randomized protocol for F .
The reason Theorem 4.3.8 is capable of separating online AMA from MA communication
complexity is that the reduction in the proof of Theorem 4.3.8 turns an online MA protocol
for the (m,n)-Sparse index Problem into an online MA protocol for the (dense) index
Problem with related costs. However, the natural variant of the reduction applied to an
online AMA protocol for the (m,n)-Sparse index Problem yields an online MAMA protocol
for the dense index Problem, not an online AMA protocol. And the dense index Problem
has an online MAMA protocol that is polynomially more efficient than any online AMA
protocol (see e.g., [3, 42]).
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Table 4.2: Comparison of m-disj schemes.
Scheme Costs Completeness Prescience Source
((m logm)2/3, (m logm)2/3): m = Ω(log n) Perfect Prescient Thm 4.4.2
(ca log n, cv log n): cacv ≥ n Perfect Online Thm 3.5.2
(m log n, log n) Perfect Online Thm 3.11.1
(ca log n logcv m, cv log n logvm): ca = mc
−1/2
v Imperfect Online Thm 4.5.1
The m-disj schemes of this chapter are the first to achieve annotation length and space usage
that are both sublinear in m for m √n, and strictly improve over the MA communication
cost (online or prescient) of prior schemes whenever m = o(n).
4.4 Prescient Schemes for Sparse Disjointness and Fre-
quency Moments
In this section and the next, we describe schemes for the m-Disjointness (m-disj) and
Frequency Moment (Fk) problems. These schemes contain the main ideas of the chapter.
4.4.1 A Prescient Scheme for Sparse Disjointness
An important special case of the communication problem disj is when Alice’s and Bob’s
input sets are promised to be small, i.e., have size at most m n. These should be thought
of as sparse instances. The sparsity parameter m has typically been denoted by the letter k
in the communication complexity literature, and the problem has typically been referred to
as k-disj rather than m-disj; we use m rather than k for consistency with our notation in
the rest of the thesis (where m denotes the sparsity of a data stream).
Among the original motivations for studying this variant is its relation to the clique-
vs.-independent-set problem introduced by Yannakakis [105] to study linear programming
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formulations for combinatorial optimization problems. More recent motivations include con-
nections to property testing [17]. A clever protocol of H˚astad and Wigderson [63] gives an
optimal O(m) communication protocol for m-disj, improving upon the trivial O(m log n)
and the easy O(m logm) bounds. This protocol requires considerable interaction between Al-
ice and Bob, a feature that turns out to be necessary. Recent results of Buhrman et al. [24]
and Dasgupta et al. [44] give tight Θ(m logm) bounds for m-disj in the one-way model.
Very recently, Brody et al. [23] and Sag˘lam and Tardos [86] have given tight rounds-vs.-
communication tradeoffs for m-disj.
Here we obtain the first nontrivial bounds for m-disj in the annotated streams model
and thus also in the online MA communication model.
Definition 4.4.1. In them-disj problem, the data stream specifies two multi-sets S, T ⊆ [n],
with ‖S‖0, ‖T‖0 ≤ m, where ‖S‖0 denotes the number of distinct items in S. An update
of the form ((0, i), δ) is interpreted as an insertion of δ copies of item i into set S, and an
update of the form ((1, i), δ) is interpreted as an insertion of δ copies of item i into T . The
goal is to determine whether or not S and T are disjoint.
Notice Definition 4.4.1 allows S and T to be multi-sets, but assumes the strict turnstile
update model, where the frequency of each item is non-negative (recall that the turnstile
model allows for updates to contains negative δ values, thereby modeling deletions, but the
strict turnstile model requires all frequencies to be non-negative at the end of the stream).
Theorem 4.4.2. Assume m > log n. There is a prescient ((m logm)2/3, (m logm)2/3)-scheme
for m-disj with perfect completeness in the strict turnstile update model. In particular, the
MA-communication complexity of m-disj is O((m logm)2/3). Any prescient (ca, cv) protocol
requires cacv = Ω(m).
Proof. Obviously if S and T are not disjoint, the prescient prover can provide an item
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i ∈ S ∩ T at the start of the stream and the verifier can check that i indeed appears in both
S and T . The total space usage and annotation length is just O(log n) in this case.
Suppose now that S and T are disjoint. We first recall that a (
√
n log n,
√
n log n)-scheme
for disj follows from Theorem 3.5.2, with f (1) and f (2) set to the indicator vectors of S and T
respectively, and g equal to the product function. We refer to this as the dense disj scheme,
because its cost does not improve if |S| and |T | are both o(n).
Our prescient scheme for m-disj works as follows. At the start of the stream, the prover
describes a hash function h : [n]→ [r], for some smaller universe [r], with the property that
h is injective on S∪T . We will write h(S) to denote the result of applying h to every member
of S. The parties can now run the dense disj scheme whereby P convinces V that h(S) and
h(T ) are disjoint. Given the existence of an injective function h, perfect completeness follows
from the fact that if S and T are disjoint, so are h(S) and h(T ), combined with the perfect
completeness of the dense disj scheme. Soundness follows from the fact that if i ∈ S ∩ T ,
then h(i) ∈ h(S) ∩ h(T ) i.e., if S and T are not disjoint, then the same holds trivially for
h(S) and h(T ).
The dense disj scheme run on h(S) and h(T ) requires annotation length and space usage
O(
√
r log r). We now show that, for a suitable choice of r, P ’s description of h is also limited
to O(
√
r log r) communication, balancing out the cost of the rest of the scheme.
A family of functions F ⊆ [r][n] is said to be κ-perfect if, for all S ⊆ [n] with |S| ≤ κ,
there exists a function h ∈ F that is injective when restricted to S. Fredman and Komlo´s [52]
have shown that for all n ≥ r ≥ κ, there exists a κ-perfect family F , with
|F| ≤ (1 + o(1))
(
κ log n
− log(1− t(r, κ))
)
,
where
t(r, κ) :=
κ−1∏
j=1
(
1− j
r
)
.
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For r ≥ 2κ, we can use the crude approximation
− log(1− t(r, κ)) ≥ t(r, κ) ≥
(
1− κ
r
)κ
≥ e−2κ2/r
to obtain the bound |F| = O(κe2κ2/r log n), which implies
log |F| = O(κ2/r) ,
for κ2/r = Ω(log κ) and κ = Ω(log n).
Let us pick a family F that is (2m)-perfect. Once P and V agree upon such a family F ,
the prover, upon seeing the input sets S and T , can pick h ∈ F that is injective on S ∪ T .
Describing h requires O(m2/r) bits; P sends this to V before the stream is seen, and V stores
it while observing the stream in order to run the dense disj scheme on h(S) and h(T ). To
balance out this communication with the O(
√
r log r) cost of running the dense disj scheme
on h(S) and h(T ), we choose r so that
m2
r
= Θ(
√
r log r) .
This is achieved by setting r = m4/3/ log2/3m. The resulting upper bound is that both the
annotation length and verifier’s space usage are O
(
(m logm)2/3
)
.
The lower bound follows from the lower bound for “dense” disj proved in Theorem
3.5.5.
4.4.2 A Prescient Scheme for Frequency Moments
We now present prescient schemes for the kth Frequency Moment problem, Fk, defined
in Definition 3.5.1.
The idea behind the scheme, as in the case of m-disj, is that P is supposed to specify a
“hash function” h to reduce the universe size in a way that does not introduce false collisions.
However, for Fk it is essential that V ensure h is truly injective on the items appearing in
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Table 4.3: Comparison of Fk schemes.
Scheme Costs Completeness Prescience Source
(k2ca log n, kcv log n): cacv ≥ n Perfect Online Thm 3.5.2
(m log n, log n) Perfect Online Thm 3.11.1
(k2m2/3 log n, km2/3 log n) Perfect Prescient Thm 4.4.3
(k2mc
−1/2
v log n logcv m, kcv log n logcv m): cv > 1 Imperfect Online Thm 4.5.1
The Fk schemes of this chapter are the first to achieve annotation length and space usage
that are both sublinear in m for m √n, and strictly improve over the MA communication
cost of prior protocols (online or prescient) whenever m = o(n).
the data stream. This is in contrast to m-disj, where a weaker notion than injectiveness was
sufficient to guarantee soundness. The fundamental difference between the two problems
is that for m-disj, collisions only “hurt the prover’s claim” that the two sets are disjoint,
whereas for Fk the prover could try to use collisions to convince the verifier that the answer
to the query is higher or lower than the true answer.
Theorem 4.4.3. There is a prescient (k2m2/3 log n, km2/3 log n)-scheme for computing Fk
over a data stream of sparsity m in the strict turnstile update model. This scheme has perfect
completeness. Any prescient (ca, cv) protocol requires cacv = Ω(m).
Proof. The idea is to have the prover specify for the verifier a perfect hash function h : [n]→
[r], where r is to be determined later, i.e., P specifies a hash function h such that for all
x 6= y appearing in at least one update in the data stream, h(x) 6= h(y). The verifier stores
the description of h, and while observing the stream runs the dense Fk scheme of Theorem
3.5.2 on the derived stream in which each update (i, δ) is replaced with the update (h(i), δ).
As discussed above, it is essential that V ensure h is injective on the set of items that
have non-zero frequency, as otherwise P could try to introduce collisions to try to trick the
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verifier. To deal with this, we introduce a mechanism by which V can “detect” collisions.
Definition 4.4.4. Define the problem Injection as follows. We observe a stream of tuples
ti = ((xi, bi), δi). Each ti indicates that δi copies of item xi are placed in bucket bi ∈ [r]. We
allow δi to be negative, modeling deletions, and refer to the quantity f(j,b) =
∑
i:(xi,bi)=(j,b)
δi
as the count of pair (j, b). We assume the strict turnstile model, so that for all pairs (j, b)
we have f(j,b) ≥ 0.
We say that the stream is an injection if for every two pairs (j, b) and (j′, b) with positive
counts, it holds that j = j′. Define the output as 1 if the stream defines an injection, and 0
otherwise.
Lemma 4.4.5. For any cacv ≥ r, there is an online (ca log r, cv log r)-scheme for determining
whether a stream in the strict turnstile model is an injection.
Proof. Say that bucket b is pure if there is at most one j ∈ [n] such that f(j,b) > 0. The
stream defines an injection if and only if every bucket b is pure.
Notice that a bucket b is pure if and only if the variance of the item identifiers mapping
to the bucket with positive count is zero. Intuitively, our scheme will compute the sum of the
these variances across all buckets b; this sum will be zero if and only if the stream defines
an injection. Details follow.
Define three r-dimensional vectors u, v, w as follows:
ub =
∑
j∈[n]
f(j,b),
vb =
∑
j∈[n]
f(j,b)j,
wb =
∑
j∈[n]
f(j,b)j
2.
It is easy to see that if bucket b is pure then v2b = ub · wb. Moreover, if bucket b is impure
then v2b < ubwb; this holds by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality applied to the n-dimensional
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vectors whose jth entries are
√
f(j,b) and
√
f(j,b) · j respectively (the strict inequality holds
because for an impure bucket b, the vector given by
√
f(j,b) · j is not a scalar multiple of the
vector given by
√
f(j,b)). Here, we are exploiting the assumption that f(j,b) ≥ 0 for all pairs
(i, b), as this allows us to conclude that all
√
f(j,b) values are real numbers.
It follows that
∑
b∈[r] v
2
b =
∑
b∈[r] ub ·wb if and only if the stream defined an injection. Both
quantities can be computed using the “dense” scheme of Theorem 3.5.2. Notice that each
update ti = ((xi, bi), δi) contributes independently to each of the vectors u, v, and w, and
hence it is possible for V to run the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 on these vectors as required.
This yields an online (ca log r, cv log r)-scheme for the injection problem for any cacv ≥ r as
claimed.
Returning to our Fk scheme, P specifies a hash function h claimed to be one-to-one on
the set of items that appear in one or more updates of the stream x. V verifies that h is
injective using the scheme of Lemma 4.4.5. If this claim is true, then Fk(x) = Fk(h(x)), the
frequency moment of the mapped-down stream, and P can prove this by running the scheme
of [30, Theorem 4.1] on the derived stream h(x).
Perfect completeness follows from P ’s ability to find a perfect hash function just as in
Theorem 4.4.2. Soundness follows from the soundness of the Injection scheme of Lemma
4.4.5, in addition to the soundness property of the Fk scheme of [30, Theorem 4.1].
To analyze the costs, note that by using the hash family of Fredman and Komlo´s [52],
the annotation length and space cost due to specifying and storing the hash function h is
O(m2 log n/r). The annotation length and space cost of the dense Fk scheme of Theorem
3.5.2 are O(k2ca log r) and O(kcv log r) for any cacv ≥ r. The annotation length and space
cost of the Injection scheme can be set to O(ca log r) and O(cv log r) respectively. Setting
r = m4/3 and ca = cv = m
2/3 yields the desired costs.
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4.5 An Online Scheme for Frequency Moments
We now give an online version of the Fk scheme of Theorem 4.4.3. A simple modification
of this scheme yields the scheme for m-disj with analogous costs as claimed in Row 4 of
Table 4.2. In addition to avoiding the use of prescience, our online scheme avoids requiring
V to explicitly store the hash function sent by P , allowing us to achieve a much wider range
of tradeoffs between annotation size and space usage relative to Theorems 4.4.2 and 4.4.3.
Theorem 4.5.1. For any cv > 1, there is an online (k
2mc
−1/2
v log n logcvm, kcv log n logcvm)-
scheme for Fk in the strict turnstile model for a stream of sparsity m over a universe of size
n. Any online (ca, cv)-scheme for this problem with ca ≥ log n requires cacv = Ω(m log(n/m)).
Notice that the annotation length is less than m log n for any cv = m
Ω(1), and therefore
this protocol is not subsumed by the simple “sparse” scheme (second row of Table 4.3) in
which P just replays the entire stream in a sorted order, and V checks this is done correctly
using fingerprints. Notice also that the product of the space usage and annotation length is
k3mc
1/2
v log
2 n log2cv m, which is in o(n) for many interesting parameter settings. This improves
upon the dense sum-check scheme (first row of Table 4.3) in such cases.
4.5.1 An Overview of the Scheme
In order to achieve an online scheme, we examine how to construct perfect hash functions
such as those used in the prescient Fk scheme of Theorem 4.4.3. Let S be the set of m items
with non-zero frequency at the end of the stream: we want the hash function to be one-to-one
on S. Choose a hash function h at random from pairwise independent hash family mapping
[n] to [r], for r to be specified later – this requires just O(log n) bits to specify. We only
expect O(m2/r) pairs to collide under h, which means that with constant probability there
will be O(m2/r) collisions if h is chosen as specified. The final hash function h∗ is specified by
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writing down h (which takes only O(log n) bits), followed by the items involved in a collision
and some special locations for them. The total (expected) bit length to specify this hash
function is O(m2 log(n)/r).
In our online Fk scheme, P will send such an h at the start of the stream. Notice h does
not depend on the stream itself – it is just a random pairwise independent hash function
– so P is not using prescience. P also has no incentive not to choose h at random from a
pairwise independent hash family, since the only purpose of choosing h in this manner is to
minimize the number of collisions under h. If P chooses h in a different way, P simply risks
that there are too many collisions under h, causing V to reject.
Now while V observes the stream, she runs the online sum-check scheme for Fk given
in Theorem 3.5.2 on the mapped-down universe of size r, using h as the mapping-down
function. At the end of the stream, P is asked to retroactively specify a hash function h∗
that is one-to-one on S as follows. P provides a list L0 of all items in S that were involved in
a collision under h, accompanied by their frequencies. Assuming that these items and their
frequencies are honestly specified by P , V can compute their contribution to Fk and remove
them from the stream. By design, h∗ is then (claimed to be) injective on the remaining items.
V can confirm this tentatively using the Injection scheme of Lemma 4.4.5.
The remainder of the scheme is devoted to making the correctness a certainty by en-
suring that the items in L0 and their frequencies are as claimed (we stress that while our
exposition of the scheme is modular, all parts of the scheme are executed in parallel, with no
communication ever occurring from V to P). A naive approach to checking the frequencies
of the items in L0 would be to run |L0| independent PointQuery schemes, one for each
item in L; however there are too many items in L0 for this to be cost-effective. Instead, we
check all of the frequencies as a batch, with a (sub-)scheme whose cost is roughly equal to
that of a single Injection query.
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This (sub-)scheme can be understood as proceeding in stages, with each stage i using
a different pairwise independent hash function hi to map down the full original input. Say
that an item j is isolated by hi if j is not involved in a collision under hi with any other
item with non-zero frequency in the original data stream x. The goal of stage i is to isolate
a large fraction of items that were not isolated by any previous stage.
A key technical insight is that at each stage i, it is possible for V to “ignore” all items
that are not isolated at that stage. This enables V to check that the frequencies of all items
that are isolated at stage i are as claimed. We bound the number of stages that are required
to isolate all items if P behaves as prescribed – if P reaches an excessive number of stages,
then V will simply reject.
4.5.2 Details of the Scheme
Proof of Theorem 4.5.1: Let r = mc
1/2
v . P sends a hash function h : [n]→ [r] at the start
of the stream, claimed to be chosen at random from a pairwise independent hash family.
While observing the stream, V runs the dense online sum-check scheme for Fk given in
Theorem 3.5.2 on the mapped-down universe [r]. Let S be the set of items with non-zero
frequency at the end of the stream. After the stream is observed, P is asked to provide a
list L0 of all items with nonzero frequency that were involved in a collision, followed by a
claimed frequency f ∗i for each i ∈ L0.
Assuming that these items and their frequencies are honestly specified in L0 by P , V can
compute their contribution C0 =
∑
i∈L0 f
∗
i to Fk and then remove them from the stream
by processing updates U = {(i,−f ∗i ) : i ∈ L0} within the dense Fk scheme. h is injective
on the remaining items. V can confirm this using the Injection scheme of Lemma 4.4.5
(conditioned on the assumed correctness of L0). Thus the dense Fk scheme will output
C1 =
∑
i 6∈L0 f
k
i . Assuming all of V ’s checks within the dense Fk scheme pass, V outputs
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C0 + C1 as the answer.
The remainder of the scheme is directed towards determining that the frequency of items
in L0 are correctly reported. We abstract this goal as the following problem.
Definition 4.5.2. Define the `-MultiIndex problem as follows. Consider a data stream
x ◦L0, where ◦ denotes concatenation. x is a usual data stream in the strict turnstile model,
while L0 is a list of ` pairs (i, f
∗
i ). Let f be the frequency vector of x. The desired output is
1 if fi = f
∗
i for all i ∈ L0, and 0 otherwise.
We defer our solution to the `-MultiIndex problem to Section 4.5.3. For now, we state
our main result about the problem in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5.3. For all cv > 1, the `-MultiIndex problem has an online
(mc
−1/2
v log n logcv `, cv log n logcv `)-scheme in the strict turnstile update model.
Analysis of Costs. Let S be the set of items with non-zero frequency when the stream
ends. First, we argue that if r is the size of the mapped-down universe, and P chooses the
hash function h at random from a pairwise independent hash family, then with probability
9/10, there will be at most 10m2/r items in S that collide under g. Indeed, by a union bound,
the probability any item i with non-zero count is involved in a collision is at most m/r, and
hence by linearity of expectation, the expected number of items involved in a collision is at
most m2/r.
So by Markov’s inequality, with probability at least 9/10, the total number of items
involved in a collision will be at most 10m2/r = O(mc
−1/2
v ) under the setting r = mc
1/2
v .
Conditioned on this event, P can specify the list L0 and the associated frequencies with
annotation length O(mc
−1/2
v log n), and V can use the MultiIndex scheme of Lemma 4.5.3
with ` = O(mc
−1/2
v ) to verify the frequencies of the items in L0 are as claimed. For any cv > 1,
Lemma 4.5.3 under this setting of ` yields an (mc−1v log n · logcv `, cv log n · logcv `)-scheme.
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Running all of the sum-check schemes (i.e., the Injection scheme and the Fk scheme it-
self) on the mapped-down universe requires annotationO(k2rc−1v log r) and spaceO(kcv log r)
for V ; in total, this provides an online (m2 log n/r+k2r log n/cv+kmc−1v log n·logcv m, cv log n·
logcv M)-scheme.
Since we set r = mc
1/2
v , we obtain a online (k2mc
−1/2
v logcv(m), kcv log n logv(m))-scheme
for any cv > 1.
The lower bound stated in Theorem 4.5.1 follows from Theorem 4.3.8 and an easy reduc-
tion from the (m,n)-sparse index problem.
4.5.3 A Scheme for MultiIndex: Proof of Lemma 4.5.3
Before presenting an efficient online scheme for the `-MultiIndex Problem, we define
two “sub”problems, which apply a function to only a subset of the desired input.
Definition 4.5.4. Define the problem SubInjection as follows. We observe a stream of
tuples ti = (xi, bi, δi), followed by a vector z ∈ {0, 1}r. As in the Injection problem, each
ti indicates that δi copies of item xi are placed in bucket bi ∈ [r].
We say that the stream defines a subinjection based on z if for every b such that zb ≥ 1, for
every two pairs (x, b) and (y, b) with positive counts, it holds that x = y. The SubInjection
problem is to decide whether the stream defines a subinjection based on z.
Notice that the Injection problem is a special case of the SubInjection problem with
zi = 1 for all i.
Lemma 4.5.5. For any cacv ≥ r, there is an online (ca log r, cv log r)-scheme for SubIn-
jection in the strict turnstile update model. Moreover, for any constant c > 0, this scheme
can be instantiated to have soundness error 1/rc.
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Proof. Define vectors u, v, and w exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4.4.5, and observe that
the stream defines a sub-injection if and only if
∑
b∈[r] zbv
2
b =
∑
b∈[r] zbubwb. V can compute
both quantities using the dense scheme of Theorem 3.5.2, with the same asymptotic costs
as the scheme of Lemma 4.4.5. The soundness error can be made smaller than 1/rc for any
constant c by running the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 over a finite field of size poly(r), for a
sufficiently fast-growing polynomial in r.
We similarly define the problem SubF2 over a data universe of size n based on a vector
z ∈ {0, 1}n as ∑i∈[n] zif 2i , the sum of squared frequencies of items indicated by z. This too is
a low-degree polynomial function of the input values, and so Theorem 3.5.2 implies SubF2
can be computed by an online (ca log r, cv log r)-scheme in the general turnstile update model
for any ca, cv such that cacv ≥ r (and the soundness error in this protocol can be made smaller
than 1/rc for any desired constant c).
Online scheme for `-MultiIndex. The scheme can be thought of as proceeding in t stages
(t will be specified later), although these stages merely serve to partition the annotation:
there is no communication from V to P during these stages. Each stage j makes use of a
corresponding hash function hj : [n]→ [r] for r = mc1/2v . The t hash functions are provided
by P at the start of the stream, so that V has access to them throughout the stream. Each
hj is claimed to be chosen at random from a pairwise independent hash family: if they are,
then there are unlikely to be too many collisions, so P has no incentive not to choose hj
at random. Let f denote the vector of frequencies defined by the input stream, and let f (0)
denote the vector satisfying f
(0)
i = fi for i ∈ L0, and f (0)i = 0 for i 6∈ L0.
Stage j begins with a list Lj−1 of items. We will refer to these items as “exceptions”. P
provides a new list Lj ⊆ Lj−1 of items that remain exceptions in stage j; P implicitly claims
that no items in Lj−1 \ Lj collide with some other input items under hash function hj. Let
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z(j) denote the indicator vector of the list of buckets corresponding to Lj−1 \Lj, i.e. z(j)hj(i) = 1
if i ∈ Lj−1 \ Lj, and z(j) entries are 0 otherwise. To check that no items in Lj−1 \ Lj collide
under hj, V will use the SubInjection scheme based on the indicator vector z(j) over the
full original input f as mapped by the hash function hj. Note that since the original input
stream is in the strict turnstile update model, so is the stream on which the SubInjection
scheme is run (as the SubInjection scheme is simply run on the original input stream as
mapped by the hash function hj, based on the vector z
(j)). Note also that Lj−1 and Lj are
provided explicitly, so V can compute z(j) easily.2
Having established that the items in Lj−1 \ Lj are no longer exceptions, V also wants to
ensure that the frequencies of these items were reported correctly in L0. To do so, V run
the SubF2 scheme over the vector f − f ∗ as mapped by hj to r buckets, based on the z(j)
indicator vector. The result is zero if and only if fi = f
(j)
i for all i where z
(j)
i = 1.
The stages continue until Lj = ∅, and there are no more exceptions. Provided all schemes
conclude correctly, and the number of stages to reach Lj = ∅ is at most t, V can accept the
result, and output 1 for the answer to the MultiIndex decision problem.
Lastly, note that V does not need to explicitly store any of the lists Lj. In fact, P can
implicitly specify all of the lists Lj while playing the list L0: for each item i ∈ L0, he provides
a number j, thereby implicitly claiming that i ∈ Lj′ for j′ ≤ j, and i 6∈ Lj′ for j′ > j.
Analysis of costs. If hj is chosen at random from a pairwise independent hash family, the
probability an item i in Lj−1 is involved in a collision with the original stream f under hj
is O(m/r) = O(c
−1/2
v ). Consider the probability that any item i survives as an exception
to stage t. The probability of this is O(c
−t/2
v ), and summed over all ` items, the expected
number is O(`c
−t/2
v ). Invoking Markov’s inequality, with constant probability it suffices to
2For example, V can add one to the corresponding entry of z(j) for each item that is marked as an
exception. This will cause z(j) to count the number of exceptions in each bucket, rather than indicate them,
but this does not affect the correctness.
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set t = O(logcv `) to ensure that we need at most t stages before no more exceptions need to
be reported.
In stage j, the SubInjection and SubF2 schemes cost (mc
−1/2
v log n, cv log n). Summing
over the t stages, we achieve for any cv > 1 an (mc
−1/2
v log(n) · logcv(m), cv log(n) · logcv(m))-
scheme as claimed in the statement of Lemma 4.5.3.
Formal Proof of Soundness. The soundness error of the protocol can be bounded by the
probability that any invocation of the SubInjection scheme or the SubF2 scheme returns
an incorrect answer. The soundness errors of both the SubInjection scheme and the SubF2
scheme can be made smaller than 1
rc
for any constant c > 0, and therefore a union bound
over all t = O(logcv `) invocations of each protocol implies that with high probability, no
invocation of either scheme returns an incorrect answer.
4.5.4 Implications of the Online Scheme for Frequency Moments
Our online scheme for Fk in Theorem 4.5.1 has a number of important consequences.
Inner Product and Hamming Distance. The discussion following Theorem 3.5.3 showed
that computing inner products and Hamming Distance can be directly reduced to (exact)
computation of the second Frequency Moment F2, so Theorems 4.4.3 and 4.5.1 immediately
yield schemes for these problems of identical cost.
An improved scheme for φ-HeavyHitters. We can use Lemma 4.5.3 to yield an online
scheme for the φ-HeavyHitters problem.
Corollary 4.5.6. For all ca, cv such that cacv ≥ m log n, there is an online (ca log n ·
logcv(m) + φ
−1 log n, cv log n logcv(m))-scheme for solving φ-HeavyHitters in the strict
turnstile update model.
Corollary 4.5.6 follows from a similar analysis to Corollary 4.3.6. Theorem 3.6.1 describes
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how to reduce φ-HeavyHitters to demonstrating the frequencies of
O(φ−1 log n) items in a derived stream. Moreover, the derived stream has sparsity O(m log n)
if the original stream has sparsity m. We use the MultiIndex scheme of Lemma 4.5.3 to
verify these claimed frequencies.
Frequency-based functions. Theorem 3.7.1 shows how to extend the sum-check scheme of
Theorem 3.5.2 to efficiently compute arbitrary frequency-based functions, which are functions
of the form F (x) =
∑
i∈[n] g(fi(x)) for an arbitrary g : (−[N ]∪ [N ])→ Z. A similar but more
involved extension applies in the sparse setting considered in this chapter. We spell out the
details below, restricting ourselves to the prescient case for brevity; an online scheme with
essentially identical costs follows by using the ideas underlying Theorem 4.5.1.
Corollary 4.5.7. Let F (x) =
∑
i∈[n] g(fi(x)) be a frequency-based function. Then there
is a prescient (N3/4 log n, N3/4 log n)-scheme for computing F (x) in the strict unit-update
turnstile model. This scheme satisfies perfect completeness.
Proof. We use a natural modification of the frequency-based functions scheme of Theorem
3.7.1. P specifies a hash function h at the start of the stream mapping the universe [n] into
[N5/4]; P chooses h to be injective on the set of items that have non-zero frequency at the
end of the stream. Using the perfect hash functions of Fredman and Komlo´s [52], h can be
represented with O(N2/r log n) = O(N3/4 log n) bits. V stores h explicitly. After the stream
is observed, P and V run the φ-HeavyHitters scheme of Corollary 4.5.6, with φ = N−1/4.
Using the fact that
∑
i fi < N , by setting the parameters of Corollary 4.5.6 appropriately
we can ensure that this part of the scheme requires annotation length O(N3/4 log n) and has
space cost O(N3/4 log n). This scheme also allows V to determine the exact frequencies of the
items in H, allowing V to compute cont(H) := ∑i∈H g(fi(x)), which gives the contribution
of the items in H to the output F (x). Moreover, whenever V learns the frequency fi of an
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item in i ∈ H, V treats this as a deletion of fi occurrences of item i, thereby obtaining a
derived stream z in which all frequencies have absolute value at most N1/4.
P and V now run the sum-check scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 on the “mapped-down” input
h(z) over the universe [N5/4]. For any pair of positive integers ca, cv satisfying cacv ≥ r,
this scheme can achieve cost (F∞(z)ca log n, cv log n), where F∞(z) denotes maxi |fi(z)|, the
largest frequency in absolute value of any item (that is, the sum-check scheme of Theorem
3.5.2 is run using a polynomial g˜ of degree F∞ such that g˜(x) = g(x) for all x ∈ {0, F∞}.)
Setting cv = N
3/4 and ca = N
1/4, we obtain a prescient (N3/4 log n,N3/4 log n)-scheme as
claimed. V computes the final answer as F (x) = cont(H) + F (h(z))− |H|g(0).
The final issue is that V needs to verify that h is actually injective over the items that
appear in x. V can accomplish this using the Injection scheme of Lemma 4.4.5. This
does not affect the asymptotic costs of our scheme, as the Injection scheme can support
annotation cost ca log r and space cost cv log r for any cacv = Ω(N
5/4).
Finally, we provide one additional corollary, which describes a protocol that will be useful
in the next section when building graph schemes.
Theorem 4.5.8. Let X, Y ⊆ [n] be sets with |X| ≤ |Y | ≤ m. Then given a stream in the
strict turnstile update model with elements of X and Y arbitrarily interleaved, there is an
online (mc
−1/2
v ·log(n)·logcv(m), cv ·log(n)·logcv(m))-scheme for determining whether X ⊆ Y
for any cv > 1.
Proof. If X 6⊆ Y , P can specify an x ∈ X \ Y and prove that x is indeed in X and not Y
with two point queries using the scheme of Theorem 4.3.2. For the other case, Theorem 3.8.2
shows how to directly reduce the case X ⊆ Y to computation of frequency moments. The
claimed costs follow from Theorem 4.5.1.
Table 4.4 provides a comparison of the Subset schemes given in this thesis.
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Table 4.4: Comparison of Subset schemes.
Scheme Costs Completeness Prescience Source
(|X| log n, log n) Perfect Prescient Lemma 3.8.1
(ca log n, cv log n): cacv ≥ n Perfect Online Thm 3.8.2
(m log n, log n) Perfect Online Thm 3.11.1
(mc
−1/2
v logcv (m) log n, cv log n logcv m): cv > 1 Imperfect Online Thm 4.5.8
The Subset scheme of this chapter is the first online Subset scheme to achieve annotation
length and space usage that are both sublinear in m for m √n, and strictly improves over
the online MA communication cost of prior protocols whenever m = o(n).
4.6 Graph Problems
We now describe some applications of the techniques developed above to graph problems.
The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the techniques developed within the
Fk and m-disj schemes are broadly applicable to a range of settings.
We begin with several non-trivial graph schemes that are direct consequences of the
Subset scheme of Theorem 4.5.8. Recall that our definition of a scheme for a function F
requires a convincing proof of the value of F (x) for all values F (x). This is stricter than the
traditional definition of interactive proofs for decision problems, which just require that if
F (x) = 1 then there is some prover that will cause the verifier to accept with high probability,
and if F (x) = 0 there is no such prover. Here, we consider a relaxed definition of schemes
that is in the spirit of the traditional definition. We require only that a scheme A = (h,V)
satisfy:
1. For all x s.t. F (x) = 1, we have PrrP ,rV [out
V(xh,rP , rV) 6= 1] ≤ 1/3.
2. For all x s.t. F (x) = 0, h′ = (h′1, h
′
2, . . . , h
′
N) ∈ ({0, 1}∗)N , we have PrrV [outV(xh′ , rV) =
1] ≤ 1/3.
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Theorem 4.6.1. Under the above relaxed definition of a scheme, each of the problems
perfect-matching, connectivity, and non-bipartiteness has an
(n log n + mc
−1/2
v log n logcv m, cv log n logcv m)-scheme on graphs with n vertices and m
edges for all cv > 1. All three schemes work in the strict turnstile update model and improve
over prior work if cv = ω(log
2m) and cv = o(m).
Proof. In the case of perfect matching, the prover can prove a perfect matching exists by
sending a matching M, which requires n log n bits of annotation. In order to prove M is a
valid perfect matching, P needs to prove that every node appears in exactly one edge ofM,
and thatM⊆ E, where E is the set of edges appearing in the stream. V can check the first
condition by comparing a fingerprint of the nodes inM to a fingerprint of the set {1, . . . , n}.
V can check that M⊆ E using Theorem 4.5.8.
In the case of connectivity, the prover demonstrates the graph is connected by specifying
a spanning tree T . V needs to check T is spanning, which can be done as in Theorem 3.10.7,
and needs to check that T ⊆ E, which can be done using Theorem 4.5.8.
In the case of non-bipartiteness, P demonstrates an odd cycle C. V needs to check C is
a cycle, C has an odd number of edges, and that C ⊆ E. The first condition can be checked
by requiring P to play the edges of C in the natural order. The second condition can be
checked by counting. The third condition can be checked using Theorem 4.5.8.
Counting Triangles. Returning to our strict definition of a scheme, we give an online
scheme for counting the number of triangles in a graph.
Theorem 4.6.2. For any cv > 1, there is an online (ca log n logm, cv log n logm)-scheme,
with imperfect completeness, for counting the number of triangles in a graph on n nodes and
m edges, where ca = mnc
−1/2
v . The scheme is valid in the strict turnstile update model.
Proof. Theorem 3.10.4 showed how to reduce counting the number of triangles in a graph
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Table 4.5: Comparison of schemes for counting triangles.
Scheme Costs Completeness Prescience Source
(ca log n, cv log n): cacv ≥ n3 Perfect Online Thm 3.10.4
(n2 log n, log n) Perfect Online Thm 3.10.3
(ca log
2 n, cv log
2 n): ca = mnc
−1/2
v Imperfect Online Thm 4.6.2
Results are stated for graphs with n nodes and m edges. For concreteness, notice that by setting
cv = n, Theorem 4.6.2 achieves a (mn
1/2 log2 n, n log2 n)-scheme, which improves over prior work
as long as m n3/2.
to computing the first three frequency moments of a derived stream. The derived stream
has sparsity m(n − 2). Using the online scheme of Theorem 4.5.1 to compute the relevant
frequency moments of the derived stream yields the claimed bounds.
The scheme of Theorem 4.6.2 should be compared to the (n2, log n)-scheme from Theorem
3.10.3 based on matrix multiplication, referenced in Row 2 of Table 4.5 and the (ca, cv)-
scheme for any cacv ≥ n3 from Theorem 3.10.4, referenced in Row 1 of Table 4.5. To compare
to the former, notice that Theorem 4.6.2 yields a
(ca log
2 n, cv log
2 n)-scheme with ca < n
2 as long as m < n
√
cv. To compare to the latter,
note that in our new scheme, cacv = mnc
1/2
v , which is less than n3 as long as c
1/2
v < n
2
m
. In
particular, if we set cv = n, then Theorem 4.6.2 improves over both old schemes as long as
m < n3/2.
Unfortunately, Theorem 4.6.2 does not yield a non-trivial MA-protocol for showing no
triangle exists. Indeed, equalizing annotation length and space usage in our new protocol
occurs by setting both quantities to (mn)2/3. But Ω
(
(mn)2/3
)
< m only when m > n2,
which is to say that the MA communication complexity of this protocol is always larger than
m, a cost that can be achieved by the trivial MA protocol where Merlin is ignored and Alice
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just sends her whole input to Bob. That is, the interest in the new protocol is that it can
lower the space usage of V to less than m without drastically blowing up the message length
of P to n2 as in the matrix-multiplication based protocol from Theorem 3.10.3.
4.7 Non-strict Turnstile Update Model
All schemes in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 work in the strict turnstile update model. The reason
these schemes require this update model is that they use the Injection and SubInjection
schemes of Lemmata 4.4.5 and 4.5.5 as sub-routines, and these sub-routines assume the strict
turnstile update model.
In this section, we consider two ways to circumvent this issue. To focus the discussion,
we concentrate on the online Fk protocol of Theorem 4.5.1.
4.7.1 An Online Scheme
One simple method for handling streams in the non-strict turnstile update model is the
following. We use the scheme of Theorem 4.5.1, but within the SubInjection sub-routine,
we treat deletions of items in the input stream as insertions of items into the derived stream
of (xi, bi, δi) updates. This ensures that the Injection and SubInjection schemes correctly
output 1 if the derived stream is a subinjection (and the remainder of the scheme computes
the correct answer on the original stream). However it increases the expected number of
collisions under the universe-reduction mappings hi, from m · |Li−1|/r to M · |Li−1|/r. The
result is that we achieve the same costs as Theorem 4.5.1, except the costs depend on to the
stream footprint M rather than the stream sparsity m (see Section 3.2.4).
Corollary 4.7.1. For any cv > 1, there is a (k
2Mc
−1/2
v ·log(n)·logcv(M), kcv·log(n)·logcv(M))
online scheme for Fk in the non-strict turnstile update model over a stream with footprint
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M over a universe of size n.
4.7.2 An Online AMA Scheme
In this section, we describe an AMA scheme for the Injection problem that works in
the non-strict turnstile stream update model i.e., the input may define a frequency vector
where some elements end with negative frequency. The scheme for Injection of Lemma
4.4.5 breaks down here, since there may be some cases where the checks performed by the
protocol indicate that a bucket is pure, when this is not the case: cancellations of item weights
in the bucket may give the appearance of purity. To address this, we use public randomness,
thereby yielding an AMA scheme. In essence, the verifier asks the prover to demonstrate
the purity of each of the r buckets via fingerprints of the bucket contents. However, if we
allow the prover to choose the fingerprint function, P could pick a function that leads to
false conclusions. Instead, V chooses the fingerprinting function using public randomness.
The players then execute a new Injection protocol using the data remapped under the
fingerprint function, which is intended to convince V of the purity of the buckets. This then
allows us to construct protocols with costs that depend on the stream sparsity m rather than
the footprint M as in Corollary 4.7.1.
In detail, the new AMA scheme proceeds as follows. Consider the Injection problem
as defined in Definition 4.4.4, but generalized to allow items with arbitrary integer counts.
Consider again a bucket b, and for 1 ≤ j ≤ log n define bj=` to be the frequency vector of
the subset of stream updates (xk, b, δk) placing items into bucket b, subject to the restriction
that the j’th bit of xk is equal to `. We observe the following property: if bucket b is pure,
then one of bj=0 and bj=1 must be the zero vector 0, for each j. Moreover, if b is not pure,
then there exists a j such that both bj=0 and bj=1 are not the zero vector.
A natural way to compactly test whether these vectors are equal to zero (probabilistically)
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is to use fingerprinting (discussed in Section 3.2.4). The verifier V could do this unaided for
a single bucket, but we wish to run this test in parallel for r buckets. At a high level, we
achieve this as follows. Given a stream of updates (xk, b, δk), we define two vectors z and o
of length r log n, such that each coordinate of z and o corresponds to a (bucket, coordinate)
pair (b, j) ∈ [r] × [log n]. In more detail, we will define z and o such that for each bucket b
and coordinate j ∈ [log n], the (b, j)th entry of z is a fingerprint of the vector bj=0, and the
(b, j)th entry of o is a fingerprint of the vector bj=1.
We choose the fingerprinting functions to satisfy two properties.
1. The fingerprint of the all-zeros vector 0 is always 0. This ensures that if all buckets
are pure, then the inner product of z and o is 0, as zb,j · ob,j is 0 for all pairs (b, j) ∈
[r]× [log n].
2. If there is an impure bucket, then the inner product of z and o will be non-zero with
high probability over the choice of fingerprint functions.
Therefore, in order to determine whether the stream defines an injection, it suffices to
compute
∑
(b,j)∈[r]×[logn] zb,j ·ob,j, which can be computed using Theorem 3.5.2 with annotation
length ca log n and space cost cv log n for any ca · cv ≥ r log n.
The idea allowing us to achieve the second property is as follows. If bucket b is im-
pure, then there is at least one coordinate j ∈ [log n] such that bj=0 and bj=1 are both not
equal to the all-zeros vector 0. By basic properties of fingerprints, this ensures that both zb,j
and ob,j are non-zero with high probability over the choice of fingerprint functions. More-
over, we choose the fingerprinting functions in such a way that non-zero terms in the sum∑
(b,j)∈[r]×[logn] zb,j · ob,j are unlikely to “cancel out” to zero.
Consequently, we can state an analog of Lemma 4.4.5.
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Lemma 4.7.2. For any cacv ≥ r log n, there is an online (ca log n, cv log n)-scheme for de-
termining whether a stream in the non-strict turnstile model is an injection.
Proof. Let Fq be a finite field of size q = poly(n), where the subsequent analysis determines
the required magnitude of q. V uses public randomness to choose two field elements α, and
β uniformly at random from Fq. For each bucket b ∈ [r], and each coordinate j ∈ [log n], we
define two “fingerprinting” functions gb,j,α and gb,j,β mapping an n-dimensional vector y as
follows:
gb,j,α(y) = α
n(b·logn+j) ∑
`∈[n]
y`α
`,
and
gb,j,β(y) = β
n(b·logn+j) ∑
`∈[n]
y`β
`,
where each entry y` of y is treated as an element of Fq in the natural manner.
We now (conceptually) construct two vectors z and o of dimension r log n, where for
each (b, j) ∈ [r] × [log n], zb,j = gb,j,α(bj=0) and ob,j = gb,j(bj=1i ). That is, the (b, j)th entry
of z equals the fingerprint of the frequency vector of items mapping to bucket b with a 0
in the jth bit of their binary representation. Observe that gb,j,α(0) = gb,j,β(0) = 0 for all
(b, j) ∈ [r]× [log n], as required by Property 1 above.
We now show that Property 2 holds, i.e., if there is an impure bucket, then the inner
product of z and o will be non-zero with high probability over the choice of α and β. In the
following, for an item ` ∈ [n] and bucket b ∈ [r], we let f`(b) denote the frequency with which
item ` is mapped to bucket b, and we let `j denote the j’th bit in the binary representation
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of `. We can write the inner product of z and o as
∑
(b,j)∈[r]×[logn]
gb,j,α(b
j=0)gb,j,β(b
j=1)
=
∑
(b,j)∈[r]×[logn]
αn(b·logn+j)βn(b·logn+j)
 ∑
`∈[n],`j=0
f`(b)α
`
 ∑
`∈[n],`j=1
f`(b)β
`

=
∑
(b,j)∈[r]×[logn]
αn(b·logn+j)βn(b·logn+j)
∑
(`,`′):`j=0,`′j=1
f`(b)f`′(b)α
`β`
′
We therefore see that the inner product of z and o is a polynomial in α and β of total degree
n2r log n in each variable. Moreover, the coefficient of the term αn(b·logn+j)+`βn(b·logn+j)+`
′
is
precisely f`(b) · f`′(b) if `j = 0 and `′j = 1, and is 0 otherwise.
Recall that if bucket b is not pure, then there is at least one coordinate j ∈ [log n],
and items `, `′ ∈ [n] with `j = 0 and `′j = 1, such that f`(b) 6= 0 and f`′(b) 6= 0. The
above analysis implies that z · o is a non-zero polynomial in α and β, as the coefficient of
αn(b·logn+j)+`βn(b·logn+j)+`
′
is non-zero. Hence, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the probability
over a random choice of α and β that z · o = 0 is at most n2r log n/q. Setting q to be
polynomial in n, there is only negligible probability (over the choice of α and β) that z · o is
zero if the stream is not an injection.
Finally, notice that the verifier can apply the scheme of Theorem 3.5.2 to compute∑
(b,j)∈[r]×[logn] zb,j · ob,j, as each stream update (xk, b, δk) can be treated as log n updates
to the vectors z and o. For example, if the jth bit of xk is 0, then update (xk, b, δk) causes
zb,j to be incremented by δk · αn(b·logn+j)+xk .
Applications. We can apply this online scheme to compute Frequency Moments (and Inner
Product, Hamming Distance, Heavy Hitters etc.) over sparse data in the non-strict turnstile
update model. In particular, this lets us compute frequency moments even when the fre-
quency vectors may have negative entries, and it lets us compute the inner product of two
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vectors even when they may have negative entries. The costs of the resulting online AMA
scheme are similar to the costs of the online schemes for the same problems developed in pre-
vious sections. The only difference is that we have scaled m up by a log n factor, to account
for the fact that within the new AMA sub-scheme for Injection, we must run the dense pro-
tocol of Theorem 3.5.2 on vectors z and o of length r log n, rather than on vectors of length r
as in prior sections, and substitute the bounds from Lemma 4.7.2. For example, the analog of
Theorem 4.5.1 is that for any cv > 1, there is a (k
2mc
−1/2
v · log2 n · logcv m, kcv · log n · logcv m)
online AMA scheme for Fk in the non-strict turnstile model.
4.8 Discussion and Open Problems
In this chapter, we have presented a number of protocols in the annotated data streaming
model that for the first time allows both the annotation length and the space usage of the
verifier to be sublinear in the stream sparsity, rather than just the size of the data universe.
Our protocols substantially improve on the applicability of prior work in natural settings
where data streams are defined over very large universes, such as IP packet flows and sparse
graph data.
A number of interesting questions remain for future work. The biggest open question is
to determine the precise dependence on the stream sparsity in problems such as m-disj and
frequency moments. When setting the annotation length and the space usage of the verifier
to be equal, our protocols have cost roughly m2/3, where m is the sparsity of the data stream.
The best known lower bound is roughly m1/2. We conjecture that our upper bound is tight
up to logarithmic factors, but proving any Merlin-Arthur communication lower bound larger
than m1/2 will require new lower bound techniques in communication complexity. Another
interesting open question is to give improved protocols for multiplying an n × n matrix
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A by a vector x, when A is sparse (i.e., has o(n2) non-zero entries), but x may be dense.
Achieving this would yield improved protocols for proving disconnectedness, bipartiteness,
or the non-existence of a perfect matching in a bipartite graph. Currently we do not know
of any protocols for these problems that leverage graph sparsity in any way.
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Chapter 5
The GKR Protocol
With the sum-check protocol described in Chapter 2 in hand, we are ready to present
Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum’s interactive proof system (henceforth GKR protocol)
[57]. We begin with a high-level overview, before describing the technical details. The GKR
protocol is framed in the context of circuit evaluation. Given a layered arithmetic circuit C
of fan-in 2, the GKR protocol allows a prover to evaluate C, while providing a guarantee
that the output is correct.
5.1 The GKR Protocol From 10,000 Feet
In the GKR protocol, P and V first agree on an arithmetic circuit C of fan-in 2 over a
finite field F computing the function of interest (C may have multiple outputs). Each gate
of C performs an addition or multiplication over F. C is assumed to be in layered form,
meaning that the circuit can be decomposed into layers, and wires only connect gates in
adjacent layers. Suppose the circuit has depth d; we will number the layers from 1 to d with
layer d referring to the input layer, and layer 1 referring to the output layer. The reason we
use this numbering system is that the GKR protocol starts by examining the output layer
134
of the circuit, and works its way one layer at a time toward the input layer.
In the first message, P tells V the (claimed) output of the circuit. The protocol then
works its way in iterations towards the input layer, with one iteration devoted to each layer.
The purpose of iteration i is to reduce a claim about the values of the gates at layer i to a
claim about the values of the gates at layer i+ 1, in the sense that it is safe for V to assume
that the first claim is true as long as the second claim is true. This reduction is accomplished
by applying the sum-check protocol to a certain polynomial.
More concretely, the GKR protocol starts with a claim about the values of the output
gates of the circuit, but V cannot check this claim without evaluating the circuit herself,
which is precisely what she wants to avoid. So the first iteration uses a sum-check protocol
to reduce this claim about the outputs of the circuit to a claim about the gate values at layer
2 (more specifically, to a claim about an evaluation of the multilinear extension of the gate
values at layer 2; multilinear extensions are formally defined in the next section). Once again,
V cannot check this claim herself, so the second iteration uses another sum-check protocol
to reduce the latter claim to a claim about the gate values at layer 3, and so on. Eventually,
V is left with a claim about the inputs to the circuit, and V can check this claim on her own.
In summary, the GKR protocol uses a sum-check protocol at each level of the circuit to
enable V to go from verifying a randomly chosen evaluation of the multilinear extension of
the gate values at layer i to verifying a (different) evaluation of the multilinear extension of
the gate values at layer i + 1. Importantly, apart from the input layer and output layer, V
does not ever see all of the gate values at a layer (in particular, P does not send these values
in full). Instead, V relies on P to do the hard work of actually evaluating the circuit, and
uses the power of the sum-check protocol as the main tool to force P to be consistent and
truthful over the course of the protocol.
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5.2 Notation
The notation introduced in this section will be used throughout Chapters 5-8.
For any d-variate polynomial p(x1, . . . , xd) : Fd → F, we use degi(p) to denote the degree
of p in variable i. We say p is said to be multilinear if degi(p) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [d]. Given a
function V : {0, 1}d → {0, 1} whose domain is the d-dimensional Boolean hypercube, the
multilinear extension (MLE) of V over F, denoted V˜ , is the unique multilinear polynomial
Fd → F that agrees with V on all Boolean-valued inputs. That is, V˜ is the unique multilinear
polynomial over F satisfying V˜ (x) = V (x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}d.
Suppose we are given a layered arithmetic circuit C of size S(n), depth d(n), and fan-in
two. For the purposes of this thesis, C will always be defined over a finite field F of prime
order. Let Si denote the number of gates at layer i of the circuit C. Assume Si is a power
of 2 and let Si = 2
si . In order to explain how each iteration of the GKR protocol proceeds,
we need to introduce several functions, each of which encodes certain information about the
circuit.
To this end, number the gates at layer i from 0 to Si− 1, and let Vi : {0, 1}si → F denote
the function that takes as input a binary gate label and outputs the corresponding gate’s
value at layer i. The GKR protocol makes use of the multilinear extension V˜i of the function
Vi.
The GKR protocol also makes use of the notion of a “wiring predicate” that encodes
which pairs of wires from layer i+ 1 are connected to a given gate at layer i in C. We define
two functions, addi and multi mapping {0, 1}si+2si+1 to {0, 1}, which together constitute the
wiring predicate of layer i of C. Specifically, these functions take as input three gate labels
(j1, j2, j3), and return 1 if gate j1 at layer i is the addition (respectively, multiplication)
of gates j2 and j3 at layer i + 1, and return 0 otherwise. Let ˜addi and ˜multi denote the
multilinear extensions of addi and multi respectively.
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Finally, let βsi(z, p) denote the function
βsi(z, p) =
si∏
j=1
((1− zj)(1− pj) + zjpj) .
It is straightforward to check that βsi is the multilinear extension of the function B(x, y) :
{0, 1}si × {0, 1}si → {0, 1} that evaluates to 1 if x = y, and evaluates to 0 otherwise.
5.2.1 Technical Outline of the GKR Protocol
The GKR protocol consists of d(n) iterations, one for each layer of the circuit. Each
iteration starts with P claiming a value for V˜i(z) for some field element z ∈ Fsi . In the case
of iteration one and circuits with a single output gate, z = 0 and V˜1(0) corresponds to the
output value of the circuit.
In the case of iteration one and circuits with many output gates, Vu et al. [104] observe the
following: P may simply send V the (claimed) values of all output gates, thereby specifying
a function V ′1 : {0, 1}s1 → F claimed to equal V1. V can pick a random point z ∈ Fs1
and evaluate V˜ ′1(z) on her own in O(S1) time. The Schwartz-Zippel Lemma (Lemma 2.2.1)
implies that if V˜ ′ 6= V˜ , then V˜ ′1(z) 6= V˜ (z) with probability at least 1−d/|F| over the random
choice of z. Thus, it is safe for V to believe that V ′1 indeed equals V1 as claimed, as long as
V˜1(z) = V˜
′
1(z) (which will be checked in the remainder of the protocol).
The purpose of iteration i is to reduce the claim about the value of V˜i(z) to a claim
about V˜i+1(ω) for some ω ∈ Fsi+1 , in the sense that it is safe for V to assume that the first
claim is true as long as the second claim is true. To accomplish this, the iteration applies
the sum-check protocol to a specific polynomial derived from V˜i+1, ˜addi, and ˜multi, and βsi .
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Details for Each Iteration
Applying the Sum-Check Protocol. It can be shown (see Lemma 8.4.1) that for any
z ∈ Fsi ,
V˜i(z) =
∑
(p,ω1,ω2)∈{0,1}si+2si+1
f (i)z (p, ω1, ω2),
where
f (i)z (p, ω1, ω2) =
βsi(z, p)·
(
˜addi(p, ω1, ω2)(V˜i+1(ω1) + V˜i+1(ω2)) + ˜multi(p, ω1, ω2)V˜i+1(ω1) · V˜i+1(ω2)
)
. (5.1)
Remark 3. Equation 5.1 is valid using any extensions of add and mult, not just the multi-
linear extensions. In fact, Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [57] use higher-degree extensions
derived from a circuit computing the functions addi and multi. We present the protocol as
using the multilinear extensions ˜add and ˜mult because their use is critical to our results in
Chapter 7.
Iteration i therefore applies the sum-check protocol to the polynomial f
(i)
z . There remains
the issue that V can only execute her part of the sum-check protocol if she can evaluate the
polynomial f
(i)
z at a random point f
(i)
z (r1, . . . , rsi+2si+1). This is handled as follows.
Let p∗ denote the first si entries of the vector (r1, . . . , rsi+2si+1), ω
∗
1 the next si+1 en-
tries, and ω∗2 the last si+1 entries. Evaluating f
(i)
z (p∗, ω∗1, ω
∗
2) requires evaluating β(z, p
∗),
˜addi(p
∗, ω∗1, ω
∗
2),
˜multi(p
∗, ω∗1, ω
∗
2), V˜i+1(ω
∗
1), and V˜i+1(ω
∗
2).
V can easily evaluate β(z, p∗) in O(si) time. For many circuits, particularly those with
“regular” wiring patterns, V can evaluate ˜addi(p∗, ω∗1, ω∗2) and ˜multi(p∗, ω∗1, ω∗2) on her own
in poly(si, si+1) time as well.
1
1Various suggestions have been put forth for what to do if this is not the case. For example, we note
in Chapter 7 that these computations can always be done by V in O(logS(n)) space as long as the circuit
is log-space uniform, which is sufficient in streaming applications where the space usage of the verifier is
paramount. Moreover, these computations can be done oﬄine before the input is even observed, because
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V cannot however evaluate V˜i+1(ω∗2), and V˜i+1(ω∗1) on her own without evaluating the
circuit. Instead, V asks P to simply tell her these two values, and uses iteration i + 1 to
verify that these values are as claimed. However, one complication remains: the precondition
for iteration i+ 1 is that P claims a value for V˜i(z) for a single z ∈ Fsi . So V needs to reduce
verifying both V˜i+1(ω
∗
2) and V˜i+1(ω
∗
1) to verifying V˜i+1(ω
∗) at a single point ω∗ ∈ Fsi+1 , in
the sense that it is safe for V to accept the claimed values of V˜i+1(ω∗1) and V˜i+1(ω∗2) as long
as the value of V˜i+1(ω
∗) is as claimed. This is done as follows.
Reducing to Verification of a Single Point. Let ` : F → Fsi+1 be some canonical line
passing through ω∗1 and ω
∗
2. For example, we can let ` be the unique line such that `(0) = ω
∗
1
and `(1) = ω∗2. P sends a degree-si+1 polynomial h claimed to be V˜i+1 ◦ `, the restriction
of V˜i+1 to the line `. V checks that h(0) = ω∗1 and h(1) = ω∗2 (rejecting if this is not the
case), picks a random point r∗ ∈ F, and asks P to prove that V˜i+1(`(r∗)) = h(r∗). By the
Schwartz-Zippel Lemma (Lemma 2.2.1), as long as V is convinced that V˜i+1(`(r∗)) = h(r∗),
it is safe for V to believe that the values of V˜i+1(ω∗1) and V˜i+1(ω∗2) are as claimed by P . This
completes iteration i; P and V then move on to the iteration for layer i + 1 of the circuit,
whose purpose is to verify that V˜i+1(`(r
∗)) has the claimed value.
The Final Iteration. Finally, at the final iteration d, V must evaluate V˜d(ω∗) on her own.
But the vector of gate values at layer d of C is simply the input x to C. We observe in
the next chapter that V can compute V˜d(ω∗) on her own in O(n log n) time, with a single
streaming pass over the input.
they only depend on the wiring of the circuit, and not on the input [39,57]. Finally, [104] notes that the cost
of this computation can be effectively amortized in a batching model, where many identical computations
on different inputs are verified simultaneously. See Chapter 8 for further discussion, and a protocol that
mitigates this issue in the context of data parallel computation.
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Discussion of Costs.
Observe that the polynomial f
(i)
z defined in Equation (5.1) is an (si + 2si+1)-variate
polynomial of degree at most 2 in each variable, and so the invocation of the sum-check
protocol at iteration i requires si + 2si+1 rounds, with three field elements transmitted per
round. Thus, the total communication cost is O(d(n) logS(n)) field elements, where d(n)
is the depth of the circuit C. We show in Chapter 7 that the verifier can be implemented
in a streaming manner, and moreover that the time cost to V is O(n log n + d(n) logS(n))
(recall that here and throughout this thesis, an addition or multiplication within a finite
field is assumed to require a single time step). The n log n term is due to the time required
to evaluate V˜d(ω
∗) (see Lemma 6.3.1), and the d(n) logS(n) term is the time required for V
to send messages to P and process and check the messages from P .
As for P ’s runtime, for any iteration i of the GKR protocol, a naive implementation
of the prover in the corresponding instance of the sum-check protocol would require time
Ω(2si+2si+1), as the sum defining each of P ’s messages is over as many as 2si+2si+1 terms. This
cost can be Ω(S(n)3), which is prohibitively large in practice. However, we show in Chapter
7 that each gate at layers i and i + 1 of C contributes to only a single term of sum, and
exploit this to bring the runtime of the P down to O(S(n) logS(n)).
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Chapter 6
Streaming Interactive Proofs
In this chapter, we introduce the model of streaming interactive proofs, which extends the
annotated data streams model to allow for multiple rounds of interaction between the prover
and verifier. We then present some preliminary results on streaming interactive proofs: we
first observe that the GKR protocol can be made to work with a streaming verifier,1 before
presenting improved protocols for specific problems of fundamental importance in streaming
and database processing. Our results in this chapter reveal an exponential separation between
the annotated data streams model and the streaming interactive proofs model.
6.1 The Model
Definition 6.1.1 (Streaming Interactive Proofs). Consider a prover P and verifier V who
both observe a stream x of length N over a data universe of size n and wish to compute a
function F (x). We assume V has access to a private random string rV , and one-way access to
the data stream x. The stream is also observed by the prover P . After the stream is observed,
P and V exchange a sequence of messages. Denote the output of V on input x, given prover
1This observation is due to Guy Rothblum; we present the details for completeness.
141
P and V ’s random bits rV , by out(V ,x, rV ,P). V can output ⊥ if V is not convinced that
P ’s claim is valid.
P is a valid prover with respect to V if for all data streams x, PrrV [out(V ,x, rV ,P) =
F (x)] = 1. We say V is a valid verifier for F with soundness error δs if there is at least one
valid prover P with respect to V , and for all provers P ′ and all inputs x, Pr[out(V ,x, rV ,P ′) /∈
{F (x),⊥}] ≤ δs. We say a prover-verifier pair (P ,V) is a valid streaming interactive proof
protocol for F if V is a valid verifier for F with soundness error 1/3, and P is a valid prover
with respect to V .
Notice that the streaming interactive proofs model permits multiple rounds of interaction
between the prover and verifier. This is in contrast to the annotated data streams model of
Chapters 3 and 4, where the prover had to send a single message to the verifier with no
communication allowed in the reverse direction. As such, streaming interactive proofs can
be thought of as a generalization of annotated data streams to allow for multiple rounds of
interaction between the prover and verifier. Alternatively, the streaming interactive proofs
model can be thought of as a restriction of the standard interactive proofs model defined in
Chapter 2, requiring the verifier be streaming.
We remark that the constant 1/3 used for the soundness error in Definition 6.1.1 is chosen
for consistency with the interactive proofs literature, where 1/3 is used by convention. As in
the annotated data stream protocols of Chapters 3 and 4, the soundness error in all of our
interactive proof protocols can be set arbitrarily small by appropriate choice of a parameter,
specifically the size of the finite field used. The space and communication costs of the protocol
will be proportional only to the logarithm of the field size, while the soundness error will
decrease linearly in the field size.
Notice for simplicity we require valid streaming interactive proof protocols to have com-
pleteness error 0 (i.e., perfect completeness), rather than completeness error at most 1/3 as
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in Definition 2.1.1. All of the methods developed in the remainder of this thesis naturally
satisfy the perfect completeness property.
As our first concern in a streaming setting is the space requirements of the verifier as
well as the communication cost for the streaming interactive proof protocol, we make the
following definition.
Definition 6.1.2. We say F possesses an r-message (ca, cv) streaming interactive proof
protocol, if there exists a valid verifier V for F such that:
1. V has access to only O(v) bits of working memory, both while processing the stream,
and while interacting with the prover.
2. There is a valid prover P for V such that P and V exchange at most r messages in
total, and the sum of the lengths of all messages is O(ca) bits.
We say an r-message streaming interactive proof protocol has dr/2e rounds.
6.2 Notation
For a vector b ∈ {0, 1}logn, let χb(x1, . . . , xlogn) =
∏logn
k=1 χbk(xk), where χ0(xk) = 1 −
xk and χ1(xk) = xk. Notice that χb is the unique multilinear polynomial that takes b ∈
{0, 1}logn to 1 and all other values in {0, 1}logn to 0, i.e., it is the multilinear extension of
the indicator function for boolean vector b.
6.3 A General Theorem
Recall from Chapter 5 that the GKR protocol is defined in the context of circuit evalua-
tion: it allows a prover to evaluate a layered arithmetic circuit C, while providing a guarantee
that the output is correct. In this section, we show that the GKR protocol can be made to
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work with a streaming verifier. Before doing so, we must precisely state how the data stream
specifies the input to the circuit C.
Input Representation. Each element of the stream is a tuple (i, δ), where i ∈ [n] and δ
is an integer. The δ values may be negative, thereby modeling deletions. The data stream
implicitly defines a frequency vector f , where fi is the sum of all δ values associated with
i in the stream. When checking the evaluation of a circuit C, we consider the inputs to C
to be the entries of the frequency vector f , interpreted as elements of the field F in the
natural way. Here, we assume that F is a field of prime order, and that |F| > 2‖f‖∞. We
emphasize that the results below imply that, in order to run the GKR protocol on a circuit
C operating on a vector f , a streaming verifier only needs to see the raw stream and not the
aggregated frequency vector f (see Lemma 6.3.1 for details). Notice that we may interpret
the frequency vector f as an object other than a vector, such as a matrix or a string. For
example, in the MatMult problem that we consider prominently in Chapters 7 and 8, the
data stream defines two matrices to be multiplied.
Implementing the GKR Protocol with a Streaming Verifier. Within the GKR pro-
tocol, the verifier chooses a random vector ω∗ ∈ Flogn and evaluates V˜d(ω∗). Recall from
Chapter 5 that V˜d denotes the multilinear extension of Vd, where Vd : {0, 1}logn → F is the
function that takes as input the binary representation of an integer i between 1 and n, and
outputs fi, the value of the ith input gate. This is the only information the verifier must
extract from the input in order to run the GKR protocol, and we show in Lemma 6.3.1 that
a streaming verifier can compute V˜d(ω
∗) using O(log |F| · log n) bits of space. Notice that in
the presentation of Chapter 5, the verifier only chose ω∗ in the final iteration of the interac-
tive proof protocol. Here, V will choose ω∗ before observing the stream, store it explicitly in
memory, and keep it private from the prover until the final iteration of GKR protocol.
Lemma 6.3.1. Assume n is a power of two. Given a data stream x ∈ Fn and a vector
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ω∗ ∈ Flogn, V can compute V˜d(ω∗) with a single pass over the data stream x while storing
O(log n) field elements. V must perform O(log n) field operations per stream update, where
V˜d is the multilinear extension of the function that maps i ∈ {0, 1}logn to the value of the ith
entry of x.
Proof. We exploit the following explicit expression for V˜d:
V˜d(p1, . . . , plogn) =
∑
b∈{0,1}logn
Vd(b)χb(p1, . . . plogn) (6.1)
Indeed, it is easy to check that the right hand side of Equation (6.1) is a multilinear poly-
nomial, and that it agrees with Vd on all Boolean inputs. Hence, the right hand side must
equal the multilinear extension of Vd.
In particular, by letting (p1, . . . , plogn) = ω
∗ in Equation (6.1), we see that
V˜d(ω
∗) =
∑
b∈{0,1}logn
Vd(b)χb(ω
∗). (6.2)
Given any stream update (i, δ), let (i1, . . . , ilogn) denote the binary representation of i. No-
tice that update (i, δ) has the effect of increasing Vd(i1, . . . , ilogn) by δ, and does not affect
Vd(x1, . . . xlogn) for any (x1, . . . , xlogn) 6= (i1, . . . , ilogn). Thus, V can compute V˜d(ω∗) incre-
mentally from the raw stream by initializing V˜d(ω
∗) ← 0, and processing each update (i, δ)
via:
V˜d(ω
∗)← V˜d(ω∗) + δ · χ(i1,...,ilogn)(ω∗).
V only needs to store V˜d(ω∗) and ω∗, which is O(log n) field elements in total. Moreover, for
any i, χ(i1,...,ilogn)(ω
∗) can be computed in O(log n) field operations, and thus V can compute
V˜d(ω
∗) with one pass over the raw stream, using O(log n) words of space and O(log n) field
operations per update.
Recall that the the total communication of the GKR protocol is O(d(n) logS(n)) field
elements, where d(n) is the depth of the circuit C. Thus, Lemma 6.3.1 implies the following
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theorem.
Theorem 6.3.2. There are (polylog n, polylog n) streaming interactive proof protocols for
every function in log-space uniform NC.
Here, NC is the class of all problems decidable by Boolean circuits of polynomial size
and polylogarithmic depth. Any problem in this class also possesses an arithmetic circuit of
polynomial size and polylogarithmic depth, over a field, and the GKR protocol can be applied
to C. NC includes, for example, frequency moments, many fundamental matrix problems
(e.g., determinant, product, inverse), and graph problems (e.g., minimum spanning tree,
shortest paths) (see [8, Chapter 6]).
We showed in Chapter 3 that any (ca, cv) annotated data streaming scheme for the
second frequency moment problem requires ca · cv ≥ Ω(n), even if the scheme is allowed to
be prescient. Thus, Theorem 6.3.2 yields an exponential separation between the streaming
interactive proofs model and the (prescient) annotated data streaming model.
Despite its powerful generality, the protocol implied by Theorem 6.3.2 is not optimal
for many important functions in streaming and database applications. The remainder of
this chapter obtains improved, practical protocols for two fundamental streaming problems:
the second frequency moment problem and the heavy hitters problem. These examples are
meant to be illustrative, as every one of our sum-check schemes developed in Chapter 3 has
an interactive variant obtained by using the full-fledged sum-check protocol as presented in
Chapter 2 in place of the non-interactive techniques of Chapter 3.
6.4 Second Frequency Moment
Let x be a stream of length N over a universe of size n, and let f be the frequency
vector of x. Recall that the second frequency moment of x, denoted F2(x), is defined to be
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Figure 6.1: A circuit for F2 on 4 inputs.
F2(x) =
∑
i∈[n] f
2
i .
Let q be a prime larger than N2, and let Fq denote the finite field with cardinality q. The
function F2(x) is computed by a natural arithmetic circuit over Fq of size O(n) and depth
log n. This circuit is depicted in Figure 6.1 in the case n = 4. Naively applying the GKR
protocol to this circuit yields a (log3 n, log2 n) streaming interactive proof protocol requiring
Θ(log2 n) rounds. Using the results of Chapter 7, the honest prover in this protocol could be
made to run time O(n log n).
We give here a much simpler (log2 n, log2 n) streaming interactive proof protocol for F2
requiring log n rounds, based on a direct application of the sum-check protocol to a carefully
chosen polynomial. This protocol is illustrative of two techniques that we will use later in this
thesis in more general contexts. First, our F2 protocol makes use of a quadratic extension,
V˜ 2d , of the function Vd. In contrast, the GKR protocol applied to a circuit C only ever uses
multilinear extensions of the set of gate values at any layer of C. We crucially exploit the
use of quadratic extensions again in Chapter 8 (Theorem 8.7.2).
Second, in Theorem 6.4.2 we show how to implement the prover in our F2 protocol in
time O(n). To accomplish this, we develop a method that allows the prover to reuse work
across rounds of the sum-check protocol. We will exploit this technique in a much more
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general context in Chapter 8.
Theorem 6.4.1. There is a (log2 n, log2 n) streaming interactive proof protocol for F2 re-
quiring log n rounds, where n is the size of the data universe. The verifier runs in time
O(N log n), where N is the stream length, assuming all operations in a field of size poly(n)
require a unit time.
Proof. Assume for simplicity that n is a power of 2. Let V˜d be as in Lemma 6.3.1. Then
F2(x) =
∑
(i1,...,ilogn)∈{0,1}logn V˜
2
d (i1, . . . , ilogn). This equality holds because V˜
2
d (i1, . . . , ilogn) =
f 2i for all (i1, . . . , ilogn) ∈ {0, 1}logn, where i is the element of the data universe with binary
representation equal to (i1, . . . , ilogn). Hence, F2(x) can be computed by applying the sum-
check protocol of Proposition 2.3.1 to the polynomial V˜ 2d . In order to perform the final check
in this protocol, V needs to evaluate the polynomial V˜ 2d at a random point r ∈ Flogn. Lemma
6.3.1 implies that V can evaluate V˜d(r) in with a single pass over the data stream x while
storing O(log n) field elements. V can then compute V˜ 2d (r) via the identity V˜ 2d (r) =
(
V˜d(r)
)2
.
In total, there are log n rounds of the sum-check protocol, each requiring P to transmit
O(1) field elements. Thus, the total communication cost of the protocol is O(log2 n) bits and
the total space usage is O(log2 n) bits. The verifier’s runtime follows from Lemma 6.3.1.
Theorem 6.4.2. Given a stream of length N over a data universe of size n, the honest
prover in the streaming interactive proof protocol of Theorem 6.4.1 can be implemented to
run in time O(min{N log n, n}), assuming all operations in a field of size poly(n) require a
unit time.
Proof. In the jth round of the sum-check protocol applied to V˜ 2d , P must specify a polynomial
of the form
gj(Xj) =
∑
(xj+1,...,xlogn)∈{0,1}logn−j
g(r1, . . . , rj−1, Xj, xj+1, . . . , xlogn),
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where (r1 . . . rj−1) ∈ Fj−1 are the values to which variables 1 through j − 1 were bound in
the first j − 1 rounds observe the protocol. Observe that gj(Xj) is a polynomial of degree 2,
so it is sufficient for P to evaluate gj(xj) at three locations, say at xj = 0, 1, 2, to determine
gj(xj). For a location xj = c, we rewrite:
gj(c) =
∑
(xj+1,...,xlogn)∈{0,1}logn−j
V˜ 2d (r1, . . . , rj−1, c, xj+1, . . . xlogn)
=
∑
(xj+1,...,xlogn)∈{0,1}logn−j
( ∑
b∈{0,1}logn
Vd(b)χb(r1, . . . , rj−1, c, xj+1, . . . xlogn)
)2
=
∑
(xj+1,...,xlogn)∈{0,1}logn−j
∑
(b1,b2)∈{0,1}logn×{0,1}logn
Vd(b1)Vd(b2)
· χb1(r1, . . . , rj−1, c, xj+1, . . . xlogn) · χb2(r1, . . . , rj−1, c, xj+1, . . . xlogn)
=
∑
(b1,b2)∈{0,1}logn×{0,1}logn
(
Vd(b1)Vd(b2)
(
j−1∏
k=1
χb1,k(rk)
)
· χb1,j (c) ·
(
j−1∏
k=1
χb2,k(rk)
)
·
χb2,j (c) ·
∑
(xj+1...xlogn)∈{0,1}logn−j
( d∏
k=j+1
χb1,k(xk)χb2,k(xk)
))
.
Note that for xk ∈ {0, 1}, χbk(xk) = 1 if xk = bk and 0 otherwise. Thus, for any pair
(b1,b2) ∈ {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logn, we have
∑
(xj+1,...,xlogn)∈{0,1}logn−j
( d∏
k=j+1
χb1,k(xk)χb2,k(xk)
)
= 1
if and only if ∀j + 1 ≤ k ≤ d : b1,k = b2,k, and 0 otherwise. Thus,
gj(c) =
∑
(b1,b2)∈{0,1}logn×{0,1}logn,∀j+1≤k≤d:b1,k=b2,k
(
Vd(b1)Vd(b2)
j−1∏
k=1
χb1,k(rk)
· χb1,j(c)
j−1∏
k=1
χb2,k(rk)χb2,j(c)
)
=
∑
(bj+1,...,blogn)∈{0,1}logn−j
 ∑
(b1,...,bj)∈{0,1}j
Vd(b)χbj(c)
j−1∏
k=1
χbk(rk)
2 .
P can maintain Vd(b)
j−1∏
k=1
χbk(rk) for each nonzero Vd(b), updating with the new rk in each
round as it is revealed in constant time. Thus the total time spent by the prover for the
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verification process can be bounded via O(m log n) = O(N log n), where m is the number of
nonzero Vd(b)’s. However, we also want to bound P ’s runtime by O(n), and to accomplish
this we observe that it is possible for P to “reuse work” between rounds.
Indeed, at the heart of P ’s computation in round j a summation over {0, 1}j for each
(bj+1, . . . ,blogn) ∈ {0, 1}logn−j. Notice that for each (bj+1, . . . ,blogn) ∈ {0, 1}logn−j,
∑
(b1,...,bj)∈{0,1}j
(
Vd(b)χbj(c)
j−1∏
k=1
χbk(rk)
)
=
1∑
bj=0
(
χbj(c) ·
∑
b1,...,bj−1∈{0,1}j−1
(
Vd(b)
j−1∏
k=1
χbk(rk)
))
And for each (bj, . . . ,blogn) ∈ {0, 1}logn−j+1, we can decompose
∑
(b1,...,bj−1)∈{0,1}j−1
(
Vd(b)
j−1∏
k=1
χbk(rk)
)
=
1∑
bj−1=0
(
χbj−1(rj−1)
∑
(b1,...,bj−2)∈{0,1}j−2
(
Vd(b)
j−2∏
k=1
χbk(rk)
))
.
By storing Aj[bj . . .blogn] =
∑
(b1...bj−1)∈{0,1}j−1
(Vd(b) j−1∏
k=1
χbk(rk)
)
, P computes
Aj+1[bj+1 . . .blogn] = χ0(rj)Aj[0,bj+1 . . .blogn] + χ1(rj)Aj[1,bj+1, . . .blogn]
in time O(n/2j). Thus, over all log n rounds of the sum-check protocol, P ’s total runtime
can be bounded by O(
∑logn
j=1 n/2
j) = O(n) as desired.
Experimental Results. We performed a brief experimental study to evaluate the practical
efficiency of the F2 protocol of Theorem 6.4.2 and more generally of the sum-check techniques
on which it is based. We compared the multi-round protocol of Theorem 6.4.2 to the non-
interactive protocol given in Theorem 3.5.2. We built a prototype implementation in C++:
it simulated the computations of both parties, and measured the resources consumed by the
protocols. All programs were compiled with g++ using the -O3 optimization flag. For the
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data, we generated synthetic streams where the number of occurrences of each item was
picked uniformly in the range [0, 1000]. Note that the choice of data does not affect the
efficiency of the protocols, as these costs only depend on the universe size n and the size of
the field over which we work. The computations were made over the field of size q = 261− 1,
giving a probability of 2 log n/q of the verifier being fooled by a dishonest prover, which
is less than 10−17 for all parameter values experimented upon. These computations were
executed using native 64-bit arithmetic. The failure probability could be reduced further to,
e.g., 127/(2127 − 1), at the cost of using 128 bit arithmetic (using a larger field size would
also be necessary to avoid “overflow” if the second frequency moment of the data stream
can be larger than 261 − 1, as when operating over a field of cardinality q for prime q, the
protocol effectively computes the second frequency moment modulo q).
We evaluated the protocols on a single core of a multi-core machine with 64-bit AMD
Opteron processors and 32 GB of memory available. The large amount of memory allowed
us to experiment with data universes containing several billion items, with the prover able
to store the entire frequency vector in memory. We measured the time for V to compute
the check information from the stream, for P to generate the proof, and for V to verify this
proof. We also measured the space required by V , and the size of the proof provided by P .
Figures 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 show the behavior of the protocols as the size of the domain
n varies. First, Figure 6.2 shows the time for V to process the stream to evaluate V˜d(r)
as the domain size increases. Both show a linear trend (here, plotted on log-log scale).
Moreover, both take roughly the same time (within a factor of two), with the multi-round
verifier processing about 21 million updates per second, and the single round V processing
35 million. The similarity is not surprising: both methods are taking each element of the
stream and computing the product of the frequency with a function of the element’s index
i and the random parameter r. The effort in computing this function is roughly similar in
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both cases. The single round V has a slight advantage, since it can compute and use lookup
tables within the O(
√
n) space bound, while the multi-round verifier, limited to logarithmic
space, must recompute some values multiple times. The time to check the proof is essentially
negligible: less than a millisecond across all data sizes. Hence, we do not consider this a
significant cost.
Figure 6.3 shows a clear separation between the two methods in P ’s effort in generating
the proof. Here, we measure total time across all rounds in the multi-round case, and the
time to generate the single round proof. For the single-round proof, we plot both the cost
of a naive prover implementation that does not utilize the FFT techniques of Corollary
3.12.2 and an implementation that does use the FFT techniques of Corollary 3.12.2. For
large streams, it is clear that the the prover in the non-interactive protocol is only scalable
if FFT techniques are used, as in the naive implementation P ’s runtime growing like n3/2;
this implementation failed to process streams over a universe of size larger than 40 million.
The FFT-based implementation of the non-interactive protocol processed between 350, 000
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and 750, 000 items per second for all tested values of n, even for values of n well into the
billions. Still, the cost in the multi-round case is dramatically lower: our multi-round prover
implementation based on Theorem 6.4.2 processed 20-21 million universe items per second.
The trend is similar for the space resources required to execute the protocol. In the single
round case, both the verifier’s space and size of the proof grow proportional to
√
n. This
is not impossibly large: Figure 6.4 shows that for u of the order of 1 billion, both these
quantities are comfortably under a megabyte. Nevertheless, it is still orders of magnitude
larger than the sizes seen in the multi-round protocol: there, the space required and proof
size are never more than 1KB even when handling gigabytes of data.
In summary, the methods we have developed in this chapter are applicable to genuinely
large data sets, defined over a domain of size in the billions. Our implementation is capable
of processing such datasets within a matter of seconds or minutes.
6.5 Heavy Hitters
We close this chapter by presenting a highly efficient protocol for the fundamental problem
of computing the φ-heavy hitters of a data stream. Recall that in this problem, the goal is
to list those items i such that fi ≥ T = φN ′, i.e. whose frequency of occurrence exceeds a
φ fraction of the total count N ′ =
∑
i∈[n] fi. The protocol we give is the natural interactive
variant of the online annotated data streaming scheme of Theorem 3.6.1.
Theorem 6.5.1. There is a (φ−1 log2 n + log2 n, log2 n) streaming interactive proof proto-
col requiring O(log n) rounds for identifying the φ-heavy hitters in a data stream over a
data universe of size n. The verifier runs in time O(N log n) and the prover runs in time
O(min{N log n, n}), and N is the stream length.
Proof. Let W be the witness set from Theorems 3.4.1 and 3.6.1. Recall that W is a subset of
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the nodes of a binary tree T imposed over the data universe, and in the schemes of Theorems
3.4.1 and 3.6.1, P sends to V a claimed value for fˆ(w) = ∑i∈L(w) fi, where L(w) denotes the
set of all leaves in the subtree rooted at W . The verifier must check that W , fˆ(`) > T for
all leaves ` ∈ W , and that fˆ(u) ≤ T for all all non-leaf nodes u ∈ W .
We show how V can check that fˆ(w) is as claimed for all items w ∈ W , at the same
cost as a single point query. Let z denote the 2n − 1-dimensional vector such that zw = 1
if w ∈ W , and zw = 0 otherwise. Let f ∗ denote the 2n − 1-dimensional vector such that
f ∗w equals the claimed value of fˆ(w) if w ∈ W , and f ∗w = 0 otherwise. Abusing notation,
we will also think of fˆ itself as a 2n − 1-dimensional vector such that fˆw = fˆ(w). As in
the protocol of Theorem 3.6.1, we observe that fˆ(w) = f ∗w for all w ∈ W if and only if
0 =
∑
j∈[2n−1] zj(fˆw − f ∗w)2.
Let F be a field of cardinality q for some prime q > 2(N ′)2. We now view the vectors z, f ∗,
and fˆ as functions mapping {0, 1}logn+1 to F: each of these functions take as input a Boolean
vector (i1, . . . , ilogn+1), interprets this vector as an integer i between 0 and 2n−1, and outputs
the ith entry of the corresponding vector. Let z˜, f˜ ∗, and ˜ˆf respectively denote the multilinear
extension of each of these functions. Then in order to compute
∑
j∈[2n−1] zj(fˆw − f ∗w)2, it
suffices to apply the sum-check protocol to the polynomial g = z˜ ·( ˜ˆf− f˜ ∗)2. The total number
of rounds in the sum-check protocol applied to g is log n + 1. Since g has degree 3 in each
variable, each of P ’s messages consists of 4 field elements, and so the total communication
cost of the sum-check protocol applied to G is O(log2 n) bits. Thus, the total communication
of the protocol as a whole is O(φ−1 log2 n) bits to specify the elements w of the witness set
W as well as the claimed values for fˆ(w), and another O(log2 n) bits to apply the sum-check
protocol to the polynomial g.
To perform the required check in the final round of the sum-check protocol, V must
evaluate g at a random point r ∈ Flogn+1. V can do this by evaluating z˜(r), ˜ˆf(r), and f˜ ∗(r)2.
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As long as V stores the random vector r, which requires O(log |F| log n) bits of space, each
of these three quantities can be computed by V with a single streaming pass over the input
using the observations of Lemma 6.3.1. For example, given any update (i, δ) to the ith entry
of the vector fˆ , let (i1, . . . , ilogn+1) denote the binary representation of i. V can compute
˜ˆ
f(r) incrementally from the stream of updates to fˆ by initializing
˜ˆ
f(r)← 0, and processing
each update (i, δ) via:
˜ˆ
f(r)← ˜ˆf(r) + δ · χ(i1,...,ilogn+1)(r).
The bound on the verifier’s runtime follows from Lemma 6.3.1, while the bound on the
prover’s runtime can be derived using the techniques of Theorem 6.4.2.
6.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we introduced the model of streaming interactive proofs and demonstrated
that streaming interactive proofs require exponentially less space and communication than
annotated data streaming protocols for a large class of problems. We also observed that
the GKR protocol can be made to work with a streaming verifier and presented improved
protocols for two specific problems of fundamental importance in streaming and database
processing: F2 and heavy hitters. These protocols are meant to be illustrative, and although
they were tailored to specific problems, they introduced important techniques that we will
utilize repeatedly as we develop general-purpose protocols in Chapters 7 and 8.
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Chapter 7
Practical Verified Computation with
Streaming Interactive Proofs
In this chapter, we revisit the GKR protocol and show how to reduce the runtime of
the prover from Ω(S3) in a naive implementation down to O(S logS), where S is the size
of an arithmetic circuit computing the function of interest. We also describe a full imple-
mentation of the protocol, demonstrating much greater scalability than one might have ex-
pected. Finally, we describe a parallel implementation of the protocol that leverages Graphics
Processing Units (GPUs) and experimentally demonstrate the GKR protocol’s substantial
amenability to parallelization.
7.1 Overview and Statement of Results
Recall from Chapter 5 that in the GKR protocol, P and V first agree on an arithmetic
circuit C of size S and fan-in 2 over a finite field F computing the function of interest. The
protocol proceeds in iterations, with one iteration per layer of C. In the ith iteration, the
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sum-check protocol is applied to the polynomial f
(i)
z : Fsi+2si+1 → F defined via:
f (i)z (p, ω1, ω2) =
βsi(z, p)·
(
˜addi(p, ω1, ω2)(V˜i+1(ω1)+V˜i+1(ω2))+ ˜multi(p, ω1, ω2)V˜i+1(ω1) · V˜i+1(ω2)
)
, (7.1)
where βsi ,
˜addi, ˜multi, and V˜i+1 are as defined in Chapter 5. In the j’th round of this sum-
check protocol, P is required to send the univariate polynomial
gj(Xj)=
∑
(xj+1,...,xsi+2si+1 )∈{0,1}si+2si+1−j
f (i)z (r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
j−1, Xj, xj+1, . . . , xsi+2si+1).
The sum defining gj involves as many as S
3 terms, and thus a naive implementation of P
would require Ω(S3) time per iteration of the protocol. However, we show that by exploiting
the multilinearity of the low-degree extensions ˜addi and ˜multi that we use in the definition
of fi, each gate at layer i contributes to exactly one term in the sum defining gj, as does each
gate at layer i+1.1 Thus, the polynomial gj can be computed with a single pass over the gates
at layer i, and a single pass over the gates at layer i+ 1. As the sum-check protocol requires
O(si + si+1) = O(logS(n)) messages for each layer of the circuit, P requires logarithmically
many passes over each layer of the circuit in total.
A complication in applying the above observation is that V must process the circuit
in order to pull out information about its structure necessary to check the validity of P ’s
messages. Specifically, each application of the sum-check protocol requires V to evaluate ˜addi
and ˜multi at a random point. Theorem 7.1.1 below follows from the fact that for any log-
space uniform circuit, V can evaluate the multilinear extension of the wiring predicates at
any point using O(logS(n) log |F|) bits of space. We present detailed proofs and discussions
of the following theorems in Section 7.2.
1In order to obtain an interactive proof protocol for log-space uniform NC in which the prover runs in
polynomial time and the verifier runs in quasi-linear time, Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum used polyloga-
rithmic degree extensions of addi and multi. In contrast, we use the multilinear extensions ˜addi and ˜multi.
Our use of multilinear extensions is essential in lowering the prover’s runtime from O(S3) to O(S logS).
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Theorem 7.1.1. For any log-space uniform circuit C of size S(n) over finite field F, P can
run in O(S(n) logS(n)) time over the entire execution of the GKR protocol applied to C,
and V can make a single streaming pass over the input, using O(logS(n) log |F|) bits of space
over the entire execution of the protocol.
Moreover, we can strengthen Theorem 7.1.1 as follows. Because the circuit’s wiring pred-
icate is independent of the input, we can separate V ’s computation into an oﬄine non-
interactive preprocessing phase, which occurs before the data stream is seen, and an online
interactive phase, which occurs after both P and V have seen the input. This is similar
to [57, Theorem 4] and ensures that V is space-efficient (but may require time O(S(n))) dur-
ing the oﬄine phase), and that P is both time- and space-efficient in the online interactive
phase. In order to determine which circuit to use, V does need to know (an upper bound on)
the length of the input during the preprocessing phase.
Theorem 7.1.2. For any log-space uniform circuit C of size S(n) and depth d(n) over
finite field F, P can run in O(S(n) logS(n)) total time over the entire execution of the
GKR protocol applied to C. V can make a single streaming pass over the input, using
O(d(n) logS(n) log |F|) bits of space over the entire execution of the protocol. V can run
in time O(S(n)) using space O(d(n) logS(n) log |F|) in a non-interactive, data-independent
preprocessing phase, and run in time O(n log n+d(n) logS(n)) using O(d(n) logS(n) log |F|)
bits of space in an online interactive phase, where the O(n log n) term is due to the time
required to evaluate the low-degree extension of the input at a point.
Finally, Theorem 7.1.3 follows by assuming P can evaluate the multilinear extension of
the wiring predicate quickly. We believe that the hypothesis of Theorem 7.1.3 is extremely
mild, and we discuss this point at length in Section 7.3, identifying a diverse array of circuits
to which Theorem 7.1.3 applies. Moreover, the solutions we adopt in our circuit-checking
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experiments of Section 7.4 correspond to Theorem 7.1.3, and are both space- and time-
efficient for the verifier.
Theorem 7.1.3. Let C be any log-space uniform circuit of size S(n) and depth d(n) over
finite field F, and assume that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d(n)}, there exists a O(logS(n) log |F|)-
space, poly(logS(n))-time algorithm for evaluating ˜addi and ˜multi at a point. Then in order
to to implement the GKR protocol applied to C, P requires O(S(n) logS(n)) time, and V
requires O(logS(n) log |F|) bits of space and time O(n log n+ d(n)poly(logS(n))), where the
O(n log n) term is due to the time required to evaluate the low-degree extension of the input
at a point.
7.2 Methodology and Proofs
7.2.1 Overview
In the j’th round of the sum-check protocol applied to f
(i)
z , P is required to send the
univariate polynomial
gj(Xj) =
∑
(xj+1,...,xsi+2si+1 )∈{0,1}si+2si+1−j
f (i)z (r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
j−1, Xj, xj+1, . . . , xsi+2si+1).
Theorems 7.1.1, 7.1.2, and 7.1.3 rely on the observation that, when ˜addi and ˜multi are
multilinear extensions, rather than arbitrary low-degree extensions, then each gate at layers
i and i+ 1 contributes to exactly one term in the sum.
More specifically, the key observation is that the multilinear extension of the wiring
predicate acts as a sum of variable-wise indicator functions on boolean-valued variables,
with one indicator function for each gate at the layer of interest. At any round j of the
sum-check protocol, the “unbound” variables (i.e., those appearing in the sum defining gj)
still only range over values in {0, 1}, and thus each gate b at the current layer of the circuit
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still contributes to only one term in the sum in intermediate rounds. Namely, b contributes
to the unique term of the sum that agrees with the trailing bits in the binary representation
of b, despite the fact that “bound” variables may take values outside of {0, 1}.
7.2.2 Decomposing ˜addi and ˜multi as Sums of Variable-Wise In-
dicator Functions
Since ˜addi and ˜multi are the multilinear extensions of the wiring predicate, we can write
them explicitly as follows.
As in Chapter 6, for b ∈ {0, 1}si+2si+1 let χb(x1, . . . , xsi+2si+1) =
∏si+2si+1
k=1 χbk(xk), where
χ0(xk) = 1 − xk and χ1(xk) = xk. χb is the unique multilinear polynomial that takes
b ∈ {0, 1}si+2si+1 to 1 and all other values in {0, 1}si+2si+1 to 0, i.e., it is the multilinear
extension of the indicator function for boolean vector b.
Notice that if (xj+1, . . . , xsi+2si+1) ∈ {0, 1}si+2si+1−j, then for any (r1, . . . rj) ∈ Fj,
χb(r1, . . . , rj, xj+1, . . . , xsi+2si+1) = (7.2)
∏j
l=1 χbl(rl), if xk = bk for all k ≥ j + 1.
0, otherwise.
Informally, Equation (7.2) implies that one may think of χb acting as a variable-wise
indicator function on boolean-valued variables. Since ˜addi and ˜multi are multilinear exten-
sions, they can be written as a sum of these χb functions, where each gate at layer i + 1
contributes a term χb to the sum. Details follow.
Recall that we numbered the layers of the circuit so that the in-neighbors of a gate at
layer i are at layer i + 1. We will refer to the triple b = (b1,b2,b3) ∈ {0, 1}si+2si+1 as a
gate triple at layer i if the first and second in-neighbors of the gate with label b1 at layer i
are gates b2 and b3 at layer i + 1 respectively. We will say b = (b1,b2,b3) is an add triple
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(respectively, mult triple) if gate b1 at layer i is an addition (respectively, multiplication)
gate. With this terminology in hand, we may write:
˜addi(x1, . . . , xsi+2si+1) =
∑
add triples b at layer i
χb(x1, . . . , xsi+2si+1) (7.3)
and
˜multi(x1,. . . ,xsi+2si+1) =
∑
mult triples b at layer i+1
χb(x1, . . . , xsi+2si+1). (7.4)
It is straightforward to observe the expressions on the right hand sides of Equations (7.3) and
(7.4) are multilinear polynomials that agree with addi and multi on boolean-valued inputs,
and hence the right hand sides are equal to the unique multilinear extensions of addi and
multi respectively.
For any vector x = (xj+1, . . . xsi+2si+1) ∈ {0, 1}si+2si+1−j, and for any (r1, . . . rj) ∈ Fj, let
x∗ denote the vector
x∗ := (r1, . . . , rj, xj+1, . . . , xsi+2si+1) ∈ Fsi+2si+1 ,
and let Sx denote the set of gate triples at layer i given by {b ∈ {0, 1}si+2si+1 : bk =
xk for all k ≥ j + 1}. Equations 7.3 and 7.4 imply that
˜addi(x
∗) =
∑
add triples b∈Sx
(
j∏
l=1
χbl(rl)
)
, (7.5)
and similarly
˜multi(x
∗) =
∑
mult triples b∈Sx
(
j∏
l=1
χbl(rl)
)
(7.6)
Completing the Calculation. At round j of this sum-check protocol, the prover must
compute the message
gj(Xj) =
∑
xj+1...xsi+2si+1∈{0,1}si+2si+1−j
f (i)z (r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
j−1, Xj, xj+1 . . . xsi+2si+1).
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Since gj has degree three if we are using multilinear extensions, it suffices for the prover to
send gj(rj) for rj ∈ {0, 1, 2}, as these evaluations uniquely define gj.
Using Equations (7.5) and (7.6), we can now easily observe that each gate at layer i
contributes to exactly one term in the sum. Specifically, for any term x = (xj+1 . . . xsi+2si+1) ∈
{0, 1}si+2si+1−j in the sum, let x∗ denote the vector
x∗ := (r(i)1 , . . . , r
(i)
j , xj+1, . . . , xsi+2si+1) ∈ Fsi+2si+1
as before, and let p∗ ∈ Fsi be the first si entries of this vector, ω∗1 ∈ Fsi+1 the middle si+1
entries, and ω∗2 ∈ Fsi+1 the final si+1 entries. Then combining Equations (7.5) and (7.6) with
(7.1), we see
f (i)z (x
∗) = βsi(z, p
∗) ·
(( ∑
add triples b∈Sx
(
j∏
l=1
χbl(rl)
))(
V˜i+1(ω
∗
1) + V˜i(ω
∗
2)
)
+
( ∑
mult triples b∈Sx
(
j∏
l=1
χbl(rl)
))
· V˜i+1(ω∗1) · V˜i+1(ω∗2)
)
. (7.7)
Each gate triple b at layer i is in Sx for exactly one x ∈ {0, 1}si+2si+1−j. Namely, x is the
boolean vector equal to the last si + 2si+1− j bits of the binary representation of b. Denote
this vector by x(b), and similarly let x∗(b), p∗(b), ω∗1(b) and ω
∗
2(b) denote the corresponding
vectors implied by x(b).
Equation (7.7) implies that b contributes only to the term x(b) of the sum defining gj(rj)
for rj ∈ {0, 1, 2}. That is, we may write
gj(rj) =∑
add triples b at layer i
βsi(z, p
∗(b))
(
j∏
l=1
χbl(rl)
)
(V˜i+1(ω
∗
1(b))+V˜i+1(ω
∗
2(b)))
+
∑
mult triples b at layer i
βsi(z, p
∗(b))
(
j∏
l=1
χbl(rl)
)
·V˜i+1(ω∗1(b))·V˜i+1(ω∗2(b)).
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Thus, the prover can compute gj(0), gj(1), and gj(2) with a single pass over the gates at
layer i. By a similar calculation, all necessary V˜i+1(ω1) and V˜i+1(ω2) for each message of the
prover can be computed with a single pass over the gates at layer i+1. In conclusion, as long
as we use the multilinear extension of the circuit’s wiring predicate, the prover can compute
each message within the sum-check protocol at layer i with a single pass over the gates at
layer i and a single pass over the gates at layer i+ 1, performing a constant number of field
operations for each gate. Thus, the prover requires at most O((Si+Si+1) log(Si+Si+1)) time
during the sum-check protocol as applied to the ith layer of the circuit. It follows that, over
the entire execution of the GKR protocol, the prover requires at most O(S(n) logS(n)) time
to compute his messages within the various invocations of the sum-check protocol.
7.2.3 Reducing to Verification of a Single Point
Recall from Chapter 5 that in the ith iteration of the GKR protocol, after executing the
sum-check protocol, V is left with the task of verifying both V˜i+1(ω∗1) and V˜i+1(ω∗2). V reduces
these two tasks to the task of verifying V˜i+1(ω
∗) at a single point ω∗ ∈ Fsi+1 . V does this by
asking P to send a degree-si+1 polynomial claimed to be V˜i+1 ◦ `, the restriction of V˜i+1 to
the line `, where ` be the unique line F→ Fsi+1 such that `(0) = ω∗1 and `(1) = ω∗2. Thus, to
complete our the proof that the prover in the GKR protocol can run in time O(S(n) logS(n)),
we must show that P can compute V˜i+1 ◦ ` in time O(Si+1 · si+1), as this will imply that
P spends O(∑i Si · si) = O(S(n) logS(n)) time on this calculation across all layers of the
circuit.
Since V˜i+1 ◦ ` is a univariate polynomial of degree si+1, it can be specified by computing
its value at si+1 + 1 points, say the points in the set T = {0, . . . , si+1}. Thus, it suffices for
P to evaluate V˜i+1 at the si+1 points `(j) : j ∈ T .
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For any point p ∈ Fsi+1 , we may write:
V˜i+1(p) =
∑
b∈{0,1}si+1
Vi+1(b)χb(p1, . . . psi+1) (7.8)
We will show that P can compute a table containing χb(p1, . . . psi+1) for all b ∈ {0, 1}si+1 in
O(Si+1) time. This fact, combined with Equation 7.8, shows that once the circuit C has been
evaluated (thereby yielding the Vi+1(b) values), P can compute V˜i+1(p) in O(2si+1) = O(Si+1)
time. Hence P can evaluate V˜i+1 at all si+1 points `(j) : j ∈ T in O(Si+1 ·si+1) time as desired.
To compute all the χb(p1, . . . psi+1) values, we use a simple memoization procedure. This
procedure will arise again in Lemma 8.3.1. The memoization procedure consists of si+1 stages,
where stage j constructs a table A(j) of size 2j, such that for any (b1, . . . , bj) ∈ {0, 1}j,
A(j)[(b1, . . . , bj)] =
∏j
i=1 χbi(pi). Notice A
(j)[(b1, . . . , bj)] = A
(j−1)[(b1, . . . , bj−1)] · χbj(pj), and
so the jth stage of the memoization procedure requires time O(2j). The total time across all
si+1 stages is therefore O(
∑si+1
j=1 2
j) = O(2si+1) = O(Si+1) as desired.
7.2.4 Finishing the Proofs of Theorems 7.1.1 and 7.1.2
We have demonstrated that if the GKR protocol is instantiated with the multilinear
extensions of the circuits wiring predicate and gate value function, then P can be made
to run in time O(S(n) logS(n)). All that remains in proving Theorem 7.1.1 is to show that
for any log-space uniform circuit, the verifier can evaluate ˜addi(p, ω1, ω2) and ˜multi(p, ω1, ω2)
using O(logS(n) log |F|) bits of space. This holds because the verifier can make an “implicit”
pass over each layer of the circuit and compute the contribution of each gate to ˜addi and
˜multi. That is, the verifier considers each gate triple b in turn, and computes b’s contribution
to ˜addi and ˜multi using Equations (7.3) and (7.4). The space requirement is O(logS(n))
bits to enumerate the triples and O(logS(n) log |F|) to store the O(logS(n)) field elements
comprising (p, ω1, ω2). This requires O(S(n)) time in total, but only O(logS(n) log |F|) bits
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of space, since the verifier never needs to store an explicit representation of the circuit.
Theorem 7.1.1 follows.
Theorem 7.1.2 follows from the additional observation that ˜addi and ˜multi do not depend
on the input, nor do the random coins of the verifier, and these coins uniquely determine
the points at which V must evaluate ˜addi and ˜multi. Thus, V can toss all her coins in the
pre-processing phase and compute the necessary evaluations of ˜addi and ˜multi. V stores the
answers and the random coins for use in the online phase. In the online phase, V only needs
to spend O(1) time per round of the protocol to check P ’s messages for consistency, and
thus V takes time O(d(n) logS(n)) in the online phase.
In streaming contexts, where V is more space-constrained than time-constrained, this
may be acceptable. However, the solutions we adopt in our experimental implementation
correspond to the stronger Theorem 7.1.3, which further reduces the space and time costs
for the verifier.
7.3 Discussion and Applicability
Theorem 7.1.3 makes the assumption that that the multilinear polynomials ˜addi and
˜multi can be evaluated quickly by a small-space algorithm. In return for this assumption, we
avoid the need for an oﬄine pre-processing phase for the verifier as required in Theorem 7.1.2,
which can be cumbersome in practice. We believe this assumption is mild in both theory
and practice, and we devote this section to discussing the applicability of Theorem 7.1.3 by
demonstrating several natural examples where it applies. In contrast, other work in this area
does require preprocessing in all cases – see e.g., [56, 82, 90–92, 104]. We view the ability of
our implementation to avoid an oﬄine pre-processing phase under many circumstances as
an important advantage of our work.
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7.3.1 Motivating Problems
To focus our discussion and experimental study, we describe three key problems that
capture different aspects of computation, including data aggregation and linear algebra.
F2: Given a stream of N elements from [n], compute
∑
i∈[n] f
2
i where fi is the number of
occurrences of i in the stream. As discussed in prior chapters, this is also known as the second
frequency moment.
Distinct: Given a stream of N elements from [n], compute the number of distinct elements,
i.e., the number of i with fi 6= 0, where again fi is the number of occurrences of i in the
stream.
MatMult: Given a stream defining two n × n integer matrices A and B, compute the
product A ·B.
For simplicity, we will assume through this chapter that the stream length N and the
universe size n are on the same order of magnitude i.e., m = Θ(n).
All three problems require linear space in the streaming model to solve exactly (although
can be solved by space-efficient approximation algorithms [80]).
We demonstrate the applicability of Theorem 7.1.3 by showing that the three motivating
problems defined above possess succinct circuits to which Theorem 7.1.3 applies. In [39],
we further identify several other important circuits from the algorithmic literature to which
Theorem 7.1.3 also applies, but we omit this analysis from this thesis for brevity. In essence,
Theorem 7.1.3 applies to any circuit with a “highly regular” wiring pattern; this explains why
it applies to such a wide array of circuits. The details in the remainder of the section grow
lengthy at times, but the main idea remains clear: Theorem 7.1.3 applies to most circuits
that arise in both practical applications and theoretical constructions.
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7.3.2 Circuits For Motivating Problems
In this section, we describe natural arithmetic circuits computing our motivating prob-
lems. In Section 7.4, we report the performance of our implementation of the GKR protocol
when applied to these circuits.
Circuit for F2: The arithmetic circuit for F2 appeared in Chapter 6 and is quite straight-
forward: the inputs are entries of the frequency vector f , and the the first level of the circuit
computes the square of the input values, then subsequent levels sum these up pairwise to ob-
tain the sum of all squared values. The total depth d is O(log n). The GKR protocol applied
to this circuit yields a O(log2 n) message (log2 n, log2 n) protocol (as per Definition 6.1.2).
Circuit for Distinct : We describe a succinct arithmetic circuit over Fq, the field of cardi-
nality q, that computes Distinct. When q is a prime larger than n, Fermat’s Little Theorem
(FLT) implies that for x ∈ Fq, xq−1 = 1 if and only if x 6= 0. Consider the circuit that, for
each coordinate i of the input vector f , computes each f q−1i via O(log q) multiplications, and
then sums the results. This circuit has total size O(n log q) and depth O(log q). Applying our
implementation of the GKR protocol to this circuit, we obtain a (log n log q, log n) protocol
where P runs in time O(n log n log q).
Circuit for MatMult : We describe an arithmetic circuit C of sizeO(n3) for multiplying two
n×n matrices A and B – this circuit essentially performs naive matrix multiplication. Let the
input gate labelled (0, i, j) ∈ {0, 1}× {0, 1}logn×{0, 1}logn correspond to Aij, and the input
labelled (1, i, j) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logn correspond to Bij. The layer of C adjacent
to the input consists of n3 gates, where the gate labeled (i, j, k) ∈ {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logn ×
{0, 1}logn computes Aik ·Bkj. All subsequent layers constitute a binary tree of addition gates
summing up the results and thereby computing
∑
k AikBkj for all (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n].
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Figure 7.1: A circuit for F2 on 4 inputs.
Wiring Predicates for F2, Distinct, and MatMult
We demonstrate that Theorem 7.1.3 applies to natural circuits computing all three of
our motivating problems.
1. F2: Recall that the circuit for F2 had a layer of multiplication gates used for computing
the square of each input, and then subsequent levels formed a binary tree of addition
gates used to sum up the results. A visual depiction of this circuit on n = 4 inputs was
provided in Figure 6.1, and is reproduced in Figure 7.1 for the reader’s convenience.
First, consider layer d− 1 immediately above the input gates, which consists of multi-
plication gates used to square each input; both the in-neighbors of gate i at layer d− 1
are equal to the i’th input gate. Therefore, if p = (p1, . . . , plogn) ∈ {0, 1}logn denotes the
boolean representation of a gate at layer d − 1, and ω1 = (ω1,1,. . . ,ω1,logn)∈{0, 1}logn
and ω2 = (ω2,1,. . . ,ω2,logn)∈{0, 1}logn denote the boolean representation of two gates
at the input layer, then multd evaluates to true if and only if p = ω1 = ω2, while
addd is identically zero. It is easily seen that the multilinear extension of multd is the
polynomial
˜multd(p,ω1,ω2)=
∏v
j=1
(
pjω1,jω2,j + (1− pj)(1− ω1j)(1− ω2,j)
)
,
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while the multilinear extension of addd is the zero polynomial. Clearly, ˜multd can be
evaluated at any point in F3 logn in time and space O(log n).
The rest of the circuit for F2 consists of a binary tree of addition gates, which is used
to sum up the squared item frequencies. Thus, ˜multi is the zero polynomial for all
i < d. Meanwhile, for i < d the predicate addi(p1, ω1, ω2) is as follows. Label the gates
at layers i and i + 1 in the natural way, so that the first input to the gate labelled
p = (p1, . . . , psi) ∈ {0, 1}si at layer i is the gate with label (p, 0) at layer i+ 1, and the
second input to gate p has label (p, 1). Here and throughout, (p, 0) denotes the (si+1)-
dimensional vector obtained by concatenating the entry 0 to the end of the vector p.
Interpreting p = (p1, . . . , psi) ∈ {0, 1}si as an integer between 0 and 2si − 1 with p1 as
the high-order bit and psi as the low-order bit, this says that the first in-neighbor of
p is 2p and the second is 2p + 1, when interpreting the binary vector p as an integer.
Thus, we may write:
˜addi(p, ω1, ω2) = (1− ω1,si+1)ω2,si+1 ·
si−1∏
j=1
(pjω1,jω2,j + (1− pj)(1− ω1,j)(1− ω2,j)) .
Conceptually, the leading factor (1 − ω1,si+1)ω2,si+1 ensures that ω1 is even (i.e., its
first bit is 0) and ω2 is odd (i.e., its first bit is 1), while the expression
si+1−1∏
j=1
(pjω1,jω2,j + (1− pj)(1− ω1,j)(1− ω2,j))
ensures that the high-order si bits of ω1 and ω2 agree with the bits of p. ˜addi is
therefore the unique multilinear polynomial evaluating to 1 on boolean inputs (p, ω1, ω2)
if ω1 = 2p and ω2 = 2p+1, and evaluating to 0 otherwise. Clearly ˜addi can be evaluated
at any point in time and space O(si + si+1) = O(log n). This completes the description
of ˜addi and ˜multi for all layers of the circuit for F2.
2. Distinct: Recall that for each of the n inputs fj, the circuit for Distinct from Section
7.2 computes f q−1j via O(log q) multiplications, and then sums the results via a binary
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a1  a2  a3  1 
x  x  x  x 
x  x  x  x  x  x 
x  x  x  x  x  x 
x  x  x  x  x  x 
Figure 7.2: The first several layers of a circuit for Distinct on three inputs (in place of a
fourth input is a “constant” gate with value one) over the field Fq with q = 261− 1. The first
layer from the bottom computes f 2j for all j. The second layer from the bottom computes f
4
j
and f 2j for all j. The third layer computes f
8
j and f
6
j = f
4
j ×f 2j for all j, while the fourth layer
computes f 16j and f
14
j = f
8
j × f 6j for all j. The remaining layers (not shown) have structure
identical to the third and fourth layers until the value f q−1j is computed for all j, and the
circuit culminates in a binary tree of addition gates.
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tree of addition gates. We have already seen the wiring predicate for binary trees,
so here we only sketch the wiring predicate for the f q−1j computation, omitting some
details for brevity. We do so for the special case of q = 261 − 1, which is the value of
q used in our experiments, as this happens to have a particularly “regular” circuit for
computing f q−1j ; the calculation would be similar but less symmetric for other values
of q.
We may write q − 1 = 261 − 2, whose binary representation is 60 1s followed by a
0. Thus, f q−1j =
∏60
k=1 f
2k
j . The circuit computing f
q−1
j repeatedly squares fj, and
multiplies together the results “as it goes”. In more detail, for i > 1 there are two
multiplication gates at each layer d − i of the circuit for computing f q−1j ; the first
computes f 2
i
j by squaring the corresponding gate at layer d − i + 1, and the second
computes
∏i−1
k=1 f
2k−1
j . See Figure 7.2 for a visual depiction of the first few layers of the
Distinct circuit.
At a high level then, the wiring predicate ˜multi(p, ω1, ω2) tests equality of ω1 and ω2
with two strings that depend on the parity of p, as even values of p correspond to gates
computing f 2
j
i while odd values correspond to gates computing
∏i−1
k=1 f
2k−1
j . Thus, we
may write
˜multi(p, ω1, ω2)=(1− p1)χeven(p, ω1, ω2)+p1χodd(p, ω1, ω2),
where χodd and χeven are multilinear extensions of the appropriate equality predi-
cates, which do not depend on p1 (we omit a precise definition of χodd and χeven
for brevity, as this circuit is studied in considerable detail in Section 8.4.3). This can
clearly be evaluated in O(log n) time and space.
3. MatMult: Recall that the circuit for MatMult consists of a layer (layer ` = log n+1)
of multiplication gates in which the gate with label (i, j, k) ∈ {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logn ×
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{0, 1}logn is connected to the input gates with labels (0, i, k) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}logn ×
{0, 1}logn and (1, k, j) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logn, followed by a binary of tree
of addition gates of depth log n. We have already analyzed the wiring predicate for
a binary tree of addition gates in the context of F2, so here we focus on the wiring
predicate of the remaining layer, layer `. Since layer ` consists only of multiplication
gates, ˜add` is the zero polynomial. Meanwhile, we can express ˜mult` as follows.
˜mult(p, ω1, ω2) = (1− ω1,1)ω2,1
(∏logn
k=1 (pkω1,k+1 + (1− pk)(1− ω1,k+1))
)
·
(∏logn
k=1 (plogn+kω2,logn+k+1 + (1− plogn+k)(1− ω2,logn+k+1))
)
·(∏logn
k=1 (p2 logn+kω1,logn+k+1ω2,k+1 + (1− p2 logn+k)(1− ω1,logn+k+1)(1− ω2,k+1))
)
Intuitively, the factor (1− ω1,1)ω2,1 in the above equation ensures that the first bit of
ω1 is 0 and the first bit of ω2 is 1. The second factor ensures that the first log n bits in
p equals the row-index in ω1, the third ensures that the second log n bits in p equals
the column-index in ω2, and the final factor ensures that the final log n bits in p equals
both the column index in ω1 and the row-index in ω2. Using the above expression for
˜mult, it is clear that ˜mult can be evaluated by V at a point in O(log n) time.
7.3.3 Circuit Design Issues
So far we have described the GKR protocol in the context of arithmetic circuits with
addition (+) and multiplication gates (×). This is sufficient to prove the power of this system,
since any efficiently computable boolean function on boolean inputs can be computed by an
(asymptotically) small arithmetic circuit. Typically such arithmetic circuits are obtained
by constructing a boolean circuit (with AND, OR, and NOT gates) for the function, and
then “arithmetizing” the circuit [8, Chapter 8]. However, we strive not just for asymptotic
efficiency, but genuine practicality, and the factors involved can grow quite quickly: every
layer of (arithmetic) gates in the circuit adds si+2si+1 rounds of interaction to the protocol.
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Hence, we further explore optimizations and implementation issues.
Extended Gates. The GKR circuit checking protocol [57] can be extended with any gates
that compute low-degree polynomial functions of their inputs. If g is a polynomial of degree
j, we can use gates computing g(x); this increases the communication complexity in each
round of the protocol by at most j − 2 words, as P must send a degree-j polynomial, rather
than a degree-2 polynomial.
The low-depth circuits we use to compute functions of interest such as Distinct make
use of the function f(x) = xq−1. Using only + and × gates, they require depth about
log2 q. If we also use gates computing g(x, y) = x
jyj for a small j, we can reduce the
depth of the circuits to about log2j q; as the number of rounds in the protocol depends
linearly on the depth of the circuit, this reduces the number of rounds by a factor of about
log2 q/ log2j q = log2 2j = 1 + log2 j. At the same time this increases the communication
cost of each round by a factor of (at most) j − 2. We can optimize the choice of j. In our
experiments, we use j = 4 (so g(x, x) is x8) and j = 8 (g(x, x) = x16) to simultaneously
reduce the number of messages by a factor of about 3 and the communication cost and prover
runtime by significant factors as well.
Another optimization is possible. The circuits we use for F2 and Distinct eventually
compute the sum of a large number of values. Let g be the low-degree extension of the values
being summed. For functions of this form, V can use a single sum-check protocol [8, Chapter
8] to reduce the computation of the sum to computing g(r) for a random point r. V can then
use the GKR protocol to delegate computation of g(r) to P . Conceptually, this optimization
corresponds to replacing a binary tree of addition gates in an arithmetic circuit C with a
single ⊕ gate with large fan-in, which sums all its inputs. This optimization can reduce the
communication cost and the number of messages required by the protocol.
General Circuit Design. The circuit checking approach can be combined with existing
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compilers, such as that in the Fairplay system [78], that take as input a program in a high-
level programming language and output a corresponding boolean circuit. This boolean circuit
can then be arithmetized and “verified” by our implementation; this yields a full-fledged sys-
tem implementing statistically-secure verifiable computation. However, this system is likely
to remain impractical even though the prover P can be made to run in time linear in the size
of the arithmetic circuit. For example, in most hardware, one can compute the sum of two
32-bit integers x and y with a single instruction. However, when encoding this operation into
a boolean circuit, it is unclear how to do this with depth less than 32. At 3 log n rounds per
circuit layer, for reasonable parameters, single additions can turn into thousands of rounds.
The circuits we described above avoid this overhead by avoiding boolean circuits entirely
and instead view the input directly as elements over Fq, the finite field with q elements,
for a large prime q. For example, if the input is an array of 32-bit integers, then we view
each element of the array as a value of Fq in the natural way, and calculating the sum of
two integers requires a single depth-1 addition gate, rather than a depth-32 boolean circuit.
However, this approach seems to severely limit the functionality that can be implemented.
For instance, we know of no compact arithmetic circuit to test whether x > y for two integers
x and y.
This polylogarithmic blowup in circuit depth compared to input size appears inherent
in any construction that encodes computations as arithmetic circuits. Therefore, the devel-
opment of general purpose protocols that avoid this representation remains an important
direction for future work.
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7.4 Implementation and Experiments
7.4.1 Implementation Details
Our experimental setup was identical to that of our F2 implementation described in
Chapter 6. Specifically, we built our implementations in C++ and simulated the compu-
tations of both parties and measured the time and resources consumed by the protocols.
All computations are over the field of size q = 261 − 1, implying a very low probability of
the verifier being fooled by a dishonest prover. Our source code for the experiments of this
section is available online at [38].
For the experiments of this section, we evaluated the protocols on a multi-core machine
with 64-bit AMD Opteron processors and 32 GB of memory available. Our scalability results
here use a single core. The large amount of memory allowed us to experiment with universes
of size several billion, with the prover able to store the full data in memory. We measured
the time for V to compute the check information from the stream, for P to generate the
proof, and for V to verify the proof. We also measured the space required by V , and the size
of the proof provided by P .
Choice of Field Size. While all the protocols we implemented work over arbitrary finite
fields, our choice of Fq with q = 261−1 proves ideal for engineering practical protocols. First,
the field size is large enough to provide a minuscule probability of error, but small enough
that any field element can be represented with a single 64-bit data type. By using native
types, we achieve a speedup of several factors. Second, reducing modulo q can be done with
a bit shift, a bit-wise AND operation, and an addition [100] The same observation applies
to any field whose size equals a Mersenne Prime, including 289 − 1, 2107 − 1, and 2127 − 1.
2127 − 1 in particular is an excellent choice if one needs to deal with larger integer values,
as elements of this field can be represented as 2 64-bit words. We experienced a speedup of
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nearly an order of magnitude by switching to this specialized “mod” operation rather than
using “% q’ operation in C++.
The main potential issue with our choice of field size is that “overflow” can occur for
problems such as matrix multiplication if the entries of the input matrices are very large.
For example, with 512× 512 matrix multiplication, if the entries of the input matrices A,B
are larger than 226, an entry in the product matrix AB can be as large as 261, which is larger
than our field size. If this is a concern, a larger field size is appropriate. (Notice that for a
problem such as Distinct, there is no danger of overflow issues as long as the length of the
stream is smaller than 261 − 2, which is larger than any stream encountered in practice). A
second reason to use larger field sizes is to handle floating-point or rational arithmetic as
proposed by Setty et al. in [91].
All of our protocols can be instantiated over fields with more than 261− 1 elements, with
an implementation using these fields experiencing a slowdown proportional to the increased
cost of arithmetic over these fields.
7.4.2 Experimental Results
In this chapter, we have put significant effort into optimizing the runtime of the prover
within the GKR protocol, achieving an implementation for which P takes time nearly linear
in the size of the circuit. Nonetheless, this cost remains the chief limitation of the implemen-
tation.
We experimented with our implementation on circuits for our three motivating problems:
F2, Distinct, and MatMult. Results are summarized in Table 7.1. Throughout, when we
refer to P ’s runtime in an interactive protocol, we are referring to the total time over all
rounds of the protocol. The speed per gate can be very high: P processed circuits with tens of
millions of gates in a matter of minutes. For example, our basic implementation processed a
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Table 7.1: Experimental results with our implementation of the GKR protocol.
Problem Gates Size P time Rounds Communication V time
(gates) (s) (KBs) (s)
F2 +,× 0.4M 8.5 986 11.5 .01
F2 +,×,⊕ 0.2M 6.5 118 2.5 .01
Distinct +,× 16M 552.6 3730 87.4 .01
Distinct +,×, ˆ8 8.4M 462.2 1684 60.0 .01
Distinct +,×, ˆ16 6.4M 457.4 1399 65.8 .01
Distinct +,×,⊕ 15.8M 546.4 3355 78.4 .01
Distinct +,×, ˆ8,⊕ 8.2M 432.6 1310 51.0 .01
Distinct +,×, ˆ16,⊕ 6.2M 441.2 1024 56.8 .01
MatMult +,× 300.0M 9759.1 767 17.9 .10
The F2 and Distinct rows report on input vectors of length n = 2
17, while the MatMult
row reports on 512×512 matrix multiplication. For MatMult, the Communication column
does not count the cost of specifying the answer, only the additional communication required
to prove correctness.
circuit for Distinct with close to 16 million gates in under 9 minutes, or close to 30,000 gates
per second. However, since the circuit’s size was more than 100 times larger than the universe
over which the input is drawn, this translated to only about 300 items per second. The other
costs incurred are very low. The verifier’s space usage and the communication cost are never
more than a few dozen kilobytes, and the verifier processes close to thirty million updates per
second across all stream lengths. Indeed, for problems that require superlinear time to solve,
the verifier’s runtime in our protocol is less than the time required to solve the problem
locally, without the help of a prover. For example, for 512 × 512 matrix multiplication,
our verifier implementation requires .10 seconds to process the input stream, while a C++
program performing naive matrix multiplication with floating point arithmetic required 1.53
seconds. We stress that the savings for the verifier would be larger for more complicated
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problems and for larger input sizes, as the verifier’s runtime grows quasi-linearly with the
size of the input. The time for V to check the prover’s messages for consistency in our
implementation is negligible compared to the (already low) time to compute the required
low-degree extension of the input.
As we previously discussed in Section 7.3.3, adding additional gate types can reduce the
cost of circuit checking. We demonstrate experimentally that adding gates that compute the
8th power (ˆ8) or the 16th power (ˆ16) of their inputs achieves substantial reductions in the
size of the circuits needed (see Table 7.1). For Distinct, this reduced the number of rounds
by nearly a factor of three, the prover time by close to 20%, and the overall communication
cost by close to 30%. We also discuss in Section 7.3.3 how to (conceptually) replace a binary
tree of addition gates with a single ⊕ gate of very large fan-in which sums all its inputs. For
Distinct, this optimization further reduced both communication and number of rounds by
10-20%. The effect of ⊕ gates was much more pronounced for F2, where we saw an order of
magnitude reduction in the number of rounds, and 5-fold reduction in communication cost.
The change was larger here because the addition gates represent a much larger fraction of
the gates in F2 circuits than in Distinct circuits.
Summary. We conclude that the costs to the verifier of our implementation of the GKR
protocol are quite attractive. Our implementation saves the verifier time and space even
for small problem instances, and the communication cost is never more than a few dozen
kilobytes. The bottleneck in our implementation is the runtime of the prover. While our
methods achieve a prover runtime that is very close to linear in the size of the circuit,
and our prover implementation demonstrates significantly better scalability than one might
expect a priori, the prover runtime remains the bottleneck in the protocol. This bottleneck
is mitigated further in Chapter 8.
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7.5 GPU Implementation
In this section, we describe a parallel implementation of our protocol using graphics
processing units (GPUs). The primary purpose of this section is to demonstrate the GKR
protocol’s substantial amenability to parallelization, which can substantially mitigate the
bottlenecks of the sequential implementation already described. GPUs are not by any means
the only parallel platform suitable for our task, but the GPU is becoming a standard par-
allel platform, and it provides a good testing ground for implementation. While some of
the bottlenecks we identify in our parallel implementation are GPU-specific, several of our
design choices should be broadly applicable. For example, in this section we describe how to
structure the implementation to ensure memory coalescing, as well as how to minimize the
number of memory transfers when working within a memory hierarchy.
7.5.1 Overview
We begin by explaining the insights necessary to parallelize the computation of both the
prover and the verifier for the implementation of the GKR protocol described in this chapter.
Parallelizing P’s computation
In every one of P ’s responses in the GKR protocol, the prescribed message from P
is defined via a large sum over roughly S3 terms, where S is the size of the circuit, and
so computing this sum naively would take Ω(S3) time. Roughly speaking, We observed in
Section 7.1 that each gate of the circuit contributes to only a single term of this sum, and
thus this sum can be computed via a single pass over the relevant gates. The contribution
of each gate to the sum can be computed in constant time, and each gate contributes to
logarithmically many messages over the course of the protocol. Using these observations
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Figure 7.3: Illustration of parallel computation of the server’s message to the client in the
GKR protocol.
carefully reduces P ’s runtime from Ω(S3), to O(S logS), where again S is the circuit size.
The same observation reveals that P ’s computation can be parallelized: each gate con-
tributes independently to the sum in P ’s prescribed response. Therefore, P can compute
the contribution of many gates in parallel, save the results in a temporary array, and use a
parallel reduction to sum the results. We stress that all arithmetic is done within the finite
field F, rather than over the integers. Figure 7.3 illustrates this process.
Parallelizing V’s computation
The bulk of V ’s computation (by far) consists of computing V˜d(r), an evaluation of the
multilinear extension of the input at a random point r ∈ Flogn. As observed in Lemma 6.3.1,
each input symbol contributes independently to V˜d(r). Thus, V can compute the contribution
of many input symbols in parallel, and sum the results via a parallel reduction, just as
in the parallel implementation of P ’s computation. This speedup is perhaps of secondary
importance, as V runs extremely quickly even in our sequential implementation. However,
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parallelizing V ’s computation is still an appealing goal, especially as GPUs are becoming
more common on personal computers and mobile devices.
7.5.2 Architectural considerations
The primary issue with any GPU-based implementation of the prover in the GKR pro-
tocol is that the computation is extremely memory-intensive: for a circuit of size S (which
corresponds to S arithmetic operations in an unverifiable algorithm), the prover in the GKR
protocol has to store all S gates explicitly, because she needs the values of these gates to
compute her prescribed messages. We investigate three alternative strategies for managing
the memory overhead of the GKR protocol, which we refer to as the no-copying approach,
the copy-once-per-layer approach, and the copy-every-message approach.
The no-copying approach
The simplest approach is to store the entire circuit explicitly on the GPU. We call this the
no-copying approach. However, this means that the entire circuit must fit in device memory,
a requirement which is violated even for relatively small circuits, consisting of roughly tens
of million of gates.
The copy-once-per-layer approach
Another approach is to keep the circuit in host memory and copy information to the
device only when it is needed. This is possible because at any point in the protocol the
prover operates on only two layers of the circuit at a time, so only two layers of the circuit
need to reside in device memory. We refer to this as the copy-once-per-layer approach. This
is the approach we use the experiments in Section 7.5.3.
Care must be taken with this approach to prevent host-to-device copying from becoming
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a bottleneck. Fortunately, in the protocol for each layer there are several dozen messages to
be computed before the prover moves on to the next layer, and this ensures that the copying
from host to device makes up a very small portion of the runtime.
This method is sufficient to scale to very large circuits for circuits in which no single
layer is significantly larger than the problem input itself. However, this method remains
problematic for circuits that have (one or several) layers that are particularly wide, as an
explicit representation of all the gates within a single wide layer may still be too large to fit
in device memory.
The copy-every-message approach
In the event that there are individual layers that are too large to reside in device memory,
a third approach is to copy part of a layer at a time from the host to the device, and compute
the contribution of each gate in the part to the prover’s message before swapping the part
back to host memory and bringing in the next part. We call this the copy-every-message
approach. This approach is viable, but it raises a significant issue, alluded to in its name.
Namely, this approach requires host-to-device copying for every message, rather than just
once per layer of the circuit. That is, in any iteration i of the protocol, P cannot compute
her jth message until after the (j−1)th challenge from V is received. Thus, for each message
j, the entirety of the ith layer must be loaded piece-by-piece into device memory, swapping
each piece back to host memory after the piece has been processed. In contrast, the copy-
once-per-layer approach allows P to copy an entire layer i to the device and leave the entire
layer in device memory for the entirety of iteration i (which will consist of several dozen
messages). Thus, the slowdown inherent in the copy-every-message approach is not just that
P has to break each layer into parts, but that P has to do host-to-device and device-to-host
copying for each message, instead of copying an entire layer and computing several messages
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from that layer.
We did not perform a careful evaluation of the copy-every-message approach, but prelim-
inary experiments suggest that this approach is viable in practice, resulting in less than a 3×
slowdown compared to the copy-once-per-layer approach. Notice that even after paying this
slowdown, our GPU-based implementation would still achieve a 10-40× speedup compared
to the sequential implementation described earlier in this chapter.
Memory access
Recall that for each message in the ith iteration of the GKR protocol, we assign a thread
to each gate g at the ith layer of the circuit, as each gate contributes independently to the
prescribed message of the prover. The contribution of gate g depends only on the index of
g, the indices of the two gates feeding into g, and the values of the two gates feeding into g.
Given this data, the contribution of gate g to the prescribed message can be computed
using roughly 10-20 additions and multiplications within the finite field F (the precise number
of arithmetic operations required varies over the course of the iteration). As described in
Section 7.3.3, we choose to work over a field that allows for extremely efficient arithmetic;
for example, multiplying two field elements requires three machine multiplications of 64-bit
data types, and a handful of additions and bit shifts.
In all of the circuits we consider, the indices of g’s in-neighbors can be determined with
very little arithmetic and no global memory accesses. For example, if the wiring pattern of
the circuit forms a binary tree, then the first in-neighbor of g has index 2 · index(g), and the
second in-neighbor of g has index 2 · index(g) + 1. For each message, the thread assigned to
g can compute this information from scratch without incurring any memory accesses.
In contrast, obtaining the values of g’s in-neighbors requires fetching 8 bytes per in-
neighbor from global memory. Memory accesses are necessary because it is infeasible to
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compute the value of each gate’s in-neighbors from scratch each message, so we store these
values explicitly. As these global memory accesses can be a bottleneck in the protocol, we
strive to arrange the data in memory to ensure that adjacent threads access adjacent memory
locations. To this end, for each layer i we maintain two separate arrays, with the j’th entry
of the first (respectively, second) array storing the first (respectively, second) in-neighbor
of the j’th gate at layer i. During iteration i, the thread assigned to the jth gate accesses
location j of the first and second array to retrieve the value of its first and second in-neighbors
respectively. This ensures that adjacent threads access adjacent memory locations.
For all layers, the corresponding arrays are populated with in-neighbor values when we
evaluate the circuit at the start of the protocol (we store each layer i’s arrays on the host until
the i’th iteration of the protocol, at which point we transfer the array from host memory
to device memory as describe in Section 7.3.3). Notice this methodology sometimes requires
data duplication: if many gates at layer i share the same in-neighbor g1, then g1’s value
will appear many times in layer i’s arrays. We feel that slightly increased space usage is a
reasonable price to pay to ensure memory coalescing.
7.5.3 GPU Evaluation
Implementation details
Except where noted, we performed our experiments on an Intel Xeon 3 GHz workstation
with 16 GB of host memory. Our workstation also has an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 480 GPU
with 1.5 GB of device memory. We implemented all our GPU code in CUDA and Thrust [65]
with all compiler optimizations turned on. Our source code is available online at [98]. We
remark that no floating point operations were necessary in any of our implementations,
because all arithmetic is done over finite fields. Finally, we stress that in all reported costs
below, we do count the time taken to copy data between the host and the device, and all
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reported speedups relative to sequential processing take this cost into account. We do not
count the time to allocate memory for scratch space because this can be done in advance.
We ran our GPU-based implementation of the GKR protocol on four separate circuits,
which together capture several different aspects of computation, from data aggregation to
search, to linear algebra. The first three problems we consider, F2,Distinct, andMatMult,
were described and evaluated earlier in the chapter, while the fourth problem, Pm, is a classic
search problem, and is motivated, for example, by clients wishing to store (and search) their
email on the cloud. Specifically, in the pattern matching problem, the input is a stream
representing text T = (t0, . . . , tn−1) ∈ [n]n and a pattern P = (p0, . . . , pq−1) ∈ [n]q, and the
pattern P is said to occur at location i in t if, for every position j in P , pj = ti+j. The
pattern-matching problem is to determine the number of locations at which P occurs in T .
Description of circuits
We briefly review the circuits for our benchmark problems.
The circuit for F2 is by far the simplest and was described earlier in the Chapter (see
Figure 6.1 for an illustration). This circuit computes the square of each input wire using a
layer of multiplication gates, and then sums the results using a single sum-gate of very large
fan-in.
The circuit for F0 was also described earlier: it exploits Fermat’s Little Theorem, which
says that for prime q, aq−1 ≡ 1 mod q if and only if a 6≡ 0. Thus, this circuit computes the
q − 1’th power of each input wire (taking all non-zero inputs to 1, and leaving all 0-inputs
at 0), and sums the results via a single sum-gate of high fan-in.
The circuit for Pm is similar to that for F0: essentially, for each possible location of the
pattern, it computes a value that is 0 if the pattern is at the location, and non-zero otherwise.
It then computes the (q − 1)th power of each such value and sums the results (i.e., it uses
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the F0 circuit as a subroutine) to determine the number of locations where the pattern does
(not) appear in the input.
For our GPU experiments, the MatMult circuit we experimented on in this section
differs slightly from the one used in Section 7.3.2. The circuit we use here is slightly more
complicated – the reason is that the GPU experiments reported on here were performed prior
to the matrix multiplication experiments reported on in Section 7.4, and it was not until later
that we realized it was possible to use the simpler circuit of Section 7.3.2. While the matrix
multiplication circuit we used for the experiments of this section is slightly more complicated
than necessary, our results on this problem nonetheless demonstrate the amenability of the
GKR protocol to parallelization.
Specifically, the circuit we use here contains a single output gate, rather than n2 output
gates as in Section 7.3.2. This circuit computes the n2 entries in C = A ·B via naive matrix
multiplication just like the circuit from Section 7.3.2, but then it subtracts the corresponding
entry of C from each. It then computes the number of non-zero values using the F0 circuit
as a subroutine. The final output of the circuit is zero if and only if C = AB.
Scaling to large inputs
As described in Section 7.5.2, the memory-intensive nature of the GKR protocol made it
challenging to scale to large inputs, especially given the limited amount of device memory.
Indeed, with the no-copying approach (where we simply keep the entire circuit in device
memory), we were only able to scale to inputs of size roughly 150, 000 for the F0 problem,
and to 32 × 32 matrices for the MatMult problem on a machine with 1 GB of device
memory. Using the copy-once-per-layer approach, we were able to scale to inputs with over
2 million entries for the F0 problem, and 128 × 128 matrices for the MatMult problem.
By running on a NVIDIA Tesla C2070 GPU with 6 GBs of device memory, we were able to
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of prover and verifier runtimes between our sequential implementa-
tion of the GKR protocol and our GPU-based implementation. Note that all plots are on a
log-log scale. Plots (a), (b), (c), and (d) depict the prover runtimes for F0, F2, Pm, MatMult
respectively. Plot (e) depicts the verifier runtimes for the GKR protocol. We include only one
plot for the verifier, since its dominant cost in the GKR protocol is problem-independent.
push to 256 × 256 matrices for the MatMult problem; the data from this experiment is
reported in Table 7.2.
Experimental Results
Figure 7.4 demonstrates the performance of our GPU-based implementation of the GKR
protocol. Table 7.2 also gives a succinct summary of our results, showing the costs for the
largest instance of each problem we ran on. We consider the main takeaways of our experi-
ments to be the following.
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Table 7.2: Experimental results for our GPU implementation of the GKR protocol.
Problem Input Size Circuit Size GPU P Sequential Circuit GPU Sequential Unverified
(number of (number of Time P Time Eval V Time V Time Alg.
entries) gates) (s) (s) Time (s) (s) (s) Time (s)
F2 8.4 million 25.2 million 3.7 424.6 0.1 0.035 3.600 0.028
Distinct 2.1 million 255.8 million 128.5 8,268.0 4.2 0.009 0.826 0.005
Pm 524,288 76.0 million 38.9 1,893.1 1.2 0.004 0.124 0.006
MatMult 65,536 42.3 million 39.6 1,658.0 0.9 0.003 0.045 0.080
Server-side speedup obtained by GPU computing. Compared to the our sequential
implementation described earlier in the chapter, our GPU-based server implementation ran
close to 115× faster for the F2 circuit, about 60× faster for the F0 circuit, 45× faster for
Pm, and about 40× faster for MatMult (see Figure 7.4).
Notice that for the first three problems, we need to look at large inputs to see the
asymptotic behavior of the curve corresponding to the parallel prover’s runtime. Due to the
log-log scale in Figure 7.4, the curves for both the sequential and parallel implementations are
asymptotically linear, and the 45-120× speedup obtained by our GPU-based implementation
is manifested as an additive gap between the two curves. The explanation for this is simple:
there is considerable overhead relative to the total computation time in parallelizing the
computation at small inputs, but this overhead is more effectively amortized as the input
size grows.
In contrast, notice that for MatMult the slope of the curve for the parallel prover
remains significantly smaller than that of the sequential prover throughout the entire plot.
This is because our GPU-based implementation ran out of device memory well before the
overhead in parallelizing the prover’s computation became negligible. We therefore believe
the speedup for MatMult would be somewhat higher than the 40× speedup observed if we
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were able to run on larger inputs.
Server-side slowdown relative to unverifiable sequential algorithms. For F2, the
total slowdown for the prover was roughly 130× (3.7 seconds compared to 0.028 seconds
for the unverifiable algorithm, which simply iterates over all entries of the frequency vector
and computes the sum of the squares of each entry). We stress that it is likely that we
overestimate the slowdown resulting from our protocol, because we did not count the time
it takes for the unverifiable implementation to compute the number of occurrences of each
item i, that is, to aggregate the stream into its frequency vector representation (f1, . . . , fn).
Instead, we simply generated the vector of frequencies at random (we did not count the
generation time), and calculated the time to compute the sum of their squares. In practice,
this aggregation step may take much longer than the time required to compute the sum of
the squared frequencies once the stream is in aggregated form.
For Distinct, our GPU-based server implementation ran roughly 25,000× slower than
the obvious unverifiable algorithm which simply counts the number of non-zero items in a
vector. The larger slowdown compared to the F2 problem is unsurprising. Since Distinct is
a less arithmetic problem than F2, its circuit representation is much larger. Once again, it is
likely that we overestimate the slowdowns for this problem, as we did not count the time for
an unverifiable algorithm to aggregate the stream into its frequency-vector representation.
Despite the substantial slow-down incurred for F0 compared to a naive unverifiable algo-
rithm, it remains valuable as a primitive for use in heavier-duty computations like Pm and
MatMult.
For Pm, the bulk of the circuit consists of a Distinct sub-routine, and so the runtime of
our GPU-based implementation was similar to those for Distinct. However, the sequential
unverifiable algorithm for Pm takes longer than that for Distinct. Thus, our GPU-based
server implementation ran roughly 6,500× slower than the naive unverifiable algorithm,
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which exhaustively searches all possible locations for occurrences of the pattern.
For MatMult, our GPU-based server implementation ran roughly 500× slower than
naive matrix-multiplication for 256× 256 matrices. Moreover, this number is likely inflated
due to cache effects from which the naive unverifiable algorithm benefited. That is, the naive
unverifiable algorithm takes only 0.09 seconds for 256× 256 matrices, but takes 7.1 seconds
for 512 × 512 matrices, likely because the algorithm experiences very few cache misses on
the smaller matrix. We therefore expect the slowdown of our implementation to fall to under
100× if we were to scale to larger matrices. Furthermore, the GKR protocol is capable
of verifying matrix-multiplication over the finite field Fq rather than over the integers at
no additional cost. Naive matrix-multiplication over this field is between 2-3× slower than
matrix multiplication over the integers (even using the fast arithmetic operations available
for this field). Thus, if our goal was to work over this finite field rather than the integers, our
slowdown would fall by another 2-3×. It is therefore possible that our server-side slowdown
may be less than 50× at larger inputs compared to naive matrix multiplication over Fq.
Client-side speedup obtained by GPU computing. The bulk of V ’s computation con-
sists of evaluating the multilinear extension of the input at a point; this computation is inde-
pendent of the circuit being verified. For reasonably large inputs (see the row for F2 in Table
7.2), our GPU-based client implementation performed this computation over 100× faster
than the sequential implementation described earlier in this Chapter. For smaller inputs the
speedup was unsurprisingly smaller due to increased overhead relative to total computation
time. Still, we obtained a 15× speedup even for an input of length 65,536 (256× 256 matrix
multiplication).
Client-side speedup relative to unverifiable sequential algorithms. Our results on
matrix multiplication clearly demonstrate that for problems requiring super-linear time to
solve, even the sequential implementation of described earlier in the chapter will save the
191
client time compared to doing the computation locally. Indeed, the runtime of the client is
dominated by the cost of evaluating the multilinear extension of the input at a single point,
and this cost grows quasi-linearly with the input size. Even for relatively small matrices of
size 256 × 256, the client in our sequential implementation saved time. For matrices with
tens of millions of entries, our results demonstrate that the client will still take just a few
seconds, while performing the matrix multiplication computation would require orders of
magnitude more time. Our results demonstrate that GPU computing can be used to reduce
the verifier’s computation time by another 100×.
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Chapter 8
Time-Optimal Interactive Proofs for
Circuit Evaluation
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 7, we showed how to implement the prover in the GKR protocol in time
O(S logS), where S is the size of an arithmetic circuit computing the function of interest. In
this chapter, we describe further refinements to the GKR protocol, which apply to circuits
with sufficiently “regular” wiring patterns; for these circuits, we bring the runtime of the
prover down to O(S). That is, our prover can evaluate the circuit with a guarantee of cor-
rectness, with only a constant-factor blowup in work compared to evaluating the circuit with
no guarantee. The log S factor we save over the implementation of Chapter 7 is significant
– easily a factor of 20 even for circuits with a just a few million gates – and our approach
also leads to significant reductions in the communication costs and the number of rounds of
interaction required by the protocol.
We argue that our refinements capture a large class of circuits, and we complement our
theoretical results with experiments on problems such as matrix multiplication and deter-
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mining the number of distinct elements in a data stream. Experimentally, our refinements
yield a 200x speedup for the prover over the implementation of Chapter 7, and our prover
is less than 10x slower than a C++ program that simply evaluates the circuit. Moreover,
a parallel implementation of our prover using a graphics processing unit (GPU) is roughly
30x faster than our serial implementation, and therefore takes less time than that required
to evaluate the circuit in serial.
We also make progress toward addressing another issue of existing interactive proof im-
plementations: their applicability. The GKR protocol applies in principle to any problem
computed by a small-depth arithmetic circuit, but this is not the case when more fine-grained
considerations of prover and verifier efficiency are taken into account. In brief, existing im-
plementations of interactive proof protocols for circuit evaluation such as that of Chapter
7 as well as that by Vu et al. [104] all require that the circuit have a highly regular wiring
pattern. If this is not the case, then these implementations require the verifier to perform
an expensive (though data-independent) preprocessing phase to pull out information about
the wiring of the circuit, and they require a substantial factor blowup (logarithmic in the
circuit size) in runtime for the prover relative to evaluating the circuit without a guarantee
of correctness. Developing a protocol that avoids these pitfalls and applies to more general
computations remains an important open question.
Our approach is the following. We do not have a magic bullet for dealing with irregular
wiring patterns; if we want to avoid an expensive pre-processing phase for the verifier and
minimize the blowup in runtime for the prover, we do need to make an assumption about
the structure of the circuit we are verifying. Acknowledging this, we ask whether there is
some general structure in real-world computations that we can leverage for efficiency gains.
To this end, we design a protocol that is highly efficient for data parallel computation.
By data parallel computation, we mean any setting in which one applies the same computa-
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tion independently to many pieces of data. Many outsourced computations are data parallel,
with Amazon Elastic MapReduce1 being one prominent example of a cloud computing ser-
vice targeted specifically at data parallel computations. Crucially, we do not want to make
significant assumptions on the sub-computation that is being applied, and in particular we
want to handle sub-computations computed by circuits with highly irregular wiring patterns.
The verifier in our protocol still has to perform an oﬄine phase to pull out information
about the wiring of the circuit, but the cost of this phase is proportional to the size of a
single instance of the sub-computation, avoiding any dependence on the number of pieces of
data to which the sub-computation is applied. Similarly, the blowup in runtime suffered by
the prover is the same as it would be if the prover had run the basic GKR protocol on a
single instance of the sub-computation.
Our final contribution is to describe a new protocol specific to matrix multiplication that
we believe to be of interest in its own right. This protocol is formalized in Theorem 8.7.2.
Given any unverifiable algorithm for n × n matrix multiplication that requires time T (n)
using space s(n), Theorem 8.7.2 allows the prover to run in time T (n) + O(n2) using space
s(n)+o(n2). Note that Theorem 8.7.2 (which is specific to matrix multiplication) is much less
general than Theorem 8.4.10 (which applies to any circuit with a sufficiently regular wiring
pattern). However, Theorem 8.7.2 achieves optimal runtime and space usage for the prover up
to leading constants, assuming there is no O(n2) time algorithm for matrix multiplication.
While these properties are also satisfied by a classic protocol due to Freivalds [53], the
protocol of Theorem 8.7.2 is significantly more amenable for use as a primitive when verifying
computations that repeatedly invoke matrix multiplication. For example, using the protocol
of Theorem 8.7.2 as a primitive, we give a natural protocol for computing the diameter of
an unweighted directed graph G. V ’s runtime in this protocol is O(m log n), where m is the
1http://aws.amazon.com/elasticmapreduce/
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number of edges in G, P ’s runtime matches the best known unverifiable diameter algorithm
up to a low-order additive term [89,107], and the total communication is just polylog (n). We
know of no other protocol achieving this. We complement Theorem 8.7.2 with experimental
results demonstrating its efficiency.
8.1.1 Roadmap for Chapter
We give a high-level overview of the ideas underlying our main results in Section 8.2.
Section 8.3 describes technical background. Section 8.4 contains the details of our time-
optimal protocol for circuit evaluation as formalized in Theorem 8.4.10. Section 8.5 describes
our experimental cases studies of the protocol described in Theorem 8.4.10. Section 8.6
describes our protocol for arbitrary data parallel computation. Section 8.7 describes some
additional optimizations that apply to specific important wiring patterns. In particular, this
section describes our special-purpose protocol for MatMult that achieves optimal prover
efficiency up to leading constants. Section 8.8 concludes.
8.2 Overview of the Ideas
8.2.1 Achieving Optimal Prover Runtime for Regular Circuits
In Theorem 8.4.10, we describe an interactive proof protocol for circuit evaluation that
brings P ’s runtime down to O(S(n)) for a large class of circuits, while maintaining the same
verifier runtime as in prior implementations of the GKR protocol. Informally, Theorem 8.4.10
applies to any circuit whose wiring pattern is sufficiently “regular”.
This protocol follows the same general outline as the GKR protocol, in that we proceed in
iterations from the output layer of the circuit to the input layer, using a sum-check protocol
at iteration i to reduce a claim about the gate values at layer i to a claim about the gate
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values at layer i + 1. However, at each iteration i we apply the sum-check protocol to a
carefully chosen polynomial that differs from the one used by GKR. In each round j of the
sum-check protocol, our choice of polynomial allows P to reuse work from prior rounds in
order to compute the prescribed message for round j, allowing us to shave a logS(n) factor
from the runtime of P relative to the O(S(n) logS(n))-time implementation of Chapter 7.
Specifically, at iteration i, the GKR protocol uses a polynomial f
(i)
z defined over logSi +
2 logSi+1 variables, where Si is the number of gates at layer i. The “truth table” of f
(i)
z is
sparse on the Boolean hypercube, in the sense that f
(i)
z (x) is non-zero for at most Si of the
Si · S2i+1 inputs x ∈ {0, 1}logSi+2 logSi+1 . In Chapter 7, we leveraged this sparsity to bring the
runtime of P in iteration i down to O(Si logSi) from a naive bound of Ω(Si ·S2i+1). The logSi
factor was due to the fact that P needed to make a pass over all of the gates at layer i for
each of the logSi rounds of the sum-check protocol. However, this same sparsity prevents P
from reusing work from prior iterations as we seek to do.
In contrast, we use a polynomial g
(i)
z defined over only logSi variables rather than logSi+
2 logSi+1 variables. Moreover, the truth table of g
(i)
z is dense on the Boolean hypercube, in
the sense that g
(i)
z (x) may be non-zero for all of the Si Boolean inputs x ∈ {0, 1}logSi . This
density allows P to reuse work from prior iterations in order to speed up her computation
in round i of the sum-check protocol.
In more detail, in each round j of the sum-check protocol, the prover’s prescribed mes-
sage is defined via a sum over a large number of terms, where the number of terms falls
geometrically fast with the round number j. Moreover, it can be shown that in each round j,
each gate at layer i+ 1 contributes to exactly one term of this sum. Essentially, what we do
is group the gates at layer i+ 1 by the term of the sum to which they contribute. Each such
group can be treated as a single unit, ensuring that in any round of the sum-check protocol,
the amount of work P needs to do is proportional to the number of terms in the sum rather
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than the number of gates Si at layer i.
We remark that a similar “reuse of work” technique was used in Theorem 6.4.2, which
gave an efficient special-purpose protocol for the the second frequency moment problem.
This frequency moment protocol was the direct inspiration for our refinements, though we
require additional insights to apply the reuse of work technique in the context of evaluating
general arithmetic circuits.
It is worth clarifying why our methods do not yield savings when applied to the poly-
nomial f
(i)
z used in the basic GKR protocol. The reason is that, since f
(i)
z is defined over
logSi + 2 logSi+1 variables instead of just logSi variables, the sum defining P ’s message in
round j is over a much larger number of terms when using f
(i)
z . It is still the case that each
gate contributes to only one term of the sum, but until the number of terms in the sum falls
below Si (which does not happen until round j = logSi+logSi+1 of the sum-check protocol),
it is possible for each gate to contribute to a different term. Before this point, grouping gates
by the term of the sum to which they contribute is not useful, since each group can have size
1.
8.2.2 Verifying General Data Parallel Computations
Theorem 8.4.10 below only applies to circuits with regular wiring patterns, as do other
existing implementations of interactive proof protocols for circuit evaluation [39, 104]. For
circuits with irregular wiring patterns, these implementations require the verifier to perform
an expensive preprocessing phase (requiring time proportional to the size of the circuit) to
pull out information about the wiring of the circuit, and they require a substantial factor
blowup (logarithmic in the circuit size) in runtime for the prover relative to evaluating the
circuit without a guarantee of correctness.
To address these bottlenecks, we do need to make an assumption about the structure
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of the circuit we are verifying. Ideally our assumption will be satisfied by many real-world
computations. To this end, Theorem 8.6.1 will describe a protocol that is highly efficient
for any data parallel computation, by which we mean any setting in which one applies the
same computation independently to many pieces of data. See Figure 8.2 in Section 8.6 for a
schematic of a data parallel computation.
The idea behind Theorem 8.6.1 is as follows. Let C be a circuit of size S with an arbitrary
wiring pattern, and let C∗ be a “super-circuit” that applies C independently to B different
inputs before possibly aggregating the results in some fashion. If one naively applied the
basic GKR protocol to the super-circuit C∗, V might have to perform a pre-processing phase
that requires time proportional to the size of C∗, which is Ω(B ·S). Moreover, when applying
the basic GKR protocol to C∗, P would require time Θ (B · S · log(B · S)).
In order to improve on this, the key observation is that although each sub-computation
C can have a complicated wiring pattern, the circuit is “maximally regular” between sub-
computations, as the sub-computations do not interact at all. Therefore, each time the basic
GKR protocol would apply the sum-check protocol to a polynomial derived from the wiring
predicate of C∗, we instead use a simpler polynomial derived only from the wiring predicate
of C. This immediately brings the time required by V in the pre-processing phase down to
O(S), which is proportional to the cost of executing a single instance of the sub-computation.
By using the reuse of work technique underlying Theorem 8.4.10, we are also able to bring
P ’s runtime down from Θ (B · S · log(B · S)) to Θ (B · S · logS), i.e., P ’s requires a factor
of O(logS) more time to evaluate the circuit with a guarantee of correctness, compared
to evaluating the circuit without such a guarantee. This O(logS) factor overhead does not
depend on the batch size B.
Our improvements are most significant when B  S, i.e., when a (relatively) small but
potentially complicated sub-computation is applied to a very large number of pieces of data.
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For example, given any very large database, one may ask “How many people in the database
satisfy Property P?” Our protocol allows one to verifiably outsource such counting queries
with overhead that depends minimally on the size of the database, but that necessarily
depends on the complexity of the property P .
8.2.3 A Special-Purpose Protocol for MatMult
We describe a special-purpose protocol for n× n MatMult in Theorem 8.7.2. The idea
behind this protocol is as follows. The GKR protocol, as well the protocols of Theorems
8.4.10 and 8.6.1, only make use of the multilinear extension V˜i of the function Vi mapping
gate labels at layer i of the circuit to their values. In some cases, there is something to be
gained by using a higher-degree extension of Vi, and this is precisely what we exploit here.
In more detail, our special-purpose protocol can be viewed as an extension of our circuit-
checking techniques applied to a circuit C performing naive matrix multiplication, but using a
quadratic extension of the gate values in this circuit. This allows us to verify the computation
using a single invocation of the sum-check protocol. More importantly, P can evaluate this
higher-degree extension at the necessary points without explicitly materializing all of the
gate values of C, which would not be possible if we had used the multilinear extension of
the gate values of C.
In the protocol of Theorem 8.7.2, P just needs to compute the correct output (possibly
using an algorithm that is much more sophisticated than naive matrix multiplication), and
then perform O(n2) additional work to prove the output is correct. Since P does not have to
evaluate C in full, this protocol is perhaps best viewed outside the lens of circuit evaluation.
Still, the idea underlying Theorem 8.7.2 can be thought of as a refinement of our circuit
evaluation protocols, and we believe that similar ideas may yield further improvements to
general-purpose protocols in the future.
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8.3 Technical Background: Making V Fast vs.
Making V Streaming
Prior work has identified two methods for implementing the verifier in the GKR protocol.
We described the first method in Lemma 6.3.1. If the circuit to which the protocol is applied
is defined over the finite field F, and addition and multiplication in F require a constant
number of machine operations, then the method of Lemma 6.3.1 requires O(n log n) time
and allows V to make a single streaming pass over the input using O(log n log |F|) bits of
space. The second method is due to Vu et al. [104]. It enables V to compute V˜d(ω∗) in O(n)
time, but requires V to use O(n log |F|) bits of space. (Recall from Chapter 5 that V˜d is the
multilinear extension of the input. We use the notation introduced there throughout this
chapter).
Lemma 8.3.1 (Vu et al. [104]). Let x ∈ Fn be the input to an arithmetic circuit C over
F, and let V˜d be the multilinear extension of the function that maps i ∈ {0, 1}logn to the ith
entry of x. V can compute V˜d(ω∗) in O(n) time while using O(n log |F|) bits of space.
Proof. We again exploit the expression for V˜d(ω
∗) in Equation (6.2). Notice the right hand
side of Equation (6.2) expresses V˜d(ω
∗) as the inner product of two n-dimensional vectors,
where the bth entry of the first vector is Vd(b) and the bth entry of the second vector is
χb(ω
∗). This inner product can be computed in O(n) time given a table of size n whose bth
entry contains the quantity χb(ω
∗). Vu et al. show how to build such a table in time O(n)
using memoization – we used this same memoization procedure in Section 7.2.3 to ensure
that the prover in the GKR protocol runs quickly in the “reducing to verification of a single
point” phase.
The memoization procedure consists of log n stages, where Stage j constructs a table
A(j) of size 2j, such that for any (b1, . . . , bj) ∈ {0, 1}j, A(j)[(b1, . . . , bj)] =
∏j
i=1 χbi(ω
∗
i ).
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Notice A(j)[(b1, . . . , bj)] = A
(j−1)[(b1, . . . , bj−1)] · χbj(ω∗j ), and so the jth stage of the mem-
oization procedure requires time O(2j). The total time across all log n stages is therefore
O(
∑logn
j=1 2
j) = O(2logn) = O(n). This completes the proof.
Remark 4. In [103], Vu et al. further observe that if the input is presented in a specific
order, then V can evaluate V˜d(ω∗) using O(log n log |F|) bits of space. Compare this result to
Lemma 6.3.1, which requires O(n log n) time for V , but allows V to use O(log n log |F|) bits
of space regardless of the order in which the input is presented.
8.4 Time-Optimal Protocols for Circuit Evaluation
8.4.1 Protocol Outline and Section Roadmap
As with the GKR protocol, our protocol consists of d(n) iterations, one for each layer of
the circuit. Each iteration starts with P claiming a value for V˜i(z) for some value z ∈ Fsi . The
purpose of the iteration is to reduce this claim to a claim about V˜i+1(ω) for some ω ∈ Fsi+1 ,
in the sense that it is safe for V to assume that the first claim is true as long as the second
claim is true. As in the GKR protocol, this is done by invoking the sum-check protocol on a
certain polynomial.
In order to improve on the costs of the GKR protocol implementation of Chapter 7, we
replace the polynomial f
(i)
z in Equation (5.1) with a different polynomial g
(i)
z defined over a
much smaller domain. Specifically, g
(i)
z is defined over only si variables rather than si + 2si+1
variables as is the case of f
(i)
z . Using g
(i)
z in place of f
(i)
z allows P to reuse work across
iterations of the sum-check protocol, thereby reducing P ’s runtime by a logarithmic factor
relative to the implementation of Chapter 7, as formalized in Theorem 8.4.10 below.
The remainder of the presentation leading up to Theorem 8.4.10 proceeds as follows. After
stating a preliminary lemma, we describe the polynomial g
(i)
z that we use in the context
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of three specific circuits: a binary tree of addition or multiplication gates, and a circuit
computing the number of non-zero entries of an n-dimensional vector a. The purpose of this
exposition is to showcase the ideas underling Theorem 8.4.10 in concrete scenarios. Second,
we explain the algorithmic insights that allow P to reuse work across iterations of the sum-
check protocol applied to g
(i)
z . Finally, we state and prove Theorem 8.4.10, which formalizes
the class of circuits to which our methods apply.
8.4.2 A Preliminary Lemma
We will repeatedly invoke the following lemma, which allows us to express the value
V˜i(z) in a manner amenable to verification via the sum-check protocol. This is essentially a
restatement of [85, Lemma 3.2.1].
Lemma 8.4.1. Let W be any polynomial Fsi → F that extends Vi, in the sense that for all
p ∈ {0, 1}si, W (p) = Vi(p). Then for any z ∈ Fsi,
V˜i(z) =
∑
p∈{0,1}si
βsi(z, p)W (p). (8.1)
Proof. It is easy to check that the right hand side of Equation (8.1) is a multilinear polynomial
in z, and that it agrees with Vi on all Boolean inputs. Thus, the right hand side of Equation
(8.1), viewed as a polynomial in z, must be the multilinear extension V˜i of Vi. This completes
the proof.
8.4.3 Polynomials for Specific Circuits
The Polynomial for a Binary Tree
Consider a circuit C that computes the product of all n of its inputs by multiplying them
together via a binary tree. Label the gates at layers i and i + 1 in the natural way, so that
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the first input to the gate labelled p = (p1, . . . , psi) ∈ {0, 1}si at layer i is the gate with label
(p, 0) at layer i − 1, and the second input to gate p has label (p, 1). Here and throughout,
(p, 0) denotes the si + 1-dimensional vector obtained by concatenating the entry 0 to the
end of the vector p. Interpreting p = (p1, . . . , psi) ∈ {0, 1}si as an integer between 0 and
2si − 1 with p1 as the high-order bit and psi as the low-order bit, this says that the first
in-neighbor of p is 2p and the second is 2p + 1. It follows immediately that for any gate
p ∈ {0, 1}si at layer i, Vi(p) = V˜i+1(p, 0) · V˜i+1(p, 1). Invoking Lemma 8.4.1, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 8.4.2. Let C be a circuit consisting of a binary tree of multiplication gates.
Then V˜i(z) =
∑
p∈{0,1}si g
(i)
z (p), where g
(i)
z (p) = βsi(z, p) · V˜i+1(p, 0) · V˜i+1(p, 1).
Remark 5. Notice that the polynomial g
(i)
z in Proposition 8.4.2 is a degree three polynomial
in each variable of p. When applying the sum-check protocol to g
(i)
z , the prover therefore needs
to send 4 field elements per round.
In the case of Proposition 8.4.2, the line ` : F → F2i+1 in the “Reducing to Verification
of a Single Point” step has an especially simple expression. Let r ∈ Fsi be the vector of
random field elements chosen by V over the execution of the sum-check protocol. Notice that
`(0) must equal the point (r, 0) ∈ Fsi+1 i.e., the point whose first si coordinates equal r and
whose last coordinate equals 0. Similarly, `(1) must equal (r, 1). We may therefore express
the line ` via the equation `(t) = (r, t). In this case, V˜i+1 ◦ ` has degree 1 and is implicitly
specified when P sends the claimed values of V˜i(r, 0) and V˜i(r, 1).
The case of a binary tree of addition gates is similar to the case of multiplication gates.
Proposition 8.4.3. Let C be a circuit consisting of a binary tree of addition gates. Then
V˜i(z) =
∑
p∈{0,1}si g
(i)
z (p), where g
(i)
z (p) = βsi(z, p)
(
V˜i+1(p, 0) + V˜i+1(p, 1)
)
.
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Remark 6. The polynomial g
(i)
z of Proposition 8.4.3 has degree 2 in all variables, rather
than degree 3 as in Proposition 8.4.2.
The Polynomials for DISTINCT
We now describe a circuit C for computing the number of non-zero entries of a vector
f ∈ Fn (this vector should be interpreted as the frequency vector of a data stream). A
similar circuit was used in conjunction with the GKR protocol in Chapter 7 to yield an
efficient protocol with a streaming verifier for Distinct, and we borrow heavily from the
presentation there. We remark that our refinements enable us to slightly simplify the circuit
used in Chapter 7 by avoiding the awkward use of a constant-valued input wire with value
set to 1. This causes some gates in our circuit to have fan-in 1 rather than fan-in 2, which is
easily supported by our protocol.
The circuit C is tailored for use over the field of cardinality equal to a Mersenne prime
q = 2k−1 for some k. Fields of cardinality equal to a Mersenne prime can support extremely
fast arithmetic, and as discussed in Section 7.3.3, there are several Mersenne primes of
appropriate magnitude for use within our protocols.
The circuit C exploits Fermat’s Little Theorem, computing f q−1i for each input entry
fi before summing the results. As described in Section 7.3.3, verifying the summation sub-
circuit can be handled with a one invocation of the sum-check protocol, or less efficiently by
running our protocol for a binary tree of addition gates described in Proposition 8.4.3.
We now turn to describing the part of the circuit computing f q−1i for each input entry
fi. We may write q − 1 = 2k − 2, whose binary representation is k − 1 1s followed by a 0.
Thus, f q−1i =
∏k−1
j=1 f
2j
i . To compute f
q−1
i , the circuit repeatedly squares f , and multiplies
together the results “as it goes”. In more detail, for j > 2 there are two multiplication gates
at each layer d(n)− j of the circuit for computing f q−1i ; the first computes f 2j by squaring
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Figure 8.1: The first several layers of a circuit for F0 on four inputs over the field F with
q = 2k − 1 elements. The first layer from the bottom computes f 2i for each input entry fi.
The second layer from the bottom computes f 4i and f
2
i for all i. The third layer computes
f 8i and f
6
i = f
4
i × f 2i , while the fourth layer computes f 16i and f 14i = f 8i × f 6i . The remaining
layers (not shown) have structure identical to the third and fourth layers until the value f q−1i
is computed for all i, and the circuit culminates in a binary tree of addition gates.
the corresponding gate at layer j − 1, and the second computes ∏j−1`=1 f 2`−1i . See Figure 8.1
for a depiction.
For our purposes there are k + 1 relevant circuit layers, all of which consist entirely of
multiplication gates. Layers 1 through k − 1 all contain 2n gates. Number the gates from 0
to 2n − 1 in the natural way. In what follows, we will abuse notation and use p to refer to
both a gate number as well as its binary representation.
An even-numbered gate p at layer i has both in-wires connected to gate p at layer i+ 1,
while an odd-numbered gate p has one in-wire connected to gate p and another connected to
gate p−1. Thus, the connectivity information of the circuit is a simple function of the binary
representation p of each gate at layer i. If the low-order bit psi of p is 0 (i.e., it is an even-
numbered gate), then both in-neighbors at layer i + 1 of gate p have binary representation
p. If the low-order bit psi is 1 (i.e., it is an odd-numbered gate), then the first in-neighbor of
gate p has binary representation p, and the second has binary representation (p−si , 0), where
p−si denotes p with the coordinate psi removed.
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Invoking Lemma 8.4.1, the following proposition is easily verified.
Proposition 8.4.4. Let C be the circuit described above. For layers i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},
V˜i(z) =
∑
p∈{0,1}si g
(i)
z (p) where
g(i)z (p) = βsi(z, p)
(
(1− psi)V˜i+1(p−si , 0) · V˜i+1(p−si , 0) + psi V˜i+1(p−si , 1) · V˜i+1(p−si , 0)
)
,
where p−si denotes p with the coordinate psi removed.
Remark 7. To check P ’s claim in the final round of the sum-check protocol applied to g(i)z ,
V needs to know V˜i+1(r, 0) and V˜i+1(r, 1) for some random vector r ∈ Fsi−1. This is identical
to the situation in the case of a binary tree of addition or multiplication gates, where the
“Reducing to Verification of a Single Point” step had an especially simple implementation.
At layer k, an even-numbered gate p has both in-wires connected to gate p/2 at layer
k + 1, while an odd-numbered gate p has its unique in-wire connected to gate (p − 1)/2 at
layer k + 1. Thus, for a gate at layer i = k, if the the low-order bit psi of the gate’s binary
representation p is 1 (i.e., it is an odd-numbered gate), then both in-neighbors at layer i+ 1
of have binary representation p−si . If the low-order bit psi is 0 (i.e., it is an even numbered
gate), then the unique in-neighbor of p at layer i+ 1 has binary representation p−si .
Invoking Lemma 8.4.1, the following is easily verified.
Proposition 8.4.5. Let C be the circuit described above. For layer i = k,
V˜i(z) =
∑
p∈{0,1}si g
(i)
z (p) where
g(i)z (p) = βsi(z, p)
(
(1− psi)V˜i+1(p−si) · V˜i+1(p−si) + psiV˜i+1(p−si)
)
,
where p−si denotes p with coordinate psi removed.
Finally, at layer k + 1, each gate p has both in-wires connected to gate p at layer k + 2
(which is the input layer). Thus:
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Proposition 8.4.6. Let C be the circuit described above. For layer i = k + 1, V˜i(z) =∑
p∈{0,1}si g
(i)
z (p) where
g(i)z (p) = βsi(z, p)V˜i+1(p) · V˜i+1(p).
8.4.4 Reusing Work
Recall that our analysis of the costs of the sum-check protocol in Section 2.3 revealed
that, when applying a sum-check protocol to an si-variate polynomial g
(i)
z , P only needs to
evaluate g
(i)
z at O(2si) points across all rounds of the protocol. Our goal in this section is to
show how P can do this in time O(2si + 2si+1) = O(Si + Si+1) for all of the polynomials g(i)z
described in Section 8.4.3. This is sufficient to ensure that P takes O(∑d(n)i=1 Si) = O(S(n))
time across all iterations of our circuit-checking protocol.
To this end, notice that all of the polynomials gz described in Propositions 8.4.2-8.4.6 have
the following property: for any r ∈ Fsi , evaluating g(i)z (r) can be done in constant time given
β(z, r) and the evaluations of V˜i+1 at a constant number of points. For example, consider
the polynomial g
(i)
z described in Proposition 8.4.4: g
(i)
z (r) can be computed in constant time
given βsi(z, r), V˜i+1(r−si , 0), and V˜i+1(r−si , 1).
Moreover, the points at which P must evaluate g(i)z within the sum-check protocol are
highly structured: in round j of the sum-check protocol, the points are all of the form
(r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi) with t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , degj(g(i)z )} and (bj+1, . . . , bsi) ∈ {0, 1}si−j.
Computing the Necessary β(z, p) Values
Pre-processing. We begin by explaining how P can, in O(2si) time, compute an array C(0)
of length 2si of all values β(z, p) =
∏si
k=1(pkzk + (1− pk)(1− zk)) for p ∈ {0, 1}si . P can do
this computation in preprocessing before the sum-check protocol begins, as this computation
does not depend on any of V ’s messages. Naively, computing all entries of C(0) would require
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O(si2
si) time, as there are 2si values to compute, and each involves Ω(si) multiplications.
However, this can be improved using dynamic programming.
The dynamic programming algorithm proceeds in stages. In stage j, P computes an
array C(0,j) of length 2j. Abusing notation, we identify a number p in [2j] with its binary
representation in {0, 1}j. P computes
C0,j[p] =
j∏
k=1
(pkzk + (1− pk)(1− zk))
via the recurrence
C0,j[(p1, . . . , pj)] = C
0,j−1[(p1, . . . , pj−1)] · (pjzj + (1− pj)(1− zj)).
Clearly C(0,si) equals the desired array C(0), and the total number of multiplications required
over the entire procedure is O(
∑si
j=1 2
j) = O(2si). We remark that our dynamic programming
procedure is similar to the method used by Vu et al. to reduce the verifier’s runtime in the
GKR protocol from O(n log n) to O(n) in Lemma 8.3.1.
Overview of Online Processing. In round j of of the sum-check protocol, P needs to evaluate
the polynomial β(z, p) at O(2si−j) points, all of which are of the form
(r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi) for t ∈ [degj(g(i)z )] and (bj+1, . . . , bsi) ∈ {0, 1}si−j. P will do this
using the help of intermediate arrays C(j) defined as follows.
Define C(j) to be the array of length 2si−j such that for (pj+1, . . . , psi) ∈ {0, 1}si−j:
C(j)[(pj+1, . . . , psi)] =
(
j∏
k=1
(rkzk + (1− rk)(1− zk))
)
·
 si∏
k=j+1
(pkzk + (1− pk)(1− zk))
 ,
Efficiently Constructing C(j) Arrays. Inductively, assume P has computed the array C(j−1)
in the previous round. As the base case, we explained how P can evaluate C(0) in O(2si)
time in pre-processing. Now observe that P can compute C(j) given C(j−1) in O(2si−j) time
using the following recurrence:
C(j)[(pj+1, . . . , psi)] = z
−1
j C
(j−1)[(1, pj+1, . . . , psi)] · (rjzj + (1− rj)(1− zj)). (8.2)
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Remark 8. Equation (8.2) is only valid when zj 6= 0. To avoid this issue, we can have V
choose zj at random from F∗ rather than from F, and this will affect the soundness probability
by at most an additive O(d(n) · logS(n)/|F|) term.
Remark 9. Since computing multiplicative inverses in a finite field is not a constant-time
operation, it is important to note that z−1j only needs to be computed once when determining
the entries of C(j), i.e., it need not be recomputed for each entry of C(j). Therefore, across
all si rounds of the sum-check protocol, only O˜(si) time in total is required to compute these
multiplicative inverses, which does not affect the asymptotic costs for P . We discount the
costs of computing z−1j for the remainder of the discussion.
Thus, at the end of round j of the sum-check protocol, when V sends P the value rj, P
can compute C(j) from C(j−1) using Equation (8.2) in O(2si−j) time.
Using the C(j) Arrays. Observe that given any point of the form
p = (r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi) with (bj+1, . . . , bsi) ∈ {0, 1}si−j, β(z, p) can be evaluated in
constant time using the array C(j−1), using the equality
β(z, p) = C(j−1)[(1, pj+1, . . . , psi)] · z−1j · (tzj + (1− t)(1− zj)).
As above, note that z−1j can be computed just once and used for all points p, and this
does not affect the asymptotic costs for P .
Putting Things Together. In round j of the sum-check protocol, P uses the array C(j−1) to
evaluate the O(2si−j) required β(z, p) values in O(2si−j) time. At the end of round j, V sends
P the value rj, and P computes C(j) from C(j−1) in O(2si−j) time. In total across all rounds
of the sum-check protocol, P spends O(∑sij=1 2si−j) = O(2si) time to compute the β(z, p)
values.
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Computing the Necessary V˜i+1(p) Values
For concreteness and clarity, we restrict our presentation within this subsection to the
polynomial g
(i)
z described in Proposition 8.4.4. Theorem 8.4.10 abstracts this analysis into a
general result capturing a large class of wiring patterns.
Recall that all of the polynomials g
(i)
z described in Propositions 8.4.2-8.4.6 have the
following property: for any p ∈ Fsi , evaluating g(i)z (p) can be done in constant time given
β(z, p) and the evaluations of V˜i+1 at a constant number of points. We have already shown
how P can evaluate all of the necessary β(z, p) values in O(2si) time. It remains to show how
P can evaluate all of the V˜i+1 values in time O(2si + 2si+1). We remark that in the context
of Proposition 8.4.4, si = si+1; however, we still distinguish between these two quantities
throughout this subsection in order to ensure maximal consistency with the general derivation
of Theorem 8.4.10.
Recall that the polynomial g
(i)
z in Proposition 8.4.4 was defined as follows:
g(i)z (p) = βsi(z, p)
(
(1− psi)V˜i+1(p−si , 0) · V˜i+1(p−si , 0) + psiV˜ (p−si , 1) · V˜ (p−si , 0)
)
.
In round j of the sum-check protocol, P needs to evaluate gz at all points in the set
S(j) ={(r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi) : t ∈ {0, . . . ,degj(g(i)z )} ∧ (bj+1, . . . , bsi) ∈ {0, 1}si−j}.
By inspection of g
(i)
z , it suffices for V to evaluate V˜i+1 at the same set of points. To show
how to accomplish this efficiently, we exploit the following explicit expression for V˜i+1. This
expression was derived for the case i + 1 = d in Equation (6.1) within Lemma 6.3.1; we
re-derive it here in the general case.
For a vector b ∈ {0, 1}si+1 let χb(x1, . . . , xsi+1) =
∏si+1
k=1 χbk(xk), where χ0(xk) = 1 − xk
and χ1(xk) = xk. With this definition in hand, we may write:
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V˜i+1(p1, . . . , psi+1) =
∑
b∈{0,1}si+1
Vi+1(b)χb(p1, . . . psi+1), (8.3)
To see that Equation (8.3) holds, notice that the right hand side of Equation (8.3) is
a multilinear polynomial in the variables (p1, . . . , bpi+1), and that it agrees with Vi+1 at all
points p ∈ {0, 1}si+1 . Hence, it must be the unique multilinear extension of Vi+1.
The intuition behind our optimizations is the following. In round j of the sum-check
protocol, there are |S(j)| points at which V˜i+1 must be evaluated. Equation (8.3) can be
exploited to show that each gate at layer i + 1 of the circuit contributes to V˜i+1(p) for at
most one point p ∈ S(j); namely the point p whose last si+1−j coordinates agrees with those
of p. This observation alone is enough to achieve an O(Si+1 logSi) runtime for P in total
across all iterations of the sum-check protocol, because there are Si+1 gates at layer i + 1,
and only si = logSi rounds of the sum-check protocol – this is precisely how we enabled the
prover in the GKR protocol to run in total time O(S logS) in Chapter 7. However, we need
to go further in order to shave off the last logSi factor from P ’s runtime. Essentially, what
we do is group the gates at layer i+ 1 by the point p ∈ S(j) to which they contribute. Each
such group can be treated as a single unit, ensuring that the work P has to do in any round
of the sum-check protocol in order to evaluate V˜i+1 at all points in S
(j) is proportional to
|S(j)| rather than to Si+1. Since the size of S(j) falls geometrically with j, our desired time
bounds follow.
Pre-processing. P will begin by computing an array V (0), which is simply defined to be
the vector of gate values at layer i + 1, i.e., identifying a number 0 < j < Si+1 with its
binary representation in {0, 1}si+1 , P sets V (0)[(j1, . . . , jsi+1)] = Vi+1(j1, . . . , jsi+1) for each
(j1, . . . , jsi+1) ∈ {0, 1}si+1 . The right hand side of this equation is simply the value of the jth
gate at layer i + 1 of C. So P can fill in the array V (0) when she evaluates the circuit C,
before receiving any messages from V .
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Overview of Online Processing. In round j of of the sum-check protocol, P needs to evaluate
the polynomial V˜i+1 at the O(2
si−j) points in the set S(j). P will do this using the help of
intermediate arrays V (j) defined as follows.
Define V (j) to be the length 2si+1−j array such that for (pj+1, . . . , psi+1) ∈ {0, 1}si+1−j,
V (j)[(pj+1, . . . , psi+1)] =
∑
(b1,...,bj)∈{0,1}j
Vi+1(b1, . . . , bj, pj+1, . . . , psi+1) ·
j∏
k=1
χbk(rk),
Efficiently Constructing V (j) Arrays. Inductively, assume P has computed in the previous
round the array V (j−1) of length 2si+1−j+1.
As the base case, we explained how P can fill in V (0) in the process of evaluating the
circuit C. Now observe that P can compute V (j) given V (j−1) in O(2si+1−j) time using the
following recurrence:
V (j)[(pj+1, . . . , psi+1)]=V
(j−1)[(0, pj+1, . . . , psi)] · χ0(rj) + V (j−1)[(1, pj+1, . . . , psi)] · χ1(rj).
Thus, at the end of round j of the sum-check protocol, when V sends P the value rj, P can
compute V (j) from V (j−1) in O(2si+1−j+1) time.
Using the V (j) Arrays. We now show how to use the array V (j−1) to evaluate V˜i+1(p) in con-
stant time for any point of the form p = (r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi+1) with (bj+1, . . . , bsi+1) ∈
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{0, 1}si+1−j. We exploit the following sequence of equalities:
V˜i+1(r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi)
=
∑
c∈{0,1}si+1
Vi+1(c)χc(r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi+1)
=
∑
(c1,...,cj)∈{0,1}j
∑
(cj+1,...,csi+1 )∈{0,1}si+1−j
Vi+1(c)χc(r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi+1)
=
∑
(c1,...,cj)∈{0,1}j
∑
(cj+1,...,csi+1 )∈{0,1}si+1−j
Vi+1(c)
(
j−1∏
k=1
χck(rk)
)(
χcj(t)
)( si+1∏
k=j+1
χck(bk)
)
=
∑
(c1,...,cj)∈{0,1}j
Vi+1(cj+1, . . . , cj, bj+1, . . . , bsi+1)
(
j−1∏
k=1
χck(rk)
)
· χcj(t)
=V (j−1)[(0, bj+1, . . . , bsi+1)] · χ0(t) + V (j−1)[(1, bj+1, . . . , bsi+1)] · χ1(t).
Here, the first equality holds by Equation (8.3). The third holds by definition of the function
χc. The fourth holds because for Boolean values bk, ck ∈ {0, 1}, χck(bk) = 1 if ck = bk, and
χck(bk) = 0 otherwise. The final equality holds by definition of the array V
(j−1).
Putting Things Together. In round j of the sum-check protocol, P uses the array V (j−1)
to evaluate V˜i+1(p) for all O(2
si−j) points p ∈ S(j). This requires constant time per point,
and hence O(2si−j) time across all points. At the end of round j, V sends P the value rj,
and P computes V (j) from V (j−1) in O(2si+1−j) time. In total across all rounds of the sum-
check protocol, P spends O(∑sij=1 2si−j + 2si+1−j) = O(2si + 2si+1) time to evaluate V˜i+1 at
the relevant points. When combined with our O(2si)-time algorithm for computing all the
relevant β(z, p) values, we see P takes O(2si + 2si+1) = O(Si + Si+1) time to run the entire
sum-check protocol for iteration i of our circuit-checking protocol.
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8.4.5 A General Theorem
In this section we formalize a large class of circuits to which our refinements yield asymp-
totic savings relative to prior implementations of the GKR protocol. Our protocol makes use
of the following functions that capture the wiring structure of an arithmetic circuit C.
Definition 8.4.7. Let C be a layered arithmetic circuit of depth d(n) and size S(n) over
finite field F. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1}, let in(i)1 : {0, 1}si → {0, 1}si+1 and in(i)2 : {0, 1}si →
{0, 1}si+1 denote the functions that take as input the binary label p of a gate at layer i of
C, and output the binary label of the first and second in-neighbor of gate p respectively.
Similarly, let type(i) : {0, 1}si → {0, 1} denote the function that takes as input the binary
label p of a gate at layer i of C, and outputs 0 if p is an addition gate, and 1 if p is a
multiplication gate.
Intuitively, the following definition captures functions whose outputs are simple bit-wise
transformations of their inputs.
Definition 8.4.8. Let f be a function mapping {0, 1}v to {0, 1}v′ . Number the v input bits
from 1 to v, and the v′ output bits from 1 to v′. Assume that one machine word contains
Ω(v+ v′) bits. We say that f is regular if f can be evaluated on any input in constant time,
and there is a subset of input bits S ⊆ [v] with |S| = O(1) such that:
1. Each input bit in [v] \ S affects O(1) of the output bits of f . Moreover, given input
j ∈ [v]\S, the set Sj of output bits affected by xj can be enumerated in constant time.
2. Each output bit of f depends on at most one input bit.
Our protocol applied to C proceeds in d(n) iterations, where iteration i consists an
application of the sum-check protocol to an appropriate polynomial derived from type(i),
in
(i)
1 , and in
(i)
2 , followed by a phase for “reducing to verification of a single point”. For any
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layer i of C such that in
(i)
1 , in
(i)
2 and type
(i) are all regular, we can show that P can execute
the sum-check protocol at iteration i in O(Si + Si+1) time. To ensure that P can execute
the “reducing to verification of a single point” phase in O(Si+1) time, we need to place one
additional condition on in
(i)
1 and in
(i)
2 .
Definition 8.4.9. We say that in
(i)
1 and in
(i)
2 are similar if there is a set of output bits
T ⊆ [si+1] with |T | = O(1) such that for all inputs x, the jth output bit of in(i)1 equals the
jth output bit of in
(i)
2 for all j ∈ [si+1] \ T .
We are finally in a position to state the class of circuits to which our refinements apply.
Theorem 8.4.10. Let C be an arithmetic circuit, and suppose that for all layers i of C, in
(i)
1 ,
in
(i)
2 , and type
(i) are regular. Suppose moreover that in
(i)
1 is similar to in
(i)
2 for all but O(1)
layers i of C. Then there is a valid interactive proof protocol (P ,V) for the function com-
puted by C, with the following costs. The total communication cost is |O|+O(d(n) logS(n))
field elements, where |O| is the number of outputs of C. The time cost to V is O(n log n +
d(n) logS(n)), and V can make a single streaming pass over the input, storing O(log(S(n)))
field elements. The time cost to P is O(S(n)).
The asymptotic costs of the protocol whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 8.4.10
are identical to those of the implementation of the GKR protocol from Chapter 7, except
that in Theorem 8.4.10 P runs in time O(S(n)) rather than O(S(n) logS(n)) as achieved in
Chapter 7. We defer the proof to Appendix A.1.
Applications
Theorem 8.4.10 applies to circuits computing functions from a wide range of applications,
with the following implications.
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MatMult. Consider the following circuit C of size O(n3) for multiplying two n×n matrices
A and B. Let the input gate labelled (0, i, j) correspond to Aij, and the input labelled (1, i, j)
correspond to Bij. The layer of C adjacent to the input consists of n
3 gates, where the gate
labeled (i, j, k) ∈ ({0, 1}logn)3 computes Aik · Bkj. All subsequent layers constitute a binary
tree of addition gates summing up the results and thereby computing
∑
k AikBkj for all
(i, j) ∈ [n]× [n].
For layers i ∈ {1, . . . , log n} of this circuit, in(i)1 , in(i)2 , and type(i) are all regular, and
moreover in
(i)
1 is similar to in
(i)
2 (see Section 8.4.3 for a careful treatment of this wiring
pattern). The remaining layer of the circuit, layer i = log n+ 1, is regular, though in
(logn+1)
1
and in
(logn+1)
2 are not similar. We obtain the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 8.4.11. There is a valid interactive proof protocol for n × n MatMult with
the following costs. The total communication cost is n2 +O(d(n) log n) field elements, where
the n2 term is required to specify the answer. The time cost to V is O(n2 log n), and V can
make a single streaming pass over the input in time O(n2 log n) and storing O(log n) field
elements. The time cost to P is O(n3).
We note that the costs of Corollary 8.4.11 are subsumed by our special-purpose matrix
multiplication protocol presented later in Theorem 8.7.2. We included Corollary 8.4.11 to
demonstrate the applicability of Theorem 8.4.10.
Distinct. Recall the circuit C over field size q = 2k− 1 described in Section 8.4.3 that takes
a vector a ∈ Fn as input and outputs the number of non-zero entries of a. This circuit has
k + 1 relevant layers and consists entirely of multiplication gates. For any layer i ∈ [k − 1],
an even-numbered gate p at layer i has both in-wires connected to gate p at layer i + 1,
while an odd-numbered gate p at layer i has one in-wire connected to gate p at layer i + 1
and another connected to gate p − 1 (which has binary representation (p−si , 0), where p−si
217
denotes the binary representation of p with the coordinate psi removed). For these layers,
in
(i)
1 , in
(i)
2 , and type
(i) are all regular, and in
(i)
1 is similar to in
(i)
2 .
At layer k, an even-numbered gate p is has both in-wires connected to gate p/2 at layer
k+ 1, while an odd-numbered gate p at layer k has its unique in-wire connected to gate (p−
1)/2 at layer k+1. In the former case, both in-neighbors of gate p have binary representation
p−si . In the latter case the unique in-neighbor of gate p has binary representation p−si . It is
therefore easily seen that in
(k)
1 , in
(k)
2 , and type
(k) are all regular, and in
(k)
1 is similar to in
(k)
2 .
Finally, at layer k + 1, both in-wires for gate p are connected to gate p at layer k + 2. It is
easily seen that in
(k+1)
1 , in
(k+1)
2 , and type
(k+1) are all regular, and in
(k+1)
1 is similar to in
(k+1)
2 .
With all layers of C satisfying the requirements of Theorem 8.4.10, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 8.4.12. Let q > max{m,n} be a Mersenne Prime. There is a valid interactive
proof protocol over the field Fq for Distinct with the following costs. The total communica-
tion cost is O(log n log q) field elements. The time cost to V is O(m log n), and V can make
a single streaming pass over the input, storing O(log n) field elements. The time cost to P is
O(n log q).
To or knowledge, Corollary 8.4.12 yields the fastest known prover of any streaming inter-
active proof protocol for Distinct that also has total communication and space usage for V
that is sublinear in both m and n. The fastest result previously was the O (n · log(n) · log(p))-
time prover obtained by the implementation of Chapter 7. We remark however that for a data
stream with F0 distinct items, the prover in the protocol of Chapter 7 actually can be made
to run in time O (n+ F0 · log(n) · log(p)), where the O(n) term is due to the time required
to simply observe the entire input stream. Therefore, for streams where F0 = o(n/ log n),
the implementation of Chapter 7 achieves an asymptotically faster prover than implied by
Corollary 8.4.12.
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Remark 10. In Section 7.3.3, we described how to extend the GKR protocol to handle cir-
cuits with gates that compute more general operations than just addition and multiplication.
At a high level, we showed in Section 7.3.3 that gates computing any “low-degree” operation
can be handled, and they demonstrate analytically and experimentally that these more gen-
eral gates can achieve cost savings for the Distinct problem. These same optimizations are
also applicable in conjunction with our refinements. We omit further details for brevity, and
did not implement these optimizations in conjunction with the refinements of this chapter.
Other Problems. In order to demonstrate its generality, we describe two other non-trivial
applications of Theorem 8.4.10.
• Pattern Matching. In the Pattern Matching problem, the input consists of a stream
of text T = (t0, . . . , tn−1) ∈ [n]n and pattern P = (p0, . . . , pm−1) ∈ [n]m. The pattern
P is said to occur at location i in T if, for every position k in P , pk = ti+k. The
pattern-matching problem is to determine the number of locations at which P occurs
in T . For example, one might want to determine the number of times a given phrase
appears in a corpus of emails stored in the cloud.
Consider the following circuit C for computing Pattern Matching over the finite field
Fq for prime q. The circuit first computes the quantity Ii =
∑m
j=0(ti+j − pj)2 for each
i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, and then exploits Fermat’s Little Theorem (FLT) by computing
M =
∑n−m
i=1 I
q−1
i . The number of occurrences of the pattern equals n−m−M .
Computing Ii for each i can be done in logm+ 2 layers: the layer closest to the input
computes ti+k − pk for each pair (i, k) ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} × {0, . . . , q− 1}, the next layer
squares each of the results, and the circuit then sums the results via a depth logm-
binary tree of addition gates. The total size of the circuit C is O(nm+ n log q), where
the nm term is due to the computation of the Ii values, and the n log q term is due to
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the FLT computation. The total depth of the circuit is O(logm+ log q) = O(log q).
We have already demonstrated that Theorem 8.4.10 applies to the squaring layer,
the binary tree sub-circuit, and the FLT computation. The only remaining layer of
the circuit is the one that computes ti+k − pk for each pair (i, k) ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} ×
{0, . . . ,m−1}. Unfortunately, Theorem 8.4.10 does not apply to this layer of the circuit.
This is because the first in-neighbor of a gate with label (i1, . . . , ilogn, k1, . . . , klogm) ∈
{0, 1}logn+logm has label equal to the binary representation of the integer i+ k, and a
single bit ij can affect many bits in the binary representation of i + k (likewise, each
bit in the binary representation of i + k may be affected by many bits in the binary
representation of i and k).
However, in Appendix A.2, we describe how to extend the ideas underlying Theo-
rem 8.4.10 to handle this wiring pattern. The extensions in Appendix A.2 may be
more broadly useful, as the wiring pattern analyzed there is an instance of a common
paradigm, in that it interprets binary gate labels as a pair of integers and performs a
simple arithmetic operation (namely addition) on those integers.
We also remark that, instead of going through the analysis of Appendix A.2, a more
straightforward approach is to simply apply the implementation of Chapter 7 to this
layer; the runtime for P in the corresponding sum-check protocol is O(nm log n). This
does not affect the asymptotic costs of the protocol if m is constant, since in this case
nm log n = O(n log q), and the total runtime of P over all other layers of the circuit is
Θ(n log q).
This analysis highlights the following point: our refinements can be applied to a circuit
on a layer-by-layer basis, so they can still yield speedups even if some but not all layers
of a circuit are sufficiently “regular” for our refinements to apply.
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A similar analysis applies to a closely related circuit that solves a more general problem
known as Pattern Matching with Wildcards. We omit these details for brevity.
• Fast Fourier Transform. Consider the following circuit over C for computing the stan-
dard radix-two decimation-in-time FFT. At a high level, this circuit works as fol-
lows. It proceeds in log n stages, where for k = (k1, . . . , kn) ∈ {0, 1}n, the kth out-
put of stage i is recursively defined as Vi(k1, . . . , kn) = Vi−1(k1, ki−1, 0, ki, . . . , kn) +
e−2piki/nVi−1(k1, . . . , ki−1, 1, ki+1, . . . , kn). Theorem 8.4.10 is easily seen to apply to the
natural circuit executing this recurrence, and our refinements would therefore shave a
logarithmic factor off the runtime of P applied to this circuit, relative to the implemen-
tation of Chapter 7 (since this circuit is defined over the infinite field C, the protocol
is only defined in a model where complex numbers can be communicated and operated
on at unit cost).
8.5 Experimental Results
We implemented the protocols implied by Theorem 8.4.10 as applied to circuits comput-
ing MatMult and Distinct. These experiments serve as case studies to demonstrate the
feasibility of Theorem 8.4.10 in practice, and to quantify the improvements over prior imple-
mentations. While Section 8.7 describes a specialized protocol for MatMult that is signif-
icantly more efficient than the protocol implied by Theorem 8.4.10, MatMult serves as an
important case study for the costs of the more general protocol described in Theorem 8.4.10,
and allows for direct comparison with prior implementation work that also evaluated general-
purpose protocols via their performance on the MatMult problem [39, 82, 91, 92, 99, 104].
Our comparison point is the implementation of Chapter 7.
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8.5.1 Summary of Results
The main takeaways of our experiments are as follows. When Theorem 8.4.10 is appli-
cable, the prover in the resulting protocol is 200x-250x faster than the previous state of
the art implementation of the GKR protocol. The communication costs and the number of
rounds required by our protocols are also 2x-3x smaller than the previous state of the art.
The verifier in our implementation takes essentially the same amount of time as in prior
implementations of the GKR protocol; this time is much smaller than the time to perform
the computation locally without a prover.
Most of the observed 200x speedup can be attributed directly to our improvements in
protocol design over prior work: the circuit for 512x512 matrix multiplication is of size 228,
and hence our logS factor improvement the runtime of P likely accounts for at least a 28x
speedup. The 3x reduction in the number of rounds accounts for another 3x speedup. The
remaining speedup factor of roughly 2x may be due to a more streamlined implementation
relative to prior work, rather than improved protocol design per se.
We have both a serial implementation and a parallel implementation that leverages graph-
ics processing units (GPUs). The prover in our parallel implementation runs roughly 30x
faster than the prover in our serial implementation. The ability to leverage GPUs to obtain
robust speedups in our setting is not unexpected, as in Section 7.5.3 we used GPUs to obtain
substantial speedups using GPUs for the GKR protocol implementation from Chapter 7.
All of our code used in this chapter is available online at [96]. All of our serial code
was written in C++ and all experiments were compiled with g++ using the −O3 compiler
optimization flag and run on a workstation with a 64-bit Intel Xeon architecture and 48 GBs
of RAM. We implemented all of our GPU code in CUDA and Thrust [65] with all compiler
optimizations turned on, and ran our GPU implementation on an NVIDIA Tesla C2070 GPU
with 6 GBs of device memory.
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8.5.2 Details
Choice of Finite Field. All of our circuits work over the finite field of size q = 261 − 1, as
with the case for our implementation in Chapter 7. We use this field because it supports
fast arithmetic, as reducing an integer modulo q can be done with a bit-shift, addition, and
a bit-wise AND. (The same observation applies to any field whose size equals a Mersenne
Prime, including 289 − 1, 2107 − 1, and 2127 − 1). Moreover, the field is large enough that
the probability a verifier is fooled by a dishonest prover is smaller than 1/245 for all of the
problems we consider (this probability is proportional to d(n) logS(n)
q
).
As in Chapter 7, the main potential issue with our choice of field size is that “overflow”
can occur for problems like matrix multiplication if the entries of the input matrices can be
very large. All of our protocols can be instantiated over fields with more than q = 261 − 1
elements, with an implementation using these fields experiencing a slowdown proportional
to the increased cost of arithmetic over these fields.
Serial Implementation
MatMult. The costs of our serial MatMult implementation are displayed in Table 8.1.
The prover in our matrix multiplication implementation is about 250x faster than the imple-
mentation of Chapter 7. For example, when multiplying two 512 x 512 matrices, our prover
takes about 38 seconds, while our comparison implementation takes over 2.5 hours. A C++
program that simply evaluates the circuit without an integrity guarantee takes 6.07 seconds,
so our prover experiences less than a 7x slowdown in order to evaluate the circuit with an
integrity guarantee relative to simply evaluating the circuit without such a guarantee.
When multiplying two 512 x 512 matrices A and B, the protocol requires 236 rounds, and
the total communication cost of our protocol is 5.48 KBs (plus the amount of communication
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required to specify the answer AB). The implementation of Chapter 7 required 767 rounds
and close to 18 KBs of communication (plus the amount of communication required to specify
AB). Notice that specifying a 512x512 matrix using 8 bytes per entry requires 2 MBs, which
is more than 500 times larger than the 5.48 KBs of extra communication required to verify
the answer.
A serial C++ program performing 512 x 512 matrix multiplication over the integers
with floating point arithmetic (without going through the circuit representation of the com-
putation) required 1.53 seconds, so our prover runs approximately 25 times slower than a
standard unverifiable matrix multiplication algorithm. A serial C++ program performing
the same multiplication over the finite field of size 261−1 required 4.74 seconds, so our serial
prover runs about 8 times slower than an unverifiable matrix multiplication algorithm over
the corresponding finite field.
Our verifier takes essentially the same amount of time as in prior work, as in both imple-
mentations the bulk of the work of the verifier is spent evaluating the low-degree extension
of the input at a point. This is more than an order of magnitude faster than the 1.03 seconds
required by a serial C++ program performing the multiplication in an unverified manner
over the integers, so the verifier is indeed saving time by using a prover (relative to doing
the computation locally without a prover). We stress that the savings for the verifier would
be larger at larger input sizes, as the time cost to the verifier in our implementation and
the prior implementation of Chapter 7 is quasilinear in the input size, which is polynomially
faster than all known matrix multiplication algorithms. Moreover, when streaming consid-
erations are not an issue, we could apply the refinement of Vu et al. from Lemma 8.3.1 to
reduce V ’s runtime from O(n2 log n) to O(n2) and thereby further speed up the verifier.
DISTINCT. The costs of our serial Distinct implementation with n = 220 (i.e., for com-
puting the number of non-zero entries of a vector of length n = 220) are displayed in Table
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Table 8.1: Experimental results for n× n MatMult using the protocol of Theorem 8.4.10.
Implementation Problem P Time V Time Rounds Total Circuit
Size Communication Eval Time
Ch. 7 256 x 256 1054 s 0.02 s 623 14.6 KBs 0.73 s
Thm. 8.4.10 256 x 256 4.37 s 0.02 s 190 4.4 KBs 0.73 s
Ch. 7 512 x 512 9759 s 0.10 s 767 17.97 KBs 6.07 s
Theorem 8.4.10 512 x 512 37.85 s 0.10 s 236 5.48 KBs 6.07 s
The Total Communication column does not count the communication required to specify
the answer, only the “extra” communication required to run the verification protocol.
8.2. The comparison of our implementation with prior work is similar to the case of matrix
multiplication. Our prover is roughly 200 times faster than the comparison implementation.
For example, when computing the number of non-zero entries of a vector of length 220, our
prover takes about 17 seconds, while our comparison implementation takes about 57 minutes.
A C++ program that simply evaluates the circuit without an integrity guarantee takes 1.88
seconds, so our prover experiences roughly a 10x slowdown to provide the integrity guarantee
relative to simply evaluating the circuit. Our implementation required 1361 rounds and 40.76
KBs of total communication, compared to 3916 rounds and 91.3 KBs for the implementa-
tion of Chapter 7. This is essentially a 3x reduction in the number of rounds, and a 2.25x
reduction in the total amount of communication.
A C++ program that (unverifiably) computes the number of non-zero entries in a vector
x with 220 entries takes less than .01 seconds, and our prover implementation runs more than
1, 700 times longer than this. The reason that the slowdown for the prover relative to an
unverifiable algorithm is larger for Distinct than for MatMult is that Distinct is a “less
arithmetic” problem, in the sense that the size of the arithmetic circuit we use for computing
Distinct is more than 100x larger than the runtime of an unverifiable serial algorithm for
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Table 8.2: Experimental results for Distinct (n = 220) using the protocol of Theorem 8.4.10.
Implementation P Time V Time Rounds Total Circuit
Communication Eval Time
Ch. 7 3400.23 s 0.20 s 3916 91.3 KBs 1.88 s
Thm. 8.4.10 17.28 s 0.20 s 1361 40.76 KBs 1.88 s
the problem. We stress however that, as pointed out in [99], when solving the Distinct
problem in practice, an unverifiable algorithm would first aggregate a data stream into its
frequency-vector representation before determining the number of non-zero frequencies. In
reporting a time bound of .01 seconds for unverifiably solving Distinct, we are not taking
the aggregation time cost into account. For sufficiently long data streams, the slow-down for
our prover relative to an unverifiable algorithm would be much smaller than 1, 700x if we
did take aggregation time into account.
Parallel Implementation
Our serial implementation demonstrates that P experiences a 10x slowdown to provide
the integrity guarantee relative to simply evaluating the circuit without such a guarantee.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that parallelization can further mitigate this
slowdown. To this end, we implemented a parallel version of our prover in the context of the
matrix multiplication protocol of Section 8.4. Our parallel implementation uses a graphics
processing unit (GPU).
The high-level idea behind our parallel implementation is the following. Each time we
apply the sum-check protocol to a polynomial g
(i)
z , it suffices for P to evaluate g(i)z at a large
number of points r of the form p = (r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi+1) with t ∈ {0, . . . , degj(g(i)z )}
and (bj+1, . . . , bsi+1) ∈ {0, 1}si+1−j. We can perform each of these evaluations independently.
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Thus, we devote a single thread on the GPU to each value of (bj+1, . . . , bsi+1) ∈ {0, 1}si+1−j
and have that thread evaluate g
(i)
z (r) at each of the degj(g
(i)
z ) + 1 points of the form
(r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bsi+1) with the help of the C
(j−1) and V (j−1) arrays described in
Section 8.4. The one remaining issue is that after each round j of each invocation of the
sum-check protocol, we need to update the arrays, i.e., we need to compute C(j) and V (j).
To accomplish this, we devote a single thread to each entry of C(j) and V (j).
All steps of our parallel implementation achieve excellent memory coalescing, which likely
plays a significant role in the large speedups we were able to achieve. For example, if two
threads are updating adjacent entries of the array V (j), the only memory accesses that the
threads need to perform are to adjacent entries of the array V (j−1).
The results are shown in Table 8.3: we obtained about a 30x speedup for the prover
relative to our serial implementation. As in our GPU experiments of Chapter 7, the reported
prover runtime does count the time required to copy data between the host (CPU) and
the device (GPU), but does not count the time required to evaluate the circuit, which our
implementation does in serial for simplicity. While our implementation evaluates the circuit
serially, this step can in principle be done in parallel one layer at a time, as these circuits
have only logarithmic depth. Notice that when the circuit evaluation runtime is excluded,
our parallel prover implementation runs faster in the case of 512x512 matrix multiplication
than the time required to evaluate the circuit sequentially.
It is possible that we would observe slightly larger speedups at larger input sizes, but our
parallel implementation exhausts the memory of the GPU at inputs larger than 512x512. This
memory bottleneck was also experienced by our GPU implementation of the GKR protocol
described in Chapter 7 and helps motivate the importance of the improved space usage of
the special purpose MatMult protocol we give later in Theorem 8.7.2. For comparison,
the GPU implementation of [99] required 39.6 seconds for 256 x 256 matrix multiplication,
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Table 8.3: Experimental results for n×nMatMult with our parallel prover implementation.
Implementation Problem Size P Time Serial Circuit Eval Time
Theorem 8.4.10, Serial Implementation 256 x 256 4.37 s 0.73 s
Theorem 8.4.10, Parallel Implementation 256 x 256 0.23 s 0.73 s
Theorem 8.4.10, Serial Implementation 512 x 512 37.85 s 6.07 s
Theorem 8.4.10, Parallel Implementation 512 x 512 1.29 s 6.07 s
which is about 175x slower than our parallel implementation.
We also mention that Thaler, Roberts, Mitzenmacher, and Pfister [99] demonstrate that
equally large speedups via parallelization are achievable for the (already fast) computation
of the verifier. These results directly apply to our protocols as well, as the verifier’s runtime
in both implementations is dominated by the time required to evaluate the MLE of the input
at a random point [39,99].
8.6 Verifying General Data Parallel Computations
In this section, our goal is to extend the applicability of the GKR protocol. While the GKR
protocol applies in principle to any function computed by a small-depth circuit, this is not the
case when fine-grained efficiency considerations are taken into account. The implementation
of Chapter 7 required the programmer to express a program as an arithmetic circuit, and
moreover this circuit needed to have a regular wiring pattern, in the sense that the verifier
could efficiently evaluate the polynomials ˜addi and ˜multi at a point. If this was not the case,
the verifier would need to do an expensive (though data-independent) preprocessing phase
to perform these evaluations. Moreover, even for circuits with regular wiring patterns, this
implementation caused the prover to suffer an O(log(S(n))) factor blowup in runtime relative
to evaluating the circuit without a guarantee of correctness. The results of Sections 8.4 and
228
8.7 asymptotically eliminate the blowup in runtime for the prover, but they also only apply
when the circuit has a very regular wiring pattern.
The implementation of Vu et al. [104] allows the programmer to express a program in
a high-level language, but compiles these programs into potentially irregular circuits that
require the verifier to incur the expensive preprocessing phase mentioned above, in order for
the verifier to evaluate the polynomials ˜addi and ˜multi at a point. They therefore propose
to apply their system in a “batching” model, where multiple instances of the same sub-
computation are applied independently to different pieces of data. More specifically, their
system applies the GKR protocol independently to each application of the computation, and
relies on the ability of the verifier to use a single ˜addi and ˜multi evaluation for all instances
of the sub-computation, thereby amortizing the cost of this evaluation across the instances.
To clarify, this use of a single ˜addi and ˜multi evaluation for all instances as in [104] is sound
only if all of the instances are checked simultaneously. If the instances are instead verified
one after the other, then P knows V ’s randomness in all but the first instance, and can use
that knowledge to mislead V .
The batching model of Vu et al. is identical to the data parallel setting we consider here.
However, a downside to the solution of Vu et al. is that the verifier’s work, as well as the
total communication cost of the protocol, grows linearly with the “batch size” – the number
of applications of the sub-computation that are being outsourced. We wish to develop a
protocol whose costs to both the prover and verifier grow much more slowly with the batch
size.
8.6.1 Motivation
As discussed above, existing interactive proof protocols for circuit evaluation either apply
only to circuits with highly regular wiring patterns or incur large overheads for the prover and
229
Data	  
Sub-­‐
Comp	  
C	  
Data	  
Sub-­‐
Comp	  
C	  
Data	  
Sub-­‐
Comp	  
C	  
Data	  
Sub-­‐
Comp	  
C	  
Data	  
Sub-­‐
Comp	  
C	  
Data	  
Sub-­‐
Comp	  
C	  
Aggrega1on	  
Figure 8.2: Schematic of a data parallel computation.
verifier. Here, we show how to mitigate the bottlenecks of existing protocols by leveraging
some general structure underlying many real-world computations. Specifically, the structure
we focus on exploiting is data-parallelism.
By data parallel computation, we mean any setting in which the same sub-computation
is applied independently to many pieces of data, before possibly aggregating the results.
Crucially, we do not want to make significant assumptions on the sub-computation that is
being applied (in particular, we want to handle sub-computations computed by circuits with
highly irregular wiring patterns), but we are willing to assume that the sub-computation
is applied independently to many pieces of data. See Figure 8.2 for a schematic of a data
parallel computation.
We have already seen a very simple example of a data parallel computation: the Distinct
problem. The circuit C from Section 8.4 used to solve this problem takes as input a vector a
and computes aq−1i mod q for all i (this is the data parallel phase of the computation), before
summing the results (this is the aggregation phase). Notice that if the data stream consists
of a sequence of words, then the Distinct problem becomes the word-count problem, a
classic data parallel application.
By design, the protocol of this section also applies to more complicated data parallel
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computations. For example, it applies to arbitrary counting queries on a database. In a
counting query, one applies some function independently to each row of the database and
sums the results. For example, one may ask “How many people in the database satisfy
Property P?” Our protocol allows one to verifiably outsource such a counting query with
overhead that depends minimally on the size of the database, but that necessarily depends
on the complexity of the property P .
8.6.2 Overview of the Protocol
Let C be a circuit of size S(n) with an arbitrary wiring pattern, and let C∗ be a “super-
circuit” that applies C independently to B different inputs before aggregating the results in
some fashion. For example, in the case of a counting query, the aggregation phase simply
sums the results of the data parallel phase. We assume that the aggregation step is sufficiently
simple that the aggregation itself can be verified using existing techniques, and we focus on
verifying the data parallel part of the computation.
If we naively apply the GKR protocol to the super-circuit C∗, V might have to perform
an expensive pre-processing phase to evaluate the wiring predicate of C∗ at the necessary
locations – this would require time Ω(B·S). Moreover, when applying the basic GKR protocol
to C∗, P would require time Θ (B · S · log(B · S)). A different approach was taken by Vu et
al [104], who applied the GKR protocol B independent times, once for each copy of C. This
causes both the communication cost and V ’s online check time to grow linearly with B, the
number of sub-computations.
In contrast, our protocol achieves the best of both prior approaches. We observe that
although each sub-computation C can have a very complicated wiring pattern, the circuit
is maximally regular between sub-computations, as the sub-computations do not interact at
all. Therefore, each time the basic GKR protocol would apply the sum-check protocol to a
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polynomial derived from the wiring predicate of C∗, we can instead use a simpler polynomial
derived only from the wiring predicate of C. By itself, this is enough to ensure that V ’s pre-
processing phase requires time only O(S), rather than O(B ·S) as in a naive application of the
basic GKR protocol. That is, the cost of V ’s pre-processing phase is essentially proportional
to the cost of applying the GKR protocol only to C, not to the super-circuit C∗.
Furthermore, by combining this observation with the methods of Section 8.4, we can
bring the runtime of P down to O(B · S · logS). That is, the blowup in runtime suffered
by the prover, relative to performing the computation without a guarantee of correctness, is
just a factor of logS – the same as it would be if the prover had run the basic GKR protocol
on a single instance of the sub-computation.
8.6.3 Technical Details
Notation
Let C be an arithmetic circuit over F of depth d and size S with an arbitrary wiring
pattern, and let C∗ be the circuit of depth d and size B · S obtained by laying B copies of
C side-by-side, where B = 2b is a power of 2. We assume that the in-neighbors of all of the
Si gates at layer i can be enumerated in O(Si) time. We will use the same notation as in
Section 8.4, using ∗’s to denote quantities referring to C∗. For example, layer i of C has size
Si = 2
si and gate values specified by the function Vi, while layer i of C
∗ has size S∗i = 2
s∗i
and gate values specified by the function V ∗i . We denote the length of the input to C
∗ by
n∗ = Bn.
Main Theorem
Our main theorem gives a protocol for compute V˜ ∗1 (z), for any point z ∈ Fs∗1 . The idea
is that the verifier would first apply simpler techniques (such as the protocol of Theorem
232
8.4.10) to the aggregation phase of the computation to obtain a claim about V˜ ∗1 (z), and
then use our main theorem to verify this claim. Hence, in principle V need not look at the
entire output of the data parallel phase, only the output of the aggregation phase, which we
anticipate to be much smaller.
Theorem 8.6.1. For any point z ∈ Fs∗1 , there is a valid interactive proof protocol for com-
puting V˜ ∗1 (z) with the following costs. V spends O(S) time in a pre-processing phase, and
O(n∗log n∗+d·log(B·S)) time in an online verification phase, where the n∗ log n∗ term is due
to the time required to evaluate the multilinear extension of the input to C∗ at a point. P
runs in total time O(S ·B · logS). The total communication is O(d · log(B ·S)) field elements.
Proof. Consider layer i of C∗. Let p = (p1, p2) ∈ {0, 1}si × {0, 1}b be the label of a gate
at layer i of C∗, where p2 specifies which “copy” of C the gate is in, while p1 designates
the label of the gate within the copy. Similarly, let ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ {0, 1}si+1 × {0, 1}b and
γ = (γ1, γ2) ∈ {0, 1}si+1 × {0, 1}b be the labels of two gates at layer i+ 1.
It is straightforward to check that for all (p1, p2) ∈ {0, 1}si × {0, 1}b,
V ∗i (p1, p2) =
∑
ω1∈{0,1}si+1
∑
γ1∈{0,1}si+1
g(i)z (p1, p2, ω1, γ1),
where
g(i)z (p1, p2, ω1, γ1) = βs∗i (z, (p1, p2))·(
˜addi(p1, ω1, γ1)
(
V˜ ∗i+1(ω1, p2)+V˜
∗
i+1(γ1, p2)
)
+ ˜multi(p1, ω1, γ1)V˜
∗
i+1(ω1, p2)·V˜ ∗i+1(γ1, p2)
)
Essentially, this equation says that an addition (respectively, multiplication) gate p =
(p1, p2) ∈ {0, 1}si+b is connected to gates ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ {0, 1}si+1+b and γ = (γ1, γ2) ∈
{0, 1}si+1+b if and only if p, ω, and γ are all in the same copy of C, and p is connected to ω
and γ within the copy.
233
Lemma 8.4.1 then implies that for any z ∈ Fs∗i ,
V˜ ∗i (z) =
∑
(p1,p2,ω1,γ1)∈{0,1}si×{0,1}b×{0,1}si+1×{0,1}si+1
g(i)z (p1, p2, ω1, γ1).
Thus, in iteration i of our protocol, we apply the sum-check protocol to the polynomial
g
(i)
z . The communication costs of this protocol are immediate.
Costs for V. In order to run her part of the sum-check protocol of iteration i, V only needs
to perform the required checks on each of P ’s messages. V ’s check requires O(1) time in
each round of the sum-check protocol except the last. In the last round of the sum-check
protocol, V must evaluate the polynomial g(i)z at a single point. This requires evaluating βs∗i ,
˜addi, ˜multi, and V˜
∗
i+1 at a constant number of points. The V˜
∗
i+1 evaluations are provided by
P in all iterations i of the protocol except the last, while the βs∗i evaluation can be done in
O(log(B · S)) time.
The ˜addi and ˜multi computations can be done in pre-processing in time O(Si) by enu-
merating the in-neighbors of each of the Si gates at layer i. Adding up the pre-processing
time across all iterations i of our protocol, V ’s pre-processing time is O(∑i Si) = O(S) as
claimed.
In the final iteration of the protocol, P no longer provides the V˜ ∗i+1 evaluation for V ;
instead, V must evaluate the multilinear extension of the input at a point on her own. This
can be done in a streaming manner using O(log n∗ log |F|) bits of space in time O(n∗ log n∗).
The time cost for V in the online phase follows.
Costs for P. It remains to show that P can perform the required computations in iteration
i of the protocol in time O((Si + Si+1) · B · log(S)). To this end, notice g(i)z is a polynomial
in v := si + 2si+1 + b variables. We order the sum in this sum-check protocol so that the
si + 2si+1 variables in p1, ω1, and γ1 are bound first in arbitrary order, followed by the
variables of p2. P can compute the prescribed messages in the first si + 2si+1 = O(logS)
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rounds exactly as in the implementation of Chapter 7. They show that each gate at layers
i and i + 1 of C∗ contributes to exactly one term in the sum defining P ’s message in any
given round of the sum-check protocol, and moreover the contribution of a given gate can
be determined in O(1) time. Hence the total time devoted required by P to handle these
rounds is O(B · (Si + Si+1) · logS). It remains to show how P can compute the prescribed
messages in the final b rounds of the sum-check protocol while investing O((Si + Si+1) · B)
across all rounds of the protocol.
Recall that in order to compute P ’s message in round j of the sum-check protocol applied
to g
(i)
z , it suffices for P to evaluate g(i)z at 2v−j points of the form (r1, . . . , rj−1, t, bj+1, . . . , bv),
with t ∈ {0, . . . , degj(g(i)z )} and (bj+1, . . . , bv) ∈ {0, 1}v−j. Each of these evaluations of g(i)z
can be computed in O(1) time given the evaluations of βs∗i ,
˜addi, ˜multi, and V˜
∗
i+1 at the
relevant points.
Notice that once the variables in p1, ω1, and γ1 are bound to specific values, say r
(p)
1 , r
(ω)
1 ,
and r
(γ)
1 ,
˜addi(p1, ω1, γ1) and ˜multi(p1, ω1, γ1) are themselves bound to specific values, namely
˜addi(r
(p)
1 , r
(ω)
1 , r
(γ)
1 ) and
˜multi(r
(p)
1 , r
(ω)
1 , r
(γ)
1 ). So P only needs to evaluate these polynomials
once, and both of these evaluations can be computed by P in O(Si) time. Thus, the ˜addi,
˜multi evaluations in the last b rounds require just O(Si) time in total.
P can evaluate the function βs∗i at the relevant points exactly as in the proof of Theorem
8.4.10 using the C(j) arrays to ensure that this computation is done quickly. The array C(0)
has size 2s
∗
i = O(Si · B), and C(j−1) gets updated to C(j) whenever a variable in p1 or
p2 becomes bound. This ensures that across all rounds of the sum-check protocol, the βs∗i
evaluations require O(Si ·B) time in total.
Likewise, the V˜ ∗i+1 evaluations can be handled exactly as in Theorem 8.4.10, using the
the V (j) arrays to ensure that this computation is done quickly. The array V (0) has size
2s
∗
i+1 = O(Si+1 · B), and V (j−1) gets updated to V (j) whenever a variable in ω1 becomes
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bound (and similarly for the variables in γ1). This ensures that across all rounds of the
sum-check protocol, the V˜ ∗i+1 evaluations take O((Si + Si+1) ·B) in total.
Reducing to Verification of a Single Point. After executing the sum-check protocol
at layer i as described above, V is left with a claim about V˜i+1(ω1, p2) and V˜i+1(γ1, p2), for
ω1, γ1 ∈ Fsi , and p2 ∈ Fb. This requires P to send V˜i+1(`(t)) for a canonical line `(t) that
passes through (ω1, p2) and (γ1, p2). It is easily seen that V˜i+1(`(t)) is a univariate polynomial
of degree at most si. Here, we are exploiting the fact that the final b coordinates of (ω1, p2)
and (γ1, p2) are equal.
Hence P can specify V˜i+1(`(t)) by sending V˜i+1(`(tj)) for O(si) many points tj ∈ F. Using
the method of Lemma 8.3.1, P can evaluate V˜i+1 at each point `(tj) in O(Si+1) time, and
hence can perform all V˜i+1(`(tj)) evaluations in O(Si+1 · si) = O(Si+1 · logS) time in total.
This ensures that across all iterations of our protocol, P devotes at most O(S · B · logS)
time to the “reducing to verification of a single point” phase of the protocol. This completes
the proof.
In practice we would expect the results of the data parallel phase of computation repre-
sented by the super-circuit C∗ to be aggregated in some fashion. We assume this aggregation
step is amenable to verification via other techniques. In the case of counting queries, the
aggregation step simply sums the outputs of the data parallel step, which can be handled
via Theorem 8.4.10, or slightly more efficiently via Proposition 8.7.1 described below in
Section 8.7. More generally, if this aggregation step is computed by a circuit C ′ of size
O(S · B · logS/ logB) such that V can efficiently evaluate the multilinear extension of the
wiring predicate of C ′, then we can simply apply the basic GKR protocol to C ′ with asymp-
totic costs smaller than those of the protocol described in Theorem 8.6.1. This application
of the GKR protocol to C ′ ends with a claim about the value of V˜ ∗1 (z) for some z ∈ Fs∗1 . The
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verifier can then invoke the protocol of Theorem 8.6.1 to verify this claim.
We stress that the protocol of Theorem 8.6.1 can be applied if there are multiple data
parallel stages interleaved with aggregation stages.
8.7 Extensions
In this section we describe two final optimizations that are much more specialized than
Theorems 8.4.10 and 8.6.1, but have a significant effect in practice when they apply. In
particular, Section 8.7.2 culminates in a protocol for matrix multiplication that is of interest
in its own right. It is hundreds of times faster than the protocol implied by Theorem 8.4.10
and studied experimentally in Section 8.5.
8.7.1 Binary Tree of Addition Gates
Cormode et al. [57] describe an optimization that applies to any circuit C with a single
output that culminates in a binary tree of addition gates; at a high level, they directly apply
a single sum-check protocol to the entire binary tree, thereby treating the entire tree as
a single addition gate with very large fan-in. In contrast, the optimization described here
applies to circuits with multiple outputs and allows the binary tree of addition gates to occur
anywhere in the circuit, not just at the layers immediately preceding the output.
At first blush, our optimization might seem quite specialized since it only applies to
circuits with a specific wiring pattern. However, this is one of the most commonly occurring
wiring patterns, as evidenced by its appearance within the circuits computing MatMult,
Distinct, Pattern Matching, and counting queries. Notice that our optimization also applies
to verifying multiple independent instances of any problem with a single output whose circuit
ends with a binary tree of sum-gates, such as verifying the number of distinct items in
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multiple distinct data streams, or posing multiple separate counting queries to a database.
This is because, similar to Theorem 8.6.1, one can lay the circuits for each of the individual
problem instances side-by-side and treat the result as a single “super-circuit” culminating in
a binary tree of addition gates with multiple outputs.
The starting point for our optimization is the observation that in order to verify that P
has correctly evaluated a circuit with many output gates, P may simply send V the (claimed)
values of all output gates, thereby specifying a function V ′1 : {0, 1}s1 → F claimed to equal
V1. V can pick a random point z ∈ Fs1 and evaluate V˜ ′1(z) on her own in O(S1) time. The
Schwartz-Zippel Lemma (Lemma 2.2.1) implies that it is safe for V to believe that V1 is
as claimed as long as V˜1(z) = V˜
′
1(z). Our protocol as described in Section 8.4 would then
proceed in iterations, with one iteration per layer of the circuit and one application of the
sum-check protocol per iteration. This would ultimately reduce P ’s claim about the value of
V˜1(z) to a claim about V˜d(z
′) for some z′ ∈ Fsd , where d is the input layer of the circuit.
Instead, our final refinement uses a single sum-check protocol to directly reduce P ’s claim
about V˜1(z) to a claim about V˜d(z
′) for some random points z′ ∈ Fsd .
Proposition 8.7.1. Let C be a depth-d circuit consisting of a binary tree of addition gates,
2k inputs, and 2k−d outputs. For any points z ∈ Fk−d, V˜1(z) =
∑
p∈{0,1}k gz(p), where
gz(p) = V˜d(z, pk−d+1, . . . , pk).
Proof. At layer i of C, the gate with label p ∈ {0, 1}si is the sum of the gates with labels (p, 0)
and (p, 1) at layer i+ 1. It is then straightforward to observe that the for any p ∈ {0, 1}k−d,
the pth output gate has value
V1(p1, . . . , pk−d) =
∑
(pk−d+1,...,pd)∈{0,1}d
V˜d(p1, . . . , pk−d, pk−d+1, . . . , pk). (8.4)
Notice that the right hand side of Equation (8.4) is a multilinear polynomial in the variables
(p1, . . . , pk−d) that agrees with V1(p1, . . . , pk−d) at all Boolean inputs. Hence, the right hand
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Table 8.4: Experimental results for n× n MatMult, with and without the refinement of Section 8.7.1.
Implementation Problem P Time V Time Rounds Total Circuit
Size Communication Eval Time
Thm. 8.4.10 256 x 256 4.37 s 0.02 s 190 4.4 KBs 0.73 s
Prop. 8.7.1 256 x 256 2.52 s 0.02 s 35 0.76 KBs 0.73 s
Thm. 8.4.10 512 x 512 37.85 s 0.10 s 236 5.48 KBs 6.07 s
Prop. 8.7.1 512 x 512 22.98 s 0.10 s 39 0.86 KBs 6.07 s
As in Table 8.1, the Total Communication column does not count the n2 field elements required to specify
the answer.
side is the (unique) multilinear extension V˜1 of the function V1 : {0, 1}k−d → {0, 1}. The
theorem follows.
In applying the sum-check protocol to the polynomial gz in Proposition 8.7.1, it is straight-
forward to use the methods of Section 8.4.4 to implement the honest prover in time O(2k).
We omit the details for brevity.
Experimental Results. Let C be the circuit for naive matrix multiplication described in
Section 8.4.5. To demonstrate the efficiency gains implied by Proposition 8.7.1, we modified
our MatMult implementation of Section 8.5.2 to use the protocol of Proposition 8.7.1 to
verify the sub-circuit of C consisting of a binary tree of addition gates. The results are
shown in Table 8.4. Our optimizations in this section shave P ’s runtime by a factor of 1.5x-
2x, the total number of rounds by a factor of more than 5, and the total communication (not
counting the cost of specifying the output of the circuit) by a factor of more than 5.
8.7.2 Optimal Space and Time Costs for MatMult
We describe a final optimization here on top of Proposition 8.7.1. While this optimiza-
tion is specific to the MatMult problem, its effects are substantial and the underlying
observation may be more broadly applicable.
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Suppose we are given an unverifiable algorithm for n × n matrix multiplication that
requires time T (n) and space s(n). Our refinements reduce the prover’s runtime from O(n3)
in the case of Sections 8.4 and 8.7.1 to T (n) + O(n2), and lowers P ’s space requirement
to s(n) + o(n2). That is, in the protocol the prover sends the correct output and performs
just O(n2) more work to provide a guarantee of correctness on top. It is irrelevant what
algorithm the prover uses to arrive at the correct output – in particular, algorithms much
more sophisticated than naive matrix multiplication are permitted. This runtime and space
usage for P are optimal even up to the leading constant assuming matrix multiplication
cannot be computed in O(n2) time.
The final protocol is extremely natural, as it consists of a single invocation of the sum-
check protocol. We believe this protocol is of interest in its own right. The proof and technical
details are in Section 8.7.2.
Theorem 8.7.2. There is a valid interactive proof protocol for n× n matrix multiplication
over the field Fq with the following costs. The communication cost is n2 + O(log n) field
elements. The runtime of the prover is T (n) + O(n2) and the space usage is s(n) + o(n2),
where T (n) and s(n) are the time and space requirements of any (unverifiable) algorithm for
n× n matrix multiplication. The verifier can make a single streaming pass over the input as
well as over the claimed output in time O(n2 log n), storing O(log n) field elements.
Using the observation of Vu et al. described in Lemma 8.3.1, the runtime of the verifier can
be brought down to O(n2) at the cost of increasing V ’s space usage to O(n2). Furthermore,
by Remark 4, the runtime of the verifier can be brought down to O(n2) while maintaining
the streaming property if the input matrices are presented in row-major order.
The prover’s runtime in Theorem 8.7.2 is within an additive low-order term of any unver-
ifiable algorithm for matrix multiplication; this is essential in many practical scenarios where
even a 2x slowdown is too steep a price to pay for verifiability. Notice also that the space
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usage bounds in Theorem 8.7.2 are in stark contrast to protocols based on circuit-checking:
the prover in a general circuit-checking protocol may have to store the entire circuit, and
this can result in space requirements that are much larger than those of an unverifiable al-
gorithm for the problem. For example, naive matrix multiplication requires time O(n3), but
only O(n2) space, while the provers in our MatMult protocols of Sections 8.4 and 8.7.1
require both space and time O(n3). As implementations of interactive proofs become faster,
the prover is likely to run out of space long before she runs out of time.
Comparison to Prior Work
It is worth comparing Theorem 8.7.2 to a well-known protocol due to Freivalds [53]. Let
D∗ denote the claimed output matrix. In Freivalds’ algorithm, the verifier stores a random
vector x ∈ Fn, and computes D∗x and ABx, accepting if and only if ABx = D∗x. Freivalds
showed that this is a valid protocol. In both Freivalds’ protocol and that of Theorem 8.7.2,
the prover runs in time T (n) +O(n2) (in the case of Freivalds’ algorithm, the O(n2) term is
0), and the verifier runs in linear or quasilinear time.
We now highlight several properties of our protocol that are not achieved by prior work.
Utility as a Primitive. A major advantage of Theorem 8.7.2 relative to prior work is its
utility as a primitive that can be used to verify more complicated computations. This is
important as many algorithms repeatedly invoke matrix multiplication as a subroutine. For
concreteness, consider the problem of computing A2
k
via repeated squaring. By iterating the
protocol of Theorem 8.7.2 k times, we obtain a valid interactive proof protocol for computing
A2
k
with communication cost n2 +O(k log(n)). The n2 term is due simply to specifying the
output A2
k
, and can often be avoided in applications – see for example the diameter protocol
described two paragraphs hence. The ith iteration of the protocol for computing A2
k
reduces a
claim about an evaluation of the multilinear extension of A2
k−i+1
to an analogous claim about
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A2
k−i
. Crucially, the prover in this protocol never needs to send the verifier the intermediate
matrices A2
k′
for k′ < k. In contrast, applying Freivalds’ algorithm to this problem would
require O(kn2) communication, as P must specify each of the intermediate matrices A2i .
The ability to avoid having P explicitly send intermediate matrices is especially important
in settings where an algorithm repeatedly invokes matrix multiplication, but the desired
output of the algorithm is smaller than the size of the matrix. In these cases, it is not
necessary for P to send any matrices; P can instead send just the desired output, and V can
use Theorem 8.7.2 to check the validity of the output with only a polylogarithmic amount
of additional communication. This is analogous to how the verifier in the GKR protocol
can check the values of the output gates of a circuit without ever seeing the values of the
“interior” gates of the circuit.
As a concrete example illustrating the power of our matrix multiplication protocol, con-
sider the fundamental problem of computing the diameter of an unweighted (possibly di-
rected) graph G on n vertices. Let A denote the adjacency matrix of G, and let I denote the
n × n identity matrix. Then it is easily verified that the diameter of G is the least positive
number d such that (A + I)dij 6= 0 for all (i, j). We therefore obtain the following natural
protocol for diameter. P sends the claimed output d to V , as well as an (i, j) such that
(A+ I)d−1ij = 0. To confirm that d is the diameter of G, it suffices for V to check two things:
first, that all entries of (A+ I)d are non-zero, and second that (A+ I)d−1ij is indeed non-zero.
The first task is accomplished by combining our matrix multiplication protocol of The-
orem 8.7.2 with our Distinct protocol from Theorem 8.4.10. Indeed, let dj denote the jth
bit in the binary representation of d. Then (A+ I)d =
∏dlog de
j (A+ I)
dj2
j
, so computing the
number of non-zero entries of (A + I)d can be computed via a sequence of O(log d) matrix
multiplications, followed by a Distinct computation. The second task, of verifying that
(A + I)d−1ij = 0, is similarly accomplished using O(log d) invocations of the matrix multi-
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plication protocol of Theorem 8.7.2 – since V is only interested in one entry of (A + I)d−1,
P need not send the matrix (A + I)d−1 in full, and the total communication here is just
polylog (n).
V ’s runtime in this diameter protocol is O(m log n), where m is the number of edges in G.
P ’s runtime in the above diameter protocol matches the best known unverifiable diameter
algorithm up to a low-order additive term [89,107], and the communication is just polylog (n).
We know of no other protocol achieving this.
As discussed above, the fact that P ’s slowdown is a low-order additive term is critical
in the many settings in which even a 2x slowdown to achieve verifiability is unacceptable.
Moreover, for a graph with n = 1 million nodes, the total communication cost of the above
protocol is on the order of KBs – in contrast, if P had to send the matrices (I + A)d or
(I +A)d−1 explicitly (as required in prior work e.g. Cormode et al. [40]), the communication
cost would be at least n2 = 1012 words, which translates to terabytes of data.
Small-Space Streaming Verifiers. In Freivalds’ algorithm, V has the store the random
vector x, which requires Ω(n) space. There are methods to reduce V ’s space usage by gener-
ating x with limited randomness: Kimbrel and Sinha [68] show how to reduce V ’s space to
O(log n), but their solution does not work if V must make a streaming pass over arbitrarily
ordered input. In Theorem 3.10.2, we extended the method of Kimbrel and Sinha to work
with a streaming verifier, but this requires P to play back the input matrices A,B in a
special order, increasing proof length to 3n2. Our protocol works with a streaming verifier
using O(log n log |F|) bits of space, and our proof length is n2 +O(log n), where the n2 term
is due to specifying AB and can be avoided in applications such as the diameter example
considered above.
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Protocol Details
The idea behind the optimization is as follows. All of our earlier circuit-checking protocols
only make use of the multilinear extension V˜i of the function Vi mapping gate labels at layer
i of the circuit to their values. In some cases, there is something to be gained by using a
higher-degree extension of Vi, and this is precisely what we exploit here. By using a higher-
degree extension of the gate values in the circuit, we are able to apply the sum-check protocol
to a polynomial that differs from the one used in Section 8.4. In particular, the polynomial
we use here avoids referencing the βsi polynomial used in Section 8.4. Details follow.
When multiplying matrices A and B such that AB = D, let A(i, j), B(i, j) and D(i, j)
denote functions from {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logn → Fq that map input (i, j) to Aij, Bij, and Dij
respectively. Let A˜, B˜, and D˜ denote their multilinear extensions.
Lemma 8.7.3. For all (p1, p2) ∈ Flogn × Flogn,
D˜(p1, p2) =
∑
p3∈{0,1}logn
A˜(p1, p3) · B˜(p3, p2)
Proof. For all (p1, p2) ∈ {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logn, the right hand side is easily seen to equal
D(p1, p2), using the fact that Dij =
∑
k AikBkj and the fact that A˜ and B˜ agree with
the functions A(i, j) and B(i, j) at all Boolean inputs. Moreover, the right hand side is a
multilinear polynomial in the variables of (p1, p2). Putting these facts together implies that
the right hand side is the unique multilinear extension of the function D(i, j).
Lemma 8.7.3 implies the following valid interactive proof protocol for matrix multiplica-
tion: P sends a matrix D∗ claimed to equal the product D = AB. V evaluates D˜∗(r1, r2)
at a random point (r1, r2) ∈ Flogn × Flogn. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, it is safe for V
to believe D∗ is as claimed, as long as D˜∗(r1, r2) = D˜(r1, r2) (formally, if D∗ 6= D, then
D˜∗(r1, r2) 6= D˜(r1, r2) with probability 1 − 2 log n/q). In order to check that D˜∗(r1, r2) =
D˜(r1, r2), we invoke a sum-check protocol on the polynomial gr1,r2(p3) = A˜(r1, p3) · B˜(p3, r2).
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V ’s final check in this protocol requires her to compute gr1,r2(r3) for a random point
r3 ∈ Flogn. V can do this by evaluating both of A˜(r1, r3) and B˜(r3, r2) with a single streaming
pass over the input, and then multiplying the results.
The prover can be made to run in time T (n) +O(n2) across all rounds of the sum-check
protocol using the V (j) arrays described in Section 8.4 to quickly evaluate A˜ and B˜ at all of
the necessary points. The V (j) arrays are initialized in round 0 to equal the input matrices
themselves, and there is no need for P to maintain an “uncorrupted” copy of the original
input (though in practice this may be desirable). Thus, the V (j) arrays can be computed
using the storage P initially devoted to the inputs, and P needs to store just O(1) additional
field elements over the course of the protocol (P does not even need to store the messages
sent by V , as P need not refer to the jth message once the array V (j) is computed). The
claimed s(n) + o(n2) space usage bound for P follows.
Remark 11. Let C be the circuit for naive matrix multiplication described in Section 8.4.
Notice that the 3 log n-variate polynomial h(p1, p2, p3) = A˜(p1, p3) · B˜(p3, p2) extends the
function Vi mapping gate labels at layer i = log n of C to their values. However, h is not the
multilinear extension of V˜i, as h has degree two in the variables of p3.
Informally, Theorem 8.7.2 cannot be said to perform “circuit checking” on C, since it is
not necessary for P to evaluate all of the gates in C; indeed, the prover in Theorem 8.7.2
can run in sub-cubic time using fast matrix multiplication algorithms. However, the use of
a low-degree extension of the gate values at layer log n of C allows one to view the protocol
of Theorem 8.7.2 as a direct extension of the circuit-checking methodology.
Remark 12. Consider the problem of computing a matrix power M2
k
via repeated squaring.
We may apply the protocol of Theorem 8.7.2 in k iterations, with the ith iteration applied to
inputs A = B = M2
k−i
. The ith iteration of this protocol reduces a claim about an evaluation
of the multilinear extension of M2
k−i+1
to an analogous claim about the multilinear extension
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of M2
k−i
at two points of the form (r1, r3), (r3, r2) ∈ Flogn×logn. We can further reduce the
claims about (r1, r3), (r3, r2) to a claim about a single point exactly as in the “Reducing to
Verification of a Single Point” step of the GKR protocol. We then move onto iteration i+ 1.
Notice in particular that the verifier only needs to observe the output matrix M2
k
and the
input matrix M to run this protocol; in particular, P does not need to explicitly send the
intermediate matrices M2
k−i
to V .
We implemented the protocol just described (our implementation is sequential). The
results are shown in Table 8.5, where the column labelled “Additional Time for P” denotes
the time required to compute P ’s prescribed messages after P has already computed the
correct answer. We report the naive matrix multiplication time both when the computation
is done using standard multiplication of 64-bit integers, as well as when the computation
is done using finite field arithmetic over the field with q = 261 − 1 elements. The reported
verifier runtime is for the O(n2 log n) time reported in Theorem 8.7.2. The verifier’s runtime
could be improved using Lemma 8.3.1 at the cost of increasing V ’s space usage to O(n),
but we did not implement this optimization. Moreover, if the input matrices are presented
in row-major order, then the observation of Vu et al. described in Remark 4 improves V ’s
runtime with no increase in space usage.
The main takeaways from Table 8.5 are that the verifier does indeed save substantial
time relative to performing matrix multiplication locally, and that the runtime of the prover
is hugely dominated by the time required simply to compute the answer.
8.8 Discussion
We believe our results substantially advance the goal of achieving a truly practical general
purpose implementation of interactive proofs. The O(logS(n)) factor overhead in the runtime
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Table 8.5: Experimental results for the n× n MatMult protocol of Theorem 8.7.2.
Implementation Problem Naive Matrix Additional Time for P V Time Rounds
Size Multiplication Time
Thm. 8.7.2 210 × 210 2.17 s over Z 0.03 s 0.67 s 11
9.11 s over Fq
Thm. 8.7.2 211 × 211 18.23 s over Z 0.13 s 2.89 s 12
73.65 s over Fq
of the prover within prior implementations of the GKR protocol is too steep a price to pay in
practice, and our refinements (formalized in Theorem 8.4.10) remove this logarithmic factor
overhead for circuits with regular wiring patterns. Our experiments demonstrate that this
protocols yields a prover that is less than 10x slower than a C++ program that simply eval-
uates the circuit, and that our protocols are highly amenable to parallelization. Exploiting
similar ideas, we have also extended the reach of prior interactive proof protocols by describ-
ing an efficient protocol (formalized in Theorem 8.6.1) for general data parallel computation,
and given a protocol for matrix multiplication in which the prover’s overhead (relative to any
unverifiable algorithm) is just a low-order additive term. The latter is a powerful primitive
for verifying the many algorithms that repeatedly invoke matrix multiplication. A major
message of our results is that the more structure that exists in a computation, the more
efficiently it can be verified, and that this structure exists in many real-world computations.
We believe two directions in particular are worthy of future work. The first direction
is to build a full-fledged system implementing our protocol for data parallel computation.
Our vision is to combine our protocol with a high-level programming language allowing the
programmer to easily specify data parallel computations, analogous to frameworks such as
MapReduce. Any such program could be automatically compiled in the manner of Vu et
al. [104] into a circuit, and our protocol could be run automatically on that circuit. The
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second direction is to further enable such a compiler to automatically take advantage of our
other refinements, which are targeted at computations that are not necessarily data parallel.
These refinements apply to a circuit on a layer-by-layer basis, so they may yield substantial
speedups in practice even if they apply only to a subset of the layers of a circuit.
248
Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this thesis, we introduced two new models, dubbed annotated data streams and stream-
ing interactive proofs, for verifiably outsourcing computations on data streams. Both models
require the verifier to process the input within the confines of the data streaming paradigm,
a restriction that fits the cloud computing setting well, as the verifier’s streaming pass over
the input can occur while uploading data to the cloud. By utilizing and extending algebraic
techniques developed in the interactive proofs literature, we developed highly efficient proto-
cols in both models and demonstrated their practicality in many cases via implementations.
We believe the general-purpose protocols developed in Chapters 7 and 8 have the largest
potential for practical impact.
9.1 Related Work
In contrast to the work on interactive proofs described in this thesis, all parallel lines
of work have focused on the development of argument systems, which are interactive proofs
that are only secure against polynomial time adversaries. That is, in an argument system
the soundness property is only required to hold against polynomial time provers; it may
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be possible for inefficient provers to convince the verifier to accept an incorrect answer.
Typically, argument systems utilize cryptographic machinery, and an inefficient prover may
be able to “break” the machinery and thereby trick the verifier.
Theoretical Work. A substantial body of theoretical work in this area has focused on the
development of protocols targeted at specific problems (e.g. [15, 19, 51]). Other theoretical
works have focused on the development of general-purpose argument systems. Several pa-
pers in this direction (e.g. [16, 33, 34, 55]) have used fully homomorphic encryption, which
unfortunately remains impractical despite substantial recent progress. Work in this category
by Chung et al. [33] focuses on streaming settings, and is therefore particularly relevant to
our work in this thesis.
Works Refining Theory Toward Implementation. In parallel with the work reported on
in this thesis, several other research groups from multiple communities have also been work-
ing toward the development of practical general-purpose protocols for verifying outsourced
computations. Interestingly, each of these approaches achieves a different tradeoff between
efficiency and applicability/functionality. The approaches are therefore likely to prove highly
complementary: users of protocols for verifiable computation will choose the most efficient
approach that has the “features” they require, and that applies to the class of computations
they are outsourcing. We give a brief summary and comparison of the existing approaches,
before briefly describing where we think this area of research should head next.
All existing work in this category is based on probabilistically-checkable proofs (PCPs).
In a PCP, the prover generates a static proof (which may be long), but the verifier only needs
to inspect a small number of randomly chosen bits of the proof in order to determine with
high probability whether or not the proof is valid. PCPs can be combined with cryptographic
machinery to yield efficient argument systems.
The first line of work that sought to develop a practical implementations of general-
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purpose argument systems is due to Setty et al. [90–92]. They begin with a base argument
system due to Ishai et al. [66] and substantially refine the theory to achieve an implementation
that approaches practicality. The most recent system developed in this line of work is called
Zaatar [92, 104]. A related line of work is due to Parno et al. [82], who describe a general-
purpose implementation, called Pinocchio, of an argument system proposed by Genarro et
al. [56]. The works of Setty et al. and Genarro et al. avoid the use of short PCPs, as these
are often a bottleneck in the development of efficient argument systems. In contrast, a line
of work by Ben-Sasson et al. [13, 14] focuses on the development of short PCPs that might
be suitable for use in practice – such PCPs can be combined with standard cryptographic
tools to yield interactive arguments.
9.2 Comparison With Other Approaches
We now provide a detailed comparison between the approach taken in this thesis and
the parallel projects on argument systems that have attempted to refine theory toward
implementation. The interactive proof protocols developed in this thesis are the most efficient
when they are applicable: in [104], Vu et al. empirically compare the protocol developed
in Chapter 7 (with some additional refinements) to Zaatar and find our approach to be
significantly more efficient for quasi-straight-line computations (e.g., programs with relatively
simple control flow), while Zaatar is appropriate for programs with more complicated control
flow. The main reasons for the superior efficiency of our approach in those cases is that it
avoids the use of cryptography (which can be expensive), and it avoids pre-processing for
regular circuits. Furthermore, for certain extremely important computations such as matrix
multiplication, our approach is unique in its ability to avoid representing the computation as
a circuit, thereby reducing the overhead for the prover to additive low-order terms. The main
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disadvantages of our approach are that it applies only to small-depth computations, since
the cost to the verifier grows linearly with circuit depth, and that we cannot support “non-
deterministic reductions”, which can be useful for turning high-level programs into small
circuits [13, 91]. Essentially, support for non-deterministic reductions means that, unlike
interactive proofs, the argument systems developed by Parno et al., Setty et al., and Ben-
Sasson et al. can be run on non-deterministic circuits – i.e., circuits that “take advice” –
without the prover having to explicitly send the advice inputs to the verifier. Very recent
implementation work by Braun et al. also exploits the ability of these argument systems to
support circuits that take advice [20].
The approach taken in Zaatar [92, 104] is the second most efficient, followed closely by
Pinocchio [82] (the underlying machinery of these two systems is closely related). Vu et
al. [104] estimate that Pinocchio is more expensive than Zaatar by small constant factors
in terms of both the prover’s runtime and the verifier’s per-instance costs, but Pinocchio
achieves several features not shared by Zaatar or the general-purpose protocols in this thesis,
including non-interactivity, public verifiability, unbounded query reuse, and support for zero-
knowledge. While more general than interactive proofs in terms of their support for non-
deterministic reductions and applicability to deep circuits, these systems inherently require
an expensive pre-processing phase for the verifier.
In contrast, the approach of Ben-Sasson et al. [13, 14] never requires expensive pre-
processing for the verifier, at least asymptotically. However, the overhead for the prover
may be substantially higher than with other approaches – at the time of writing, definite
conclusions cannot be drawn, as experimental results from this approach are not yet avail-
able.
We conclude that each of the approaches to verifiable computation being pursued thus far
achieves a different tradeoff between efficiency, expressiveness, and support for features such
252
as public verifiability and zero knowledge properties. This diversity can only be a good thing,
as users will be able to choose the approach that best suits their needs. Moreover, different
approaches have come out of different communities (including the systems, security, and
theory communities) – there has been substantial interplay of ideas across multiple groups,
and it is essential that this continue in the future if the area is to continue to progress.
9.3 Future Directions
A major message of this thesis has been that the more structure that exists in a com-
putation, the more efficiently it can be verified, and that this structure exists in real-world
computations. Fully general-purpose protocol implementations for verifiable computation
already exist and will continue to grow more efficient, but we strongly believe that such
structure must be leveraged to achieve fully practical protocols. For this reason, further ex-
ploration of the kind of structure that can be exploited for efficiency gains in protocols for
verifiable computation is an important direction for future research.
Along these lines, we view the matrix multiplication protocol of Theorem 8.7.2 as par-
ticularly encouraging, as for many problems, the main bottleneck of the protocols developed
in this thesis is in representing the outsourced computation as an arithmetic circuit (i.e.,
already the overhead due to evaluating the circuit verifiably is much smaller than the over-
head in generating the circuit in the first place). The matrix multiplication protocol of of
Theorem 8.7.2 is the most striking example we have of a protocol for an extremely important
algorithmic primitive that completely avoids representing the computation as a circuit, and
consequently reduces the overhead for the prover to low-order additive terms. It would be
very interesting to develop a larger set of primitives that can be verified with overhead that
are just additive low-order terms – this would allow any computation that can be expressed
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as a combination of these primitives to be verified with similarly tiny overhead.
The ultimate goal should be to develop protocols and build systems that can verifiably
execute general computations, but that automatically leverage structure within computa-
tions for efficiency gains. The end result may be a programming framework analogous to
MapReduce: a restricted framework that still allows for the expression of a powerful class of
computations, and automatically “extracts” the structure necessary to verify the computa-
tion efficiently. Determining the right balance between the level of generality to support and
the amount of structure to force upon computations for efficiency gains is perhaps the most
critical long-term direction for the area.
254
Bibliography
[1] List of open problems in sublinear algorithms: Problem 47. http://sublinear.info/
47.
[2] Scott Aaronson. QMA/qpoly ⊆ PSPACE/poly: De-merlinizing quantum protocols.
In IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity, pages 261–273. IEEE Computer
Society, 2006.
[3] Scott Aaronson and Avi Wigderson. Algebrization: A new barrier in complexity theory.
ACM Trans. Comput. Theory, 1(1):2:1–2:54, February 2009.
[4] Farid Ablayev. Lower bounds for one-way probabilistic communication complexity and
their application to space complexity. Theoretical Computer Science, 175(2):139–159,
1996.
[5] Dimitris Achlioptas. Database-friendly random projections. In Proceedings of the
Twentieth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database
Systems, PODS ’01, pages 274–281, New York, NY, USA, 2001. ACM.
[6] Noga Alon, Yossi Matias, and Mario Szegedy. The space complexity of approximating
the frequency moments. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 58(1):137–147,
1999.
[7] Alexandr Andoni, Robert Krauthgamer, and Krzysztof Onak. Streaming algorithms
via precision sampling. In Rafail Ostrovsky, editor, FOCS, pages 363–372. IEEE, 2011.
[8] Sanjeev Arora and Boaz Barak. Computational Complexity: A Modern Approach.
Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 1st edition, 2009.
[9] La´szlo´ Babai. Trading group theory for randomness. In Robert Sedgewick, editor,
STOC, pages 421–429. ACM, 1985.
[10] Laszlo Babai, Peter Frankl, and Janos Simon. Complexity classes in communication
complexity theory. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, SFCS ’86, pages 337–347, Washington, DC, USA, 1986. IEEE
Computer Society.
[11] Ziv Bar-Yossef, Ravi Kumar, and D. Sivakumar. Reductions in streaming algorithms,
with an application to counting triangles in graphs. In SODA, pages 623–632, 2002.
255
[12] Paul Beame and Trinh Huynh. The value of multiple read/write streams for approx-
imating frequency moments. ACM Trans. Comput. Theory, 3(2):6:1–6:22, January
2012.
[13] Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Daniel Genkin, and Eran Tromer. Fast reductions
from rams to delegatable succinct constraint satisfaction problems: extended abstract.
In Robert D. Kleinberg, editor, ITCS, pages 401–414. ACM, 2013.
[14] Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Daniel Genkin, and Eran Tromer. On the concrete
efficiency of probabilistically-checkable proofs. In Dan Boneh, Tim Roughgarden, and
Joan Feigenbaum, editors, STOC, pages 585–594. ACM, 2013.
[15] Siavosh Benabbas, Rosario Gennaro, and Yevgeniy Vahlis. Verifiable delegation of com-
putation over large datasets. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference on Advances
in Cryptology, CRYPTO’11, pages 111–131, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer-Verlag.
[16] Nir Bitansky and Alessandro Chiesa. Succinct arguments from multi-prover interactive
proofs and their efficiency benefits. In Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Ran Canetti, editors,
CRYPTO, volume 7417 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 255–272. Springer,
2012.
[17] Eric Blais, Joshua Brody, and Kevin Matulef. Property testing lower bounds via
communication complexity. Computational Complexity, 21(2):311–358, 2012.
[18] Manuel Blum, Will Evans, Peter Gemmell, Sampath Kannan, and Moni Naor. Check-
ing the correctness of memories. Algorithmica, pages 90–99, 1995.
[19] Dan Boneh and David Mandell Freeman. Homomorphic signatures for polynomial
functions. In Kenneth G. Paterson, editor, EUROCRYPT, volume 6632 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 149–168. Springer, 2011.
[20] Benjamin Braun, Ariel J. Feldman, Srinath Setty Zuocheng Ren, Andrew J. Blumberg,
and Michael Walfish. Verifying computations with state. In 24th ACM Symposium on
Operating Systems Principles, November 2013, Preprint: Cryptology ePrint 2013/356,
June 2013.
[21] Vladimir Braverman and Rafail Ostrovsky. Recursive sketching for frequency moments.
CoRR, abs/1011.2571, 2010.
[22] Vladimir Braverman and Rafail Ostrovsky. Zero-one frequency laws. In STOC ’10:
Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 281–290,
New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[23] Joshua Brody, Amit Chakrabarti, and Ranganath Kondapally. Certifying equality with
limited interaction. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC),
19:153, 2012.
[24] Harry Buhrman, David Garc´ıa-Soriano, Arie Matsliah, and Ronald de Wolf. The non-
adaptive query complexity of testing k-parities. CoRR, abs/1209.3849, 2012.
256
[25] Luciana S. Buriol, Gereon Frahling, Stefano Leonardi, Alberto Marchetti-Spaccamela,
and Christian Sohler. Counting triangles in data streams. In Proceedings of the Twenty-
Fifth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Sys-
tems, PODS ’06, pages 253–262, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[26] C. Sidney Burrus and Peter W. Eschenbacher. An in-place, in-order prime factor fft
algorithm. IEEE Transactions on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 29:806–
817, 1981.
[27] Ran Canetti, Ben Riva, and Guy N. Rothblum. Practical delegation of computation
using multiple servers. In Yan Chen, George Danezis, and Vitaly Shmatikov, editors,
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 445–454. ACM,
2011.
[28] Ran Canetti, Ben Riva, and Guy N. Rothblum. Refereed delegation of computation.
Inf. Comput., 226:16–36, 2013.
[29] Amit Chakrabarti, Graham Cormode, and Andrew McGregor. Robust lower bounds
for communication and stream computation. In STOC, pages 641–650, 2008.
[30] Amit Chakrabarti, Graham Cormode, Andrew Mcgregor, and Justin Thaler. Annota-
tions in data streams. In Submitted, 2012. A preliminary version of this paper appeared
at ICALP, pages 222–234, 2009.
[31] Amit Chakrabarti, Subhash Khot, and Xiaodong Sun. Near-optimal lower bounds on
the multi-party communication complexity of set disjointness. In IEEE Conference on
Computational Complexity, pages 107–117, 2003.
[32] Moses Charikar, Kevin Chen, and Martin Farach-Colton. Finding frequent items in
data streams. Theor. Comput. Sci., 312(1):3–15, 2004.
[33] Kai-Min Chung, Yael Tauman Kalai, Feng-Hao Liu, and Ran Raz. Memory delegation.
In Phillip Rogaway, editor, CRYPTO, volume 6841 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 151–168. Springer, 2011.
[34] Kai-Min Chung, Yael Tauman Kalai, and Salil P. Vadhan. Improved delegation of
computation using fully homomorphic encryption. In Tal Rabin, editor, CRYPTO,
volume 6223 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 483–501. Springer, 2010.
[35] Anne Condon. The complexity of space bounded interactive proof systems. Complexity
Theory: Current Research, pages 47–190, 1993.
[36] James Cooley and John Tukey. An algorithm for the machine calculation of complex
fourier series. Mathematics of Computation, 19:297–301, April 1965.
[37] Graham Cormode, Flip Korn, S. Muthukrishnan, and Divesh Srivastava. Finding
hierarchical heavy hitters in data streams. In Proceedings of the 29th International
Conference on Very Large Data Bases - Volume 29, VLDB ’03, pages 464–475. VLDB
Endowment, 2003.
257
[38] Graham Cormode, Michael Mitzenmacher, and Justin Thaler. Source code. http:
//people.seas.harvard.edu/~jthaler/code.htm, 2011.
[39] Graham Cormode, Michael Mitzenmacher, and Justin Thaler. Practical verified com-
putation with streaming interactive proofs. In Shafi Goldwasser, editor, ITCS, pages
90–112. ACM, 2012.
[40] Graham Cormode, Michael Mitzenmacher, and Justin Thaler. Streaming graph com-
putations with a helpful advisor. Algorithmica, 65(2):409–442, 2013.
[41] Graham Cormode and S. Muthukrishnan. An improved data stream summary: the
count-min sketch and its applications. J. Algorithms, 55(1):58–75, 2005.
[42] Graham Cormode, Justin Thaler, and Ke Yi. Verifying computations with streaming
interactive proofs. PVLDB, 5(1):25–36, 2011.
[43] Atish Das Sarma, Richard J. Lipton, and Danupon Nanongkai. Best-order streaming
model. In Theory and Applications of Models of Computation, pages 178–191, 2009.
[44] Anirban Dasgupta, Ravi Kumar, and D. Sivakumar. Sparse and lopsided set disjoint-
ness via information theory. In Anupam Gupta, Klaus Jansen, Jose´ D. P. Rolim, and
Rocco A. Servedio, editors, APPROX-RANDOM, volume 7408 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 517–528. Springer, 2012.
[45] M. Datar and S. Muthukrishnan. Estimating rarity and similarity over data stream
windows. In ESA, volume 2461 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 323–334,
2002.
[46] Camil Demetrescu, Irene Finocchi, and Andrea Ribichini. Trading off space for passes
in graph streaming problems. ACM Trans. Algorithms, 6(1):6:1–6:17, December 2009.
[47] David Eppstein and Michael T. Goodrich. Straggler identification in round-trip data
streams via newton’s identities and invertible bloom filters. IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data
Eng., 23(2):297–306, 2011.
[48] Joan Feigenbaum, Sampath Kannan, Andrew McGregor, Siddharth Suri, and Jian
Zhang. On graph problems in a semi-streaming model. Theoretical Computer Science,
348(2-3):207–216, 2005.
[49] Joan Feigenbaum, Sampath Kannan, Andrew McGregor, Siddharth Suri, and Jian
Zhang. Graph distances in the data-stream model. SIAM J. Comput., 38(5):1709–
1727, 2008.
[50] Joan Feigenbaum, Sampath Kannan, and Jian Zhang. Annotation and computational
geometry in the streaming model. Technical Report YALEU/DCS/TR-1249, Yale
University, 2003.
258
[51] Dario Fiore and Rosario Gennaro. Publicly verifiable delegation of large polynomials
and matrix computations, with applications. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’12, pages 501–512, New York,
NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[52] M.L. Fredman and J. Komlo´s. On the size of separating systems and perfect hash
functions. SIAM J. Algebra. Discr., 5(1):61–68, 1984.
[53] Rusins Freivalds. Fast probabilistic algorithms. In MFCS, pages 57–69, 1979.
[54] Dmitry Gavinsky and Alexander A. Sherstov. A separation of NP and coNP in mul-
tiparty communication complexity. Theory of Computing, 6(1):227–245, 2010.
[55] Rosario Gennaro, Craig Gentry, and Bryan Parno. Non-interactive verifiable comput-
ing: outsourcing computation to untrusted workers. In Proceedings of the 30th Annual
Conference on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO’10, pages 465–482, Berlin, Heidel-
berg, 2010. Springer-Verlag.
[56] Rosario Gennaro, Craig Gentry, Bryan Parno, and Mariana Raykova. Quadratic span
programs and succinct NIZKs without PCPs. In Thomas Johansson and Phong Q.
Nguyen, editors, EUROCRYPT, volume 7881 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 626–645. Springer, 2013.
[57] Shafi Goldwasser, Yael Tauman Kalai, and Guy N. Rothblum. Delegating computation:
interactive proofs for muggles. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing, STOC ’08, pages 113–122, New York, NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
[58] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Charles Rackoff. The knowledge complexity of
interactive proof systems. SIAM J. Comput., 18(1):186–208, 1989.
[59] Shafi Goldwasser and Michael Sipser. Private coins versus public coins in interactive
proof systems. In Juris Hartmanis, editor, STOC, pages 59–68. ACM, 1986.
[60] Jens Groth. Short pairing-based non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments. In
Masayuki Abe, editor, ASIACRYPT, volume 6477 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 321–340. Springer, 2010.
[61] Tom Gur and Ran Raz. Arthur-Merlin streaming complexity. In Proceedings of the 40th
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part I, ICALP
’13, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013. Springer-Verlag.
[62] Sariel Har-Peled, Piotr Indyk, and Rajeev Motwani. Approximate nearest neighbor:
Towards removing the curse of dimensionality. Theory of Computing, 8(14):321–350,
2012.
[63] Johan H˚astad and Avi Wigderson. The randomized communication complexity of set
disjointness. Theory of Computing, 3(1):211–219, 2007.
259
[64] Monika R. Henzinger, Prabhakar Raghavan, and Sridhar Rajagopalan. Computing on
data streams. External memory algorithms, pages 107–118, 1999.
[65] Jared Hoberock and Nathan Bell. Thrust: A parallel template library, 2011. Version
1.3.0.
[66] Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, and Rafail Ostrovsky. Efficient arguments without short
PCPs. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual IEEE Conference on Compu-
tational Complexity, pages 278–291, Washington, DC, USA, 2007. IEEE Computer
Society.
[67] Hossein Jowhari and Mohammad Ghodsi. New streaming algorithms for counting
triangles in graphs. In Lusheng Wang, editor, COCOON, volume 3595 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 710–716. Springer, 2005.
[68] Tracy Kimbrel and Rakesh K. Sinha. A probabilistic algorithm for verifying matrix
products using o(n2) time and log2 n+o(1) random bits. Inf. Process. Lett., 45(2):107–
110, 1993.
[69] Valerie King. A simpler minimum spanning tree verification algorithm. Algorithmica,
18(2):263–270, 1997.
[70] Hartmut Klauck. Rectangle size bounds and threshold covers in communication com-
plexity. In IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity, pages 118–134, 2003.
[71] Hartmut Klauck. On Arthur Merlin games in communication complexity. In IEEE
Conference on Computational Complexity, pages 189–199. IEEE Computer Society,
2011.
[72] Hartmut Klauck and Ved Prakash. Streaming computations with a loquacious prover.
In Robert D. Kleinberg, editor, ITCS, pages 305–320. ACM, 2013.
[73] Jon Kleinberg and Eva Tardos. Algorithm Design. 2005.
[74] Feifei Li, Ke Yi, Marios Hadjieleftheriou, and George Kollios. Proof-infused streams:
enabling authentication of sliding window queries on streams. In Proceedings of the
33rd International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, VLDB ’07, pages 147–158.
VLDB Endowment, 2007.
[75] Helger Lipmaa. Progression-free sets and sublinear pairing-based non-interactive zero-
knowledge arguments. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Theory
of Cryptography, TCC’12, pages 169–189, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012. Springer-Verlag.
[76] Richard J. Lipton. Efficient checking of computations. In STACS, pages 207–215, 1990.
[77] Carsten Lund, Lance Fortnow, Howard Karloff, and Noam Nisan. Algebraic methods
for interactive proof systems. J. ACM, 39:859–868, October 1992.
260
[78] Dahlia Malkhi, Noam Nisan, Benny Pinkas, and Yaron Sella. Fairplay – a secure two-
party computation system. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on USENIX Security
Symposium - Volume 13, SSYM’04, pages 20–20, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2004. USENIX
Association.
[79] Yaron Minsky, Ari Trachtenberg, and Richard Zippel. Set reconciliation with nearly
optimal communication complexity. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
49(9):2213–2218, 2003.
[80] S. Muthukrishnan. Data Streams: Algorithms And Applications. Foundations and
Trends in Theoretical Computer Science. Now Publishers Incorporated, 2005.
[81] Michael Nu¨sken and Martin Ziegler. Fast multipoint evaluation of bivariate polynomi-
als. In ESA, pages 544–555, 2004.
[82] Bryan Parno, Craig Gentry, Jon Howell, and Mariana Raykova. Pinocchio: Nearly
practical verifiable computation. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2013.
[83] Ran Raz and Amir Shpilka. On the power of quantum proofs. In IEEE Conference on
Computational Complexity, pages 260–274. IEEE Computer Society, 2004.
[84] Alexander Razborov. On the distributional complexity of disjontness. In ICALP, pages
249–253, 1990.
[85] Guy Rothblum. Delegating computation reliably : paradigms and constructions. PhD
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009.
[86] Mert Sag˘lam and Gabor Tardos. On the communication complexity of sparse set
disjointness and exists-equal problems. CoRR, abs/1209.3849, 2013.
[87] A. Schrijver. Theory of Linear and Integer Programming. Wiley Series in Discrete
Mathematics & Optimization. John Wiley & Sons, 1998.
[88] J. T. Schwartz. Fast probabilistic algorithms for verification of polynomial identities.
J. ACM, 27(4):701–717, October 1980.
[89] Raimund Seidel. On the all-pairs-shortest-path problem in unweighted undirected
graphs. J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 51(3):400–403, December 1995.
[90] Srinath Setty, Richard McPherson, Andrew J. Blumberg, and Michael Walfish. Making
argument systems for outsourced computation practical (sometimes). In NDSS, 2012.
[91] Srinath Setty, Victor Vu, Nikhil Panpalia, Benjamin Braun, Andrew J. Blumberg,
and Michael Walfish. Taking proof-based verified computation a few steps closer to
practicality. In Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium,
Security’12, pages 12–12, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2012. USENIX Association.
261
[92] Srinath T. V. Setty, Benjamin Braun, Victor Vu, Andrew J. Blumberg, Bryan Parno,
and Michael Walfish. Resolving the conflict between generality and plausibility in veri-
fied computation. In Zdenek Hanza´lek, Hermann Ha¨rtig, Miguel Castro, and M. Frans
Kaashoek, editors, EuroSys, pages 71–84. ACM, 2013.
[93] Adi Shamir. IP = PSPACE. J. ACM, 39:869–877, October 1992.
[94] Alexander A. Sherstov. The multiparty communication complexity of set disjointness.
In Howard J. Karloff and Toniann Pitassi, editors, STOC, pages 525–548. ACM, 2012.
[95] Alexander A. Sherstov. Communication lower bounds using directional derivatives. In
Dan Boneh, Tim Roughgarden, and Joan Feigenbaum, editors, STOC, pages 921–930.
ACM, 2013.
[96] Justin Thaler. Source code. http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~jthaler/Tcode.
htm, 2011.
[97] Justin Thaler. Time-optimal interactive proofs for circuit evaluation. In Proceedings
of the 33rd Annual Conference on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO’13, Berlin, Hei-
delberg, 2013. Springer-Verlag.
[98] Justin Thaler, Mike Roberts, Michael Mitzenmacher, and Hanspeter Pfister. Source
code. http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~jthaler/TRMPcode.htm, 2012.
[99] Justin Thaler, Mike Roberts, Michael Mitzenmacher, and Hanspeter Pfister. Verifying
computations with massively parallel interactive proofs. In HotCloud, 2012.
[100] Mikkel Thorup. Even strongly universal hashing is pretty fast. In Proceedings of the
Eleventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete algorithms, SODA, pages 496–
497, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2000. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
[101] Mikkel Thorup and Yin Zhang. Tabulation based 4-universal hashing with applications
to second moment estimation. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA ’04, pages 615–624, Philadelphia, PA, USA,
2004. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
[102] Peter A. Tucker, David Maier, Lois M. L. Delcambre, Tim Sheard, Jennifer Widom,
and Mark P. Jones. Punctuated data streams, 2005.
[103] Victor Vu, Srinath Setty, Andrew J. Blumberg, and M. Walfish. Personal communica-
tion. January 2013.
[104] Victor Vu, Srinath Setty, Andrew J. Blumberg, and Michael Walfish. A hybrid archi-
tecture for interactive verifiable computation. In IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, 2013.
[105] Mihalis Yannakakis. Expressing combinatorial optimization problems by linear pro-
grams. J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 43(3):441–466, 1991.
262
[106] Ke Yi, Feifei Li, Marios Hadjieleftheriou, George Kollios, and Divesh Srivastava. Ran-
domized synopses for query assurance on data streams. In Gustavo Alonso, Jose´ A.
Blakeley, and Arbee L. P. Chen, editors, ICDE, pages 416–425. IEEE, 2008.
[107] Raphael Yuster. Computing the diameter polynomially faster than APSP. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1011.6181, 2010.
[108] Mariano Zelke. Weighted matching in the semi-streaming model. In STACS, pages
669–680, 2008.
[109] Richard Zippel. Probabilistic algorithms for sparse polynomials. In Edward W. Ng,
editor, EUROSAM, volume 72 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 216–226.
Springer, 1979.
263
Appendix A
Deferred Proofs from Chapter 8
A.1 Proof of Theorem 8.4.10
Proof. Consider layer i of the circuit C. Since in
(i)
1 and in
(i)
2 are regular, there is a subset of
input bits Si ⊆ [v] with |Si| = ci for some constant ci such that each input bit in [v]\S affects
O(1) of the output bits of in
(i)
1 and in
(i)
2 . Number the input variables so that the numbers
{1, . . . , ci} correspond to variables in Si.
Let ρ ∈ {0, 1}ci be an assignment to the variables in S, and let Iρ : {0, 1}si → {0, 1}
denote the indicator function for ρ. For example, if ci = 3 and ρ = (1, 0, 1), then Iρ(x) = 1 if
x1 = 1, x2 = 0, and x3 = 1, and Iρ(x) = 0 otherwise. Let I˜ρ denote the multilinear extension
of Iρ. In the previous example, I˜ρ = x1(1 − x2)x3. Finally, let in(i)1,ρ and in(i)2,ρ denote the
functions in
(i)
1 and in
(i)
2 with the variables in Si fixed to the assignment ρ, and for k ∈ {1, 2},
let bρ,k,j denote the jth output bit of in
(i)
k,ρ.
By regularity, for each assignment ρ ∈ {0, 1}ci to the variables in Si, the jth output
bit bρ,k,j of in
k
ρ depends on only one variable xq(ρ,k,j) ∈ [si] \ Si for some function q(ρ, k, j).
Let b˜ρ,k,j(xq(ρ,k,j)) : F → F denote the multilinear extension of the function bρ,k,j(xq(ρ,k,j)) :
{0, 1} → {0, 1}. If bρ,k,j is not identically 0 or identically 1, then either b˜ρ,k,j(xq(ρ,k,j)) = xq(ρ,k,j)
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or b˜ρ,k,j = 1− xq(ρ,k,j).
For any ρ ∈ {0, 1}si , define i˜n(i)1,ρ to be the concatenation of the b˜ρ,1,j functions for all
j ∈ [si+1]. Under this definition, i˜n(i)1,ρ is a collection of si+1 linear polynomials, where each
of the polynomials depends on a single variable, and we may view i˜n
(i)
1,ρ as a single function
mapping Fsi to Fsi+1 . We define i˜n(i)2,ρ and ˜type
(i)
ρ analogously to i˜n1.
Now let
W (i)(p) =
∑
ρ∈L(i)
I˜ρ(p) ·
(
˜type
(i)
ρ (p) · V˜i+1
(
i˜n
(i)
1,ρ (p)
)
· V˜i+1
(
i˜n
(i)
2,ρ (p)
)
+
(
1− ˜typeρ(i) (p)
)(
V˜i+1
(
i˜n
(i)
1,ρ (p)
)
+ V˜i+1
(
i˜n
(i)
2,ρ (p)
)))
.
It is easily checked that for all p ∈ {0, 1}si , Vi (p) = W (i)(p). Lemma 8.4.1 then implies
that V˜i(z) =
∑
p∈{0,1}si g
(i)
z (p), where g
(i)
z (p) = βsi(z, p) ·W (i)(p). Our protocol follows pre-
cisely the description of Section 8.4.1, with P and V applying the sum-check protocol to the
polynomial g
(i)
z at iteration i.
Communication Costs and Costs to V. Notice that our polynomial g(i)z (p) = β(z, p) ·
W (i)(p) has degree O(1) in each variable. Indeed, β(z, p) has degree 1 in each variable.
Moreover, W (i)(p) is a sum of polynomials that each have degree O(1) in each variable, and
hence W (i)(p) itself has degree O(1) in each variable.
This latter fact can be seen by observing that for each assignment ρ ∈ {0, 1}ci to the
variables in Si, it holds that I˜ρ(p), ˜type(i)ρ (p), V˜i+1
(
i˜n
(i)
1,ρ (p)
)
and V˜i+1
(
i˜n
(i)
2,ρ (p)
)
all have
constant degree in each variable. That V˜i+1
(
i˜n
(i)
1,ρ (p)
)
and V˜i+1
(
i˜n
(i)
2,ρ (p)
)
have constant
degree in each variable follows from the facts that V˜i+1 is a multilinear polynomial, and that
each input variable j ∈ [si] \ Si affects at most a constant number of outputs for i˜n1,ρ and
i˜n2,ρ by Property 1 of Definition 8.4.8.
Since g
(i)
z (p) has degree O(1) in each variable, the claimed communication cost and the
costs to the verifier follow immediately by summing the corresponding costs of the sum-check
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protocols over all iterations i ∈ {1, . . . , d(n)} (see Section 2.3).
Time Cost for P. It remains to demonstrate how P can compute her prescribed messages
when applying the sum-check protocol to the polynomial g
(i)
z in time O(Si + Si+1). It will
follow that P ’s runtime over all d(n) invocations of the sum-check protocol is O(∑d(n)i=1 Si) =
O(S(n)).
As in our analysis of Section 8.4.4, it suffices to show how P can quickly evaluate g(i)z at
all points in S(j), where S(j) consists of all points of the form p = (r1, . . . , rj−1, t, pj+1, . . . , psi)
with t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,degj(g(i)z )} and (pj+1, . . . , psi) ∈ {0, 1}si−j. As g(i)z (p) = βsi(z, p) ·W (i)(p), it
suffices for P to evaluate βsi(z, ·) and W (·) at all such points p. The βsi(z, ·) computations
can be done in O(Si) total time across all iterations of the sum-check protocol, exactly as in
Section 8.4.4.
To see how P can efficiently evaluate all of the W (i)(p) values efficiently, notice that for
any fixed point p ∈ Fsi , W (i)(p) can be computed efficiently given ˜type(i)ρ (p), V˜i+1(i˜n1,ρ(p)),
and V˜i+1(i˜n2,ρ(p)) for all ρ ∈ {0, 1}ci . As |Si| = ci = O(1), modulo a constant-factor blowup
in runtime it suffices to explain how to perform these evaluations for a fixed restriction
ρ ∈ {0, 1}ci to the variables in Si.
It is easy to see that ˜type
(i)
ρ (p) can be evaluated in constant time, since this function
depends on only 1 input variable xq(ρ,3,1). All that remains is to show how P can evaluate
V˜i+1(i˜n1,ρ(p)) quickly; the case for V˜i+1(i˜n2,ρ(p)) is similar.
To this end, we follow the approach of Section 8.4.4.
Pre-processing. P will begin by computing an array V (0), which is simply defined to be
the vector of gate values at layer i + 1 i.e., identifying a number 0 < j < Si+1 with its
binary representation in {0, 1}si+1 , P sets V (0)[(j1, . . . , jsi+1)] = Vi+1(j1, . . . , jsi+1) for each
(j1, . . . , jsi+1) ∈ {0, 1}si+1 . The right hand side of this equation is simply the value of the jth
gate at layer i + 1 of C. So P can fill in the array V (0) when she evaluates the circuit C,
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before receiving any messages from V .
Overview of Online Processing. Assume without loss of generality that the output bits of
i˜n1,ρ(p) are labelled in increasing order of the input bits they are affected by. So for example
if p1 affects 2 output bits of i˜n1,ρ and p2 affects 3 output bits, then the bits affected by p1
are labelled 1 and 2 respectively, while the bits affected by p2 are labelled 3, 4, and 5.
In round j of of the sum-check protocol, P needs to evaluate the polynomial V˜i+1 at
the O(2si+1−j) points in the sets i˜n1,ρ(S(j)) and i˜n2,ρ(S(j)). P will do this using the help of
intermediate arrays as follows.
Efficiently Constructing V (j) Arrays. Let aj−1 denote the total number of output bits affected
by the first j−1 input variables. Inductively, assume P has computed in the previous round an
array V (j−1) of length 2si+1−aj−1 , such that for each p = (paj−1+1, . . . , psi+1) ∈ {0, 1}si+1−aj−1 ,
the pth entry of V (j−1) equals
V (j−1)[(paj−1+1, . . . , psi+1)] =∑
(c1,...,caj−1 )∈{0,1}aj−1
Vi+1(c1, . . . , caj−1 , paj−1+1, . . . , psi+1) ·
j−1∏
k=1
χck(b˜ρ,1,k(rq(ρ,1,k))),
where recall that q(ρ, 1, k) is the input bit that output bit k of in1,ρ depends on. As the base
case, we explained how P can fill in V (0) in the process of evaluating the circuit C.
Let x1, . . . , xsi denote the input variables to in1, and let b1, . . . , bsi+1 denote the outputs
of in1. Intuitively, at the end of round j of the sum-check protocol, P must “bind” input
variable xj to value rj ∈ F. This has the effect of binding the output variables affected by xj,
since each such output variable depends only on xj. For illustration, suppose the variable x1
affects output variable b1; specifically, suppose that b1 = 1− x1. Then binding x1 to value r1
has the effect of binding b1 to value 1− r1. V (j) is obtained from V (j−1) by taking this into
account. We formalize this as follows.
Assume that variable xj affects only one output variable bρ,1,aj−1+1, and thus aj = aj−1+1;
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if this is not the case, we can compute V (j) by applying the following update once for each
output variable affected by xj. Observe that P can compute V (j) given V (j−1) in O(2si+1−aj−1)
time using the following recurrence:
V (j)[(paj+1, . . . , psi+1)] =
V (j−1)[(0, paj+1, . . . , psi+1)] · χ0(b˜ρ,1,aj (rj)) + V (j−1)[(1, paj+1, . . . , psi+1)] · χ1(b˜ρ,1,aj (rj)).
Thus, at the end of round j of the sum-check protocol, when V sends P the value rj, P can
compute V (j) from V (j−1) in O(2si+1−aj−1) time.
Using the V (j) Arrays. We now show how to use the array V (j−1) to evaluate V˜i+1(i˜n1,ρ(p))
in O(1) time for any point p of the form p=(r1, . . . , rj−1, t, pj+1, . . . , psi) with (pj+1, . . . , psi) ∈
{0, 1}si−j. In order to ease notation in the following derivation, we make the simplifying
assumption that b˜ρ,1,k(xq(ρ,1,k)) = xq(ρ,1,k) for all output bits k ∈ [si+1]. The derivation when
this assumption does not hold is similar.
We exploit the following sequence of equalities:
V˜i+1(i˜n1,ρ(p)) =
∑
c∈{0,1}si+1
Vi+1(c)χc(i˜n1,ρ(p))
=
∑
(c1,...,caj−1 )∈{0,1}aj−1
∑
(caj−1+1,...,csi+1 )∈{0,1}si+1−aj−1
Vi+1(c)χc(i˜n1,ρ(p))
=
∑
(c1,...,caj−1 )∈{0,1}aj−1
∑
(caj−1+1,...,csi+1 )∈{0,1}si+1−aj−1
Vi+1(c)
(
aj−1∏
k=1
χck(b˜ρ,1,k(rq(ρ,1,k)))
)
·
 aj∏
k=aj−1+1
χck(b˜ρ,1,k(t))
 si+1∏
k=aj+1
χck(pq(ρ,1,k))

=
∑
(c1,...,caj )∈{0,1}aj
Vi+1(cj+1, . . . , caj , pq(ρ,1,aj+1), . . . , pq(ρ,1,sj+1))
(
aj−1∏
k=1
χck(rk)
)
·
 aj∏
k=aj−1+1
χck(t)

=
∑
(paj−1+1,...,paj )∈{0,1}aj−aj−1
V (j−1)[(pq(ρ,1,aj−1+1), . . . , pq(ρ,1,sj+1))] ·
aj∏
k=aj−1+1
χpk(t).
Here, the first equality holds by Equation (8.3). The third holds by definition of the functions
χc and i˜n1, as well as the assumption that b˜ρ,1,k(xq(ρ,1,k)) = xq(ρ,1,k) for all k ∈ [si+1]. The
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fourth holds because for Boolean values ck, pq(ρ,1,k) ∈ {0, 1}, χck(pq(ρ,1,k)) = 1 if ck = pq(ρ,1,k),
and χck(pq(ρ,1,k)) = 0 otherwise. The final equality holds by definition of the array V
(j−1).
The final expression above can be computed with O(2aj−aj−1) time given the array V (j−1).
Since aj − aj−1 is constant by Property 1 of Definition 8.4.8, O(2aj−aj−1) = O(1).
Putting Things Together. In round j of the sum-check protocol, P uses the array V (j−1) to
evaluate V˜i+1(i˜n1(p)) for all O(2
si−j) points p ∈ S(j), which requires constant time per point
and hence O(2si−j) time over all points in S(j). At the end of round j, V sends P the value
rj, and P computes V (j) from V (j−1) in O(2si+1−aj−1) time. By ordering input variables in
such a way that aj > aj−1 for all j, we ensure that in total across all rounds of the sum-
check protocol, P spends O(∑sij=1 2si−j + 2si+1−j) = O(2si + 2si+1) time to evaluate V˜i+1 at
the relevant points. When combined with our O(2si)-time algorithm for computing all the
relevant β(z, p) values, we see that P takes O(2si + 2si+1) = O(Si + Si+1) time to run the
entire sum-check protocol for iteration i of our circuit-checking protocol.
Reducing to Verification of a Single Point. After executing the sum-check protocol
at layer i as described above, V is left with a claim about V˜i+1(ω1) and V˜i+1(ω2) from two
points ω1, ω2 ∈ Fsi+1 . If i is a layer for which in(i)1 and in(i)2 are similar (see Definition 8.4.9), we
run the reducing to verification of a single point phase exactly as in the basic GKR protocol.
This requires P to send V˜i+1(`(t)) for a canonical line `(t) that passes through the points
ω1 and ω2. Because in
(i)
1 and in
(i)
2 are similar, it is easily seen that V˜i+1(`(t)) is a univariate
polynomial of constant degree. Hence P can specify V˜i+1(`(t)) by sending V˜i+1(`(tj)) for O(1)
many points tj ∈ F. Using the method of Lemma 8.3.1, P can evaluate V˜i+1 at each point
`(tj) in O(Si+1) time, and hence can perform all V˜i+1(`(tj)) evaluations in O(Si+1) time in
total.
Let c = O(1) be the number of layers i for which in
(i)
1 and in
(i)
2 are not similar. At each
such layer i, we skip the “reducing to verification at a single point” phase of the protocol.
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Each time we do this, it doubles the number of points ω ∈ Fsi+1 that must be considered
at the next iteration. However, we only skip the “reducing to verification at a single point”
phase c times, and thus at all layers i of the circuit, V needs to check V˜i(ωj) for at most
2c = O(1) points. This affects P ’s and V ’s runtime by at most a 2c = O(1) factor, and the
O(S) time bound for P , and the O(n log n+ d(n) logS(n)) time bound for V follow.
A.2 Analysis for Pattern Matching
Let C be the circuit for pattern matching described in Section 8.4.5. Our goal in this
appendix is to handle the layer of the circuit adjacent to the input layer. Call this layer `.
Layer ` computes ti+k − pk for each pair (i, k) ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} × {0, . . . , q − 1}. We want to
show how to use a sum-check protocol to reduce a claim about the value of V˜`(z) for some
z ∈ Fs` to a claim about V˜`+1(r) for some r ∈ Fs`+1 , while ensuring that P runs in time
O(S`) = O(nm).
The idea underlying our analysis here is the following. The reason Theorem 8.4.10 does
not apply to layer ` is that the first in-neighbor of a gate with label
p = (i1, . . . , ilogn, k1, . . . , klogm) ∈ {0, 1}logn+logm
has label equal to the binary representation of the integer i+k, and a single bit ik can affect
many bits in the binary representation of i+k (likewise, each bit in the binary representation
of i + k may be affected by many bits in the binary representation of i and k). In order to
ensure that each bit of p affects only a single bit of y = in
(`)
1 (p), we introduce log n dummy
variables (c1, . . . , clogn) and force the jth dummy variable cj to have value equal to the jth
carry bit when adding numbers i and k in binary. Now each bit of p affects only one output
bit, and each output bit yj is only affected by at most three “input bits”: ij, kj, and cj if
j ≤ logm, and just ij and cj if j > logm.
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To this end, let φ : {0, 1}4 → {0, 1} be the function that evaluates to 1 on input
(i1, k1, c0, c1) if and only if c1 = 0 and i1 + k1 + c0 < 2 or c1 = 1 and i + k + c0 ≥ 2.
That is, φ outputs 1 if and only if c1 is equal to the carry bit when adding i1, k1, and c0. Let
φ˜ be the multilinear extension of φ. Notice φ˜ can be evaluated at any point r ∈ F4 in O(1)
time.
Now let (i, k, c) denote a vector in Flogn × Flogm × Flogn, and define
Φ(i, k, c) :=
logn∏
j=1
φ˜(ij, kj, cj−1, cj),
where it is understood that c−1 = 0 and kj = 0 for j > logm.
For any Boolean vector (i, k, c) ∈ {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logm × {0, 1}logn, it is easily verified
that Φ(i, k, c) = 1 if and only if for all j, cj equals the jth carry bit when adding numbers i
and k in binary.
Finally, let γ : {0, 1}3 → {0, 1} be the function that evaluates to 1 on input (i1, k1, c1) if
and only if i1 + k1 + c1 = 1 mod 2. Let γ˜ be the multilinear extension of γ. Notice γ˜ can be
evaluated at any point r ∈ F3 in O(1) time.
Now consider the following log n+ logm-variate polynomial over the field F:
W (`)(i, k) =
∑
(c1,...,clogn)∈{0,1}logn
Φ(i, k, c)·
(
T˜ (γ˜(i1 + k1 + c0), . . . , γ˜(ilogn + klogn + clogn−1))− P˜ (k1, . . . , klogm)
)
,
where again it is understood that c−1 = 0 and kj = 0 for j > logm. Here, T˜ is the
multilinear extension of the input T , viewed as a function from {0, 1}logn to [n], and P˜ is
the multilinear extension of the input pattern P , viewed as a function from {0, 1}logm to [n].
It can be seen that for all Boolean vectors (i, k) = {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logm,
W (`)(i, k) = V`(i, k). This is because for any (i, k) ∈ {0, 1}logn × {0, 1}logm, Φ(i, k, c) will be
zero for all c except the c consisting of the correct carry bits for i and k, and for this input
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c, T˜ (γ˜(i1 + k1 + c0), . . . , γ˜(ilogn + klogn + clogn−1)) will equal T (i+ k) when interpreting i, k
as integers in the natural way.
Lemma 8.4.1 then implies that for all z ∈ Flogn+logm,
V˜`(z) =
∑
(i,k)∈{0,1}logn×{0,1}logm
βlogn+logm(z, (i, k)) ·W (`)(i, k)
=
∑
(i,k,c)∈{0,1}logn×{0,1}logm×{0,1}logn
βlogn+logm(z, (i, k))·
Φ(i, k, c) ·
(
T˜ (γ˜(i1 + k1 + c0), . . . , γ˜(ilogn + klogn + clogn−1))− P˜ (j1, . . . , jlogm)
)
.
Therefore, in order to reduce a claim about V˜`(z) to a claim about T˜ (r1) and P˜ (r2) for
random vectors r1 ∈ Flogn and r2 ∈ Flogm, it suffices to apply the sum-check protocol to the
2 log n+ logm-variate polynomial
gz(i, k, c) = βlogn+logm(z, (i, k)) · Φ(i, k, c)·(
T˜ (γ˜(i1 + k1 + c0), . . . , γ˜(ilogn + klogn + clogn−1))− P˜ (j1, . . . , jlogm)
)
.
It remains to show how to extend the techniques underlying Theorem 8.4.10 to allow P to
compute all of the required messages in this sum-check protocol in O(nm) time. For brevity,
we restrict ourselves to a sketch of the techniques.
The first obvious complication is that the sum defining P ’s message in a given round of
the sum-check protocol has as many as 22 logn+logm = Ω(mn2) > nm terms. Fortunately, the
Φ polynomial ensures that almost all of these terms are zero: when considering any Boolean
setting of the variables ij, kj, and cj−1, the only setting of cj that P must consider is the
one corresponding to the carry bit of ij + kj + cj−1 i.e., the unique setting of cj such that
φ(ij, kj, cj−1, cj) = 1. This ensures that at round 3j, 3j + 1, and 3j + 2 of the sum-check
protocol applied to gz, P must only evaluate gz at O(2logn+logm−j) terms, which is falling
geometrically quickly with j.
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We now turn to explaining how P can evaluate gz at all necessary points in round 3j,
3j + 1 and 3j + 2 in total time O(2logn+logm−j). To accomplish this, it is sufficient for P to
evaluate βlogn+logm at the necessary points, as well as Φ, T˜ , and P˜ at the necessary points.
The βlogn+logm evaluations are handled exactly as in Theorem 8.4.10 i.e., by using C
(j) arrays
(but these arrays only get updated every time a variable ij or kj gets bound within the sum-
check protocol; no update is necessary when a variable cj gets bound). The P˜ evaluations are
also handled exactly as in Theorem 8.4.10, using V (j) arrays that only need to be updated
when a variable kj gets bound.
The T˜ evaluations require some additional explanation on top of the analysis of Theorem
8.4.10. We want P to be able to use V (j) arrays as in Theorem 8.4.10 to evaluate T˜ at the
necessary points in constant time per point, but we need to make sure that P can compute
array V (j) from V (j−1) in time that falls geometrically quickly with j. In order to do this, it
is essential to choose a specific ordering for the sum in the sum-check protocol.
Specifically, we write the sum as:∑
i1
∑
k1
∑
c1
∑
i2
∑
k2
∑
c2
· · ·
∑
ilogn
∑
clogn
gz(i, k, c).
This ensures that e.g. (i1, k1, c1) are the first three variables in the sum-check protocol to
become bound to random values in F. The reason we must do this is so that every 3 rounds,
another value γ˜(ij+kj+cj−1) feeding into T˜ becomes bound to a specific value (and moreover
the outputs of γ˜(ij′ +kj′ + cj′−1) are unaffected by the bound variables for all j′ > j). This is
precisely the property we exploited in the protocol of Theorem 8.4.10 to ensure that the V (j)
arrays there halved in size every round, and that V (j) could be computed from V (j−1) in time
proportional to its size. So we can use V (j) arrays to efficiently perform the T˜ evaluations,
updating the arrays every time another value γ˜(ij +kj + cj−1) feeding into T˜ becomes bound
to a specific value.
Finally, the Φ evaluations can be handled as follows. Consider for simplicity round 3j of
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the protocol. Recall that P only needs to evaluate Φ at points for which φj′(ij′ , kj′ , cj′−1, cj′) =
1 for all j′ > j. Thus, for all j′ > j, φj′ does not affect the product defining Φ. So in order
to evaluate Φ at the relevant points, it suffices for P to evaluate the φj′s for j′ ≤ j. Now
at round 3j of the protocol, all triples (ij′ , kj′ , cj′) for j
′ < j are already bound, say to the
values (r
(i)
j′ , r
(k)
j′ , r
(c)
j′ ), and hence all the φj′ functions for j
′ < j are themselves already bound
to specific values. So in order to quickly determine the contribution of the φj′s for j
′ < j to
the product defining Φ, it suffices for P to maintain the quantity ∏j′<j φj′(r(i)j′ , r(k)j′ , r(c)j′ ) over
the course of the protocol, which takes just O(log n) time in total. Finally, the contribution
of φj to the product defining Φ can be computed in constant time per point. This completes
the proof that Φ can be evaluated by P at all of the necessary points in O(1) time per point
over all rounds of the sum-check protocol, and completes the proof of the theorem.
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